xpm/node_modules/@sigstore/protobuf-specs/dist/__generated__/sigstore_trustroot.d.ts

The xPack project manager command line tool

import { DistinguishedName, HashAlgorithm, LogId, PublicKey, TimeRange, X509CertificateChain } from "./sigstore_common";
/**
 * TransparencyLogInstance describes the immutable parameters from a
 * transparency log.
 * See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162.html#name-log-parameters
 * for more details.
 * The included parameters are the minimal set required to identify a log,
 * and verify an inclusion proof/promise.
 */
export interface TransparencyLogInstance {
    /** The base URL at which can be used to URLs for the client. */
    baseUrl: string;
    /** The hash algorithm used for the Merkle Tree. */
    hashAlgorithm: HashAlgorithm;
    /**
     * The public key used to verify signatures generated by the log.
     * This attribute contains the signature algorithm used by the log.
     */
    publicKey: PublicKey | undefined;
    /**
     * The unique identifier for this transparency log.
     * Represented as the SHA-256 hash of the log's public key,
     * calculated over the DER encoding of the key represented as
     * SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
     * See https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6962#section-3.2
     */
    logId: LogId | undefined;
    /**
     * The checkpoint key identifier for the log used in a checkpoint.
     * Optional, not provided for logs that do not generate checkpoints.
     * For logs that do generate checkpoints, if not set, assume
     * log_id equals checkpoint_key_id.
     * Follows the specification described here
     * for ECDSA and Ed25519 signatures:
     * https://github.com/C2SP/C2SP/blob/main/signed-note.md#signatures
     * For RSA signatures, the key ID will match the ECDSA format, the
     * hashed DER-encoded SPKI public key. Publicly witnessed logs MUST NOT
     * use RSA-signed checkpoints, since witnesses do not support
     * RSA signatures.
     * This is provided for convenience. Clients can also calculate the
     * checkpoint key ID given the log's public key.
     * SHOULD be set for logs generating Ed25519 signatures.
     * SHOULD be 4 bytes long, as a truncated hash.
     */
    checkpointKeyId: LogId | undefined;
}
/**
 * CertificateAuthority enlists the information required to identify which
 * CA to use and perform signature verification.
 */
export interface CertificateAuthority {
    /**
     * The root certificate MUST be self-signed, and so the subject and
     * issuer are the same.
     */
    subject: DistinguishedName | undefined;
    /**
     * The URI identifies the certificate authority.
     *
     * It is RECOMMENDED that the URI is the base URL for the certificate
     * authority, that can be provided to any SDK/client provided
     * by the certificate authority to interact with the certificate
     * authority.
     */
    uri: string;
    /**
     * The certificate chain for this CA. The last certificate in the chain
     * MUST be the trust anchor. The trust anchor MAY be a self-signed root
     * CA certificate or MAY be an intermediate CA certificate.
     */
    certChain: X509CertificateChain | undefined;
    /**
     * The time the *entire* chain was valid. This is at max the
     * longest interval when *all* certificates in the chain were valid,
     * but it MAY be shorter. Clients MUST check timestamps against *both*
     * the `valid_for` time range *and* the entire certificate chain.
     *
     * The TimeRange should be considered valid *inclusive* of the
     * endpoints.
     */
    validFor: TimeRange | undefined;
}
/**
 * TrustedRoot describes the client's complete set of trusted entities.
 * How the TrustedRoot is populated is not specified, but can be a
 * combination of many sources such as TUF repositories, files on disk etc.
 *
 * The TrustedRoot is not meant to be used for any artifact verification, only
 * to capture the complete/global set of trusted verification materials.
 * When verifying an artifact, based on the artifact and policies, a selection
 * of keys/authorities are expected to be extracted and provided to the
 * verification function. This way the set of keys/authorities can be kept to
 * a minimal set by the policy to gain better control over what signatures
 * that are allowed.
 *
 * The embedded transparency logs, CT logs, CAs and TSAs MUST include any
 * previously used instance -- otherwise signatures made in the past cannot
 * be verified.
 *
 * All the listed instances SHOULD be sorted by the 'valid_for' in ascending
 * order, that is, the oldest instance first. Only the last instance is
 * allowed to have their 'end' timestamp unset. All previous instances MUST
 * have a closed interval of validity. The last instance MAY have a closed
 * interval. Clients MUST accept instances that overlaps in time, if not
 * clients may experience problems during rotations of verification
 * materials.
