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urisanity

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vet URIs in web and web-like applications with confidence

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![@isocroft](https://img.shields.io/badge/@isocroft-CodeSplinta-blue) [![PRs Welcome](https://img.shields.io/badge/PRs-welcome-cyan.svg?style=flat-square)](http://makeapullrequest.com) [![Made in Nigeria](https://img.shields.io/badge/made%20in-nigeria-008751.svg?style=flat-square)](https://github.com/acekyd/made-in-nigeria) # URI Sanity A small library used in the Browser and NodeJS to vet URIs (to mitigate vulnerabilities) with confidence. In other words, It's the [DOMPurify](https://www.github.com/cure53/DOMPurify) for URIs. A uniform resource locator (URL) is, in fact, a subset of [uniform resource identifiers](https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/URI-Uniform-Resource-Identifier?_gl=1*7pixwg*_ga*NDg2NjQ5NTIxLjE2NDQ3MTE5NjA.*_ga_TQKE4GS5P9*MTY0NDcxMTk1OC4xLjAuMTY0NDcxMTk1OC4w&_ga=2.95812444.1772810844.1644711960-486649521.1644711960) (URI). Therefore, this library covers the super set of all resource identifiers where possible. ## Motivation There are many web-based zero-day vulnerabilities that can be expolited in Browsers/NodeJS servers using Standard and/or Custom URI schemes. Certain browsers like Safari and Firefox are usually subceptible to launching such URIs without a prompt or restrictions and enable [Arbitrary File Execution](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arbitrary_code_execution#:~:text=arbitrary%20code%20execution%20(ACE)%20is%20an%20attacker's%20ability%20to%20run%20any%20commands%20or%20code%20of%20the%20attacker's%20choice%20on%20a%20target%20machine%20or%20in%20a%20target%20process.), [Remote Code Execution](https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/cyber-security/what-is-remote-code-execution-rce/#:~:text=Remote%20code%20execution%20(RCE)%20attacks,control%20over%20a%20compromised%20machine.) and/or [Connection String Pollution](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-16120-9_16?noAccess=true) (on the server) where possible. This is why this library was built. It moves to create a layer of protection for your web applications both on the Browser and on the Server (NodeJS only) by blocking badly formed/suspicious URIs. Furthermore, other solutions like [braintree/sanitize-url](https://www.github.com/braintree/sanitize-url) are quite naive and a bit too specific in [it's approach](https://github.com/braintree/sanitize-url/issues/14) to URL sanitization. Also, most web front-end frameworks like **Angular** and **Vue** (safe for **React**) do not do a very robust and serious (non-trivial) job of sanitiziting URLs either. This is why this library is very important to web application developers who need reliability in sanitizing URLs. ## Validation This library has been validated against popular malicious URIs delineated [here](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting) and [here](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XSS_Filter_Evasion_Cheat_Sheet.html) ## Installation Install using `npm` ```bash npm install urisanity ``` or install using `yarn`. ```bash yarn add urisanity ``` ## Getting Started All you need to do is import the package appropriately depending on the environment (Browser OR Node) being used ### Browser environment > Using a `script` tag directly inside a web page ```html <script type="text/javascript" src="https://unpkg.com/browse/urisanity@0.1.4/dist/urisanity.min.js" crossorigin="anonymous"></script> ``` > import as ES6 module - no setup required ```js import URISanity from 'urisanity'; const sanitizedUrl = URISanity.vet('blob:https://www.foo-.evil.com/undefined', { // All flag options set - valid allowScriptOrDataURI: false, allowFileSystemURI: false, allowCommsAppURI: true, allowDBConnectionStringURI: false, allowBrowserSpecificURI: false, allowWebTransportURI: false, allowServiceAPIURI: false, }); console.log(sanitizedUrl); // "about:blank" const sanitizedDBUri = URISanity.vet("jdbc:sqlserver://;servername=server_name;integratedSecurity=true;authenticationScheme=JavaKerberos", { // One flag option set - valid allowDBConnectionStringURI: true, allowFileSystemURI: false, // you can omit this since it's `false` allowCommsAppURI: false, // you can omit this since it's `false` allowScriptOrDataURI: false, // you can omit this since it's `false` allowWebTransportURI: false, // you can omit this since it's `false` allowServiceAPIURI: false // you can omit this since it's `false` }) console.log(sanitizedDBUri) // "jdbc:sqlserver://;servername=server_name;integratedSecurity=true;authenticationScheme=JavaKerberos" const sanitizedCustomUrl = URISanity.vet( 'icloud-sharing://www.icloud.com/photos/01eFfrthOPvnfZqlKMn', { /* No flag options set - valid */ }); console.log(sanitizedCustomUrl); // "about:blank" const santizedBadUrl = URISanity.vet('http://aa.com/</script>"><img src=x onerror="prompt(document.domain)">)', { allowWebTransportURI: true, allowScriptOrDataURI: true }) console.log(sanitizedBadUrl); // "about:blank" const paramValue = URISanity.extractParamValueFromUri( 'https://www.example.com?xyz=%200000#intro', 'xyz' ); console.log(paramValue); // " 0000" const checkPassed = URISanity.checkParamsOverWhiteList( 'grpc://api.broker.rt-msg.io:443?user=sal%C3%A1ta', ['user'] ); console.log(checkPassed); // true const isSame = URISanity.isSameOrigin(window.location.href) console.log(isSame) // true ``` ### NodeJS environment > Setup an env file in your NodeJS app and include an `ORIGIN` ```.env ORIGIN=http://127.0.0.1:4050 ``` ```js const URISanity = require('urisanity'); const sanitizedFileUrl = URISanity.vet( 'file://www.airbnb.com/Users/xxx/Desktop/index.html', { allowWebTransportURI: true } ); console.log(sanitizedFileUrl) // "about:blank" ``` ```js const URISanity = require('urisanity'); let sanitizedUrl = URISanity.vet( 'file://www.airbnb.com/Users/xxx/Desktop/index.html', { allowWebTransportURI: false, allowFileSystemURI: true } ); console.log(sanitizedUrl) // "file://www.airbnb.com/Users/xxx/Desktop/index.html" ``` ## Implementing Trusted Types > You can make use of [**Trusted Types**](https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-trusted-types/dist/spec/#trused-script-url) while using **URI Sanity**. An excerpt from a [_**2021 report from Google on Trusted Types**_](https://storage.googleapis.com/pub-tools-public-publication-data/pdf/2cbfffc0943dabf34c499f786080ffa2cda9cb4c.pdf) reads: _Trusted Types are supported in several popular frameworks and libraries including Angular, React (with a feature flag), Lit, Karma, and Webpack. Enforcing Trusted Types in applications built on top of these frameworks is now [relatively simple](https://auth0.com/blog/securing-spa-with-trusted-types/); in some cases no application-level code changes are required._ Before the advent of **Trusted Types** (specifically, in the days of Angular 1.x), frontend web engineers used [this approach](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/15606751/angularjs-changes-urls-to-unsafe-in-extension-page) in sanitizing URIs for web applications and it was grossly inefficient and/or naive. This is also [another approach](https://github.com/angular/angular/blob/master/packages/core/src/sanitization/url_sanitizer.ts#L36) that still doesn't cater to a much braoder system for URI sanitization. Now, with **URISanity**, you have the broader systems needed for quality URI sanitization. ```js import URISanity from 'urisanity'; import DOMPurify from 'dompurify'; window.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', console.error.bind(console)); /* @HINT: feature / object detection */ if (typeof window.trustedTypes !== 'undefined') { trustedTypes.createPolicy('default', { createHTML: (html) => { /* @HINT: sanitize all potentially malicious characters from HTML string */ return DOMPurify.sanitize(html, { USE_PROFILES: { html: true, svg: true, }, }) }, createScriptURL: (url) => { /* @HINT: vet URL string and return "about:blank" if URL string is suspicious */ return URISanity.vet(url, { allowWebTransportURI: true, }) }, }); } ``` ## More Use Cases **URISanity** can be used to improve the web security of browser API sinks (injection sinks) that make use if URIs and aren't covered and/or catered for by **Trusted Types** and basic **CSP**. By instrumenting these API sinks (sinks for Document Object Model / Browser Object Model) and utilizing browser custom event API(s), the solution is quite elegant. Take a look below: >Let's define some basic browser custom events and their handler ```javascript /* @NOTE: Can also be the "connect-src" whitelist of urls from a CSP directive */ /* @HINT: The whitelist below is for excluding URLs that are not known to the web app and may be expoitative/suspicious */ const whitelistedURLEndpoints = [ 'https://www.facebook.com/tr', 'https://www.google-analytics.com/collect' ] /* @HINT: Setting custome events to check and validate URLs */ document.addEventListener( 'beforerequest', onBeforeURIUsed, false ) document.addEventListener( 'beforeinclude', onBeforeURIUsed, false ) /* @HINT: Event handler common to the two events above */ function onBeforeURIUsed ( event ) { /* @CHECK: https://www.npmjs.com/package/urisanity ; urisanity */ /* @HINT: Vet the URL endpoint being requested/included for safety */ if (window.urisanity.vet( event.detail.endpoint, { allowWebTransportURI: true } ) !