 *
 * To be able to manage planned rotations of either transparency logs or
 * certificate authorities, clienst MUST accept lists of instances where
 * the last instance have a 'valid_for' that belongs to the future.
 * This should not be a problem as clients SHOULD first seek the trust root
 * for a suitable instance before creating a per artifact trust root (that
 * is, a sub-set of the complete trust root) that is used for verification.
 */
export interface TrustedRoot {
    /**
     * MUST be application/vnd.dev.sigstore.trustedroot.v0.1+json
     * when encoded as JSON.
     * Clients MUST be able to process and parse content with the media
     * type defined in the old format:
     * application/vnd.dev.sigstore.trustedroot+json;version=0.1
     */
    mediaType: string;
    /** A set of trusted Rekor servers. */
    tlogs: TransparencyLogInstance[];
    /**
     * A set of trusted certificate authorities (e.g Fulcio), and any
     * intermediate certificates they provide.
     * If a CA is issuing multiple intermediate certificate, each
     * combination shall be represented as separate chain. I.e, a single
     * root cert may appear in multiple chains but with different
     * intermediate and/or leaf certificates.
     * The certificates are intended to be used for verifying artifact
     * signatures.
     */
    certificateAuthorities: CertificateAuthority[];
    /** A set of trusted certificate transparency logs. */
    ctlogs: TransparencyLogInstance[];
    /** A set of trusted timestamping authorities. */
    timestampAuthorities: CertificateAuthority[];
}
/**
 * SigningConfig represents the trusted entities/state needed by Sigstore
 * signing. In particular, it primarily contains service URLs that a Sigstore
 * signer may need to connect to for the online aspects of signing.
 */
export interface SigningConfig {
    /**
     * A URL to a Fulcio-compatible CA, capable of receiving
     * Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) and responding with
     * issued certificates.
     *
     * This URL **MUST** be the "base" URL for the CA, which clients
     * should construct an appropriate CSR endpoint on top of.
     * For example, if `ca_url` is `https://example.com/ca`, then
     * the client **MAY** construct the CSR endpoint as
     * `https://example.com/ca/api/v2/signingCert`.
     */
    caUrl: string;
    /**
     * A URL to an OpenID Connect identity provider.
     *
     * This URL **MUST** be the "base" URL for the OIDC IdP, which clients
     * should perform well-known OpenID Connect discovery against.
     */
    oidcUrl: string;
    /**
     * One or more URLs to Rekor-compatible transparency log.
     *
     * Each URL **MUST** be the "base" URL for the transparency log,
     * which clients should construct appropriate API endpoints on top of.
     */
    tlogUrls: string[];
    /**
     * One ore more URLs to RFC 3161 Time Stamping Authority (TSA).
     *
     * Each URL **MUST** be the **full** URL for the TSA, meaning that it
     * should be suitable for submitting Time Stamp Requests (TSRs) to
     * via HTTP, per RFC 3161.
     */
    tsaUrls: string[];
}
/**
 * ClientTrustConfig describes the complete state needed by a client
 * to perform both signing and verification operations against a particular
 * instance of Sigstore.
 */
export interface ClientTrustConfig {
    /** MUST be application/vnd.dev.sigstore.clienttrustconfig.v0.1+json */
    mediaType: string;
    /** The root of trust, which MUST be present. */
    trustedRoot: TrustedRoot | undefined;
    /** Configuration for signing clients, which MUST be present. */
    signingConfig: SigningConfig | undefined;
}
export declare const TransparencyLogInstance: {
    fromJSON(object: any): TransparencyLogInstance;
    toJSON(message: TransparencyLogInstance): unknown;
};
export declare const CertificateAuthority: {
    fromJSON(object: any): CertificateAuthority;
    toJSON(message: CertificateAuthority): unknown;
};
export declare const TrustedRoot: {
    fromJSON(object: any): TrustedRoot;
    toJSON(message: TrustedRoot): unknown;
};
export declare const SigningConfig: {
    fromJSON(object: any): SigningConfig;
    toJSON(message: SigningConfig): unknown;
};
export declare const ClientTrustConfig: {
    fromJSON(object: any): ClientTrustConfig;
    toJSON(message: ClientTrustConfig): unknown;
};