== 'about:blank') { const { origin, pathname } = new URL(event.detail.endpoint) /* @HINT: Make sure the endpoint being requested/included is part of the whitelist */ if (whitelistedURLEndpoints.includes(`${origin}${pathname}`)) { if (origin.includes('.google-analytics.')) { /* @HINT: Check that only the request params we need are attached */ /* @HINT: Any other extra params should not be allowed */ if (window.urisanity.checkParamsOverWhiteList( event.detail.endpoint, ['tid', 'cid'], event.detail.data )) { return; } } } } /* @HINT: trigger an error to be thrown when the endpoint is not in the whitelist above */ /* @HINT: Or the validation above for any origin (or for google-analytics) doesn't pass */ event.preventDefault() } ``` >Now, let's instrument certain browser API sinks and make them able to throw errors on suspicion of a malformed/malicious API. ```javascript /*! * FIRST SECTION * */ /* @HINT: Extract the native definitions of these APIs from the DOM Interfaces */ const originalSetAttributeMethod = HTMLElement.prototype.setAttribute /* @HINT: Create a new definition for `setAttribute` that instruments the API to detect suspicious URIs */ HTMLElement.prototype.setAttribute = function setAttribute (attributeName, newValue) { const that = this; const previousValue = that.getAttribute(attributeName); const timerID = window.setTimeout(function () { /* @HINT: Stop [ DOMSubtreeModified ] event from firing before [ DOMAttrModified ] event */ originalSetAttributeMethod.call(that, attributeName, newValue); }, 0); /* @HINT: Whenever the attribute name is `href`, then check the URL that is the value */ if (attributeName === 'href') { /* @HINT: Fire a custom event `beforeinclude` to track manual whitelisting of URL endpoints */ let event = new window.CustomEvent('beforeinclude', { detail: { endpoint: newValue, sink: "HTMLElement.setAttribute", data: null }, bubbles: true, cancelable: true }); /* @HINT: Detect if the dispatched custom event was cancelled by a call to `event.preventDefault()` */ /* @HINT: If the event was cancelled, it means the URL endpoint above was disallowed by the checks */ const cancelled = !document.dispatchEvent(event) /* @HINT: If it's cancelled, stop the `setTimeout` call above from being executed by clearing the timeout */ /* @HINT: Also, we throw an error to stop the call to `setAttribute` from being requested */ if (cancelled) { window.clearTimeout(timerID) throw new Error( "Suspicious Activity: " + event.detail.endpoint + " request, using [ " + event.detail.data + " ] in " + " [ " + event.detail.sink + " ]" ) } } /* @HINT: When listening to mutation events, might be okay to stagger certain event sequences properly */ if (newValue !== previousValue) { let event = document.createEvent("MutationEvent"); event.initMutationEvent( "DOMAttrModified", true, false, that, previousValue || "", newValue || "", attributeName, (previousValue === null) ? event.ADDITION : event.MODIFICATION ); that.dispatchEvent( event ); } }; /*! * NEXT SECTION * */ /* @HINT: craete a function/constructor that does nothing a.k.a no-operation function */ const noop = function noOperation () {} /* @HINT: Copy out the user-agent interface function `sendBeacon` */ const NativeSendBeacon = window.Navigator.prototype.sendBeacon || noop window.Navigator.prototype.sendBeacon = function sendBeacon (url, data) { /* @HINT: Fire a custom event `beforerequest` to track manual whitelisting of URL endpoints */ const event = new window.CustomEvent('beforerequest', { detail: { endpoint: url, method: "POST", sink: "Navigator.sendBeacon", data: data }, bubbles: true, cancelable: true }) /* @HINT: Detect if the dispatched custom event was cancelled by a call to `event.preventDefault()` */ /* @HINT: If the event was cancelled, it means the URL endpoint above was disallowed by the checks */ const cancelled = !document.dispatchEvent(event) /* @HINT: If it's cancelled, we throw an error to stop the call to `sendBeacon` from being requested */ if (cancelled) { throw new Error( "Suspicious Activity: " + event.detail.endpoint + " request, using [ " + event.detail.data + " ] in " + " [ " + event.detail.sink + " ]" ) } /* @HINT: If all checks out and no error was thrown above then proceed as usual */ return NativeSendBeacon.call(this, url, data); }; /* @HINT: define property `name` on custom function */ Object.defineProperty(sendBeacon, 'name', { writable: false, value: 'sendBeacon' }); /* @HINT: define property function `toString` on custom function */ Object.defineProperty(sendBeacon, 'toString', { writable: true, value: function toString () { return NativeSendBeacon.toString() } }) /* @HINT: Take care of the special Firefox/IceWeasel (Gecko) property `toSource` */ if ('toSource' in NativeSendBeacon) { Object.defineProperty(sendBeacon, 'toSource', { writable: true, value: function toSource () { return NativeSendBeacon.toSource() } }) } ``` Finally, the code above in the event handler get triggered whenever `navigator.sendBeacon()` is called and the URLs are using **URISanity**. ## Documentation Here is a brief guide to using this library and it's API method(s) ### Flag Options >When using the `.vet(uri: String [, options: Object])` API method, there are flag option(s) to filter out different URI categories in the vetting process. They are as follows: 1. **allowCommsAppURI** : This applies only to the deep links that are used by communication tools and apps like Whatsapp, Zoom, Slack, Skype or browser comms URIs e.g. _sms, tel, whatsapp, slack_ 2. **allowDBConnectionStringURI** : This applies only to database connection string URIs e.g. _postgresql, mongodb, jdbc:mysql_ 3. **allowBrowserSpecificURI** : This applies only to browser extensions, packaged apps and browser data display URIs e.g. _view-source, moz-extension_ 4. **allowServiceAPIURI** : This appies only to third-party data storage services whos have specialized URIs for data transfer and storage operations e.g. _cloudinary, s3, grpc_ 5. **allowScriptOrDataURI** : This applies only to script and/or data URIs e.g. _data, javascript_ 6. **allowFileSystemURI** : This applies only to URIs related to the local filesystem e.g. _blob, file, local_ 7. **allowWebTransportURI** : This applies only to web data transport URIs e.g. _http, ws, https, wss, blob:https_ ### API Methods ### `URISanity.vet(uri: String [, options: Object]): String` >The `.vet(uri: String [, options: Object])` method is used to sanitize a URI of any [standard form](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_URI_schemes) to ensure that it doesn't contain unwanted and/or malicious content. Only the second argument is optional. If the second ( **options** ) argument isn't passed, it means that all [flag options](https://github.com/codesplinta/URISanity#flag-options) are `false`. ### `URISanity.extractParamValueFromUri(uri: String, queryParamName: String): String` >The `.extractParamValueFromUri(uri: String, queryParamName: String)` method is used to extract the value of a query parameter from a given URI. Both arguments are not optional. ### `URISanity.checkParamsOverWhiteList(uri: String, paramNamesWhiteList: Array [, querySearch: String]): Boolean` >The `.checkParamsOverWhiteList(uri: String, queryParamNames: Array [, querySearch: String | Object])` method is used to check whether the params (query OR body) associated with a given URI is correct, allowed and valid for it's use case. Only the third argument for this method is optional. ### `URISanity.isSameOrigin(uri: String): Boolean` >The `.isSameOrigin(uri: String)` method is used to check if the URI being inspected has the sam origin (protocol + host) as the environment (Browser or NodeJS). The only argument for this method is not optional. ## License MIT License ## Contributing If you wish to contribute to this project, you are very much welcome. Please, create an issue first before you proceed to create a PR (either to propose a feature or fix a bug). Make sure to clone the repo, checkout to a contribution branch and build the project before making modifications to the codebase. Run all the following command (in order they appear) below: ```bash $ npm run lint $ npm run build $ npm run test ``` ## TypeScript You can find the TS declaration [here](https://gist.github.com/isocroft/021098c660318bf92f7ab05bba042f48) (simply copy from the gist and paste in the root of your project as `urisanity.d.ts`)