pi-lens/rules/tree-sitter-queries/python/python-subprocess-shell.yml

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id: python-subprocess-shell
name: subprocess with shell=True
severity: warning
category: security
defect_class: injection
inline_tier: warning
language: python

message: "subprocess called with shell=True — command injection risk if any argument is user-controlled"

description: |
  shell=True passes the command to the OS shell (/bin/sh -c), enabling
  shell metacharacters (;, |, &&, $()) to be interpreted. If any part
  of the command comes from user input, this is a command injection vulnerability.

  ✅ FIX: use a list of arguments without shell=True.

  ❌ NEVER:
    subprocess.run(f"git log {branch}", shell=True)

  ✅ SAFE:
    subprocess.run(["git", "log", branch], check=True)

query: |
  (call
    function: (attribute
      object: (identifier) @MOD
      attribute: (identifier) @FN)
    arguments: (argument_list
      (keyword_argument
        name: (identifier) @KW
        value: (true) @VAL))
    (#eq? @MOD "subprocess")
    (#match? @FN "^(run|Popen|call|check_output|check_call)$")
    (#eq? @KW "shell"))

metavars:
  - MOD
  - FN
  - KW

has_fix: false

tags:
  - python
  - security
  - command-injection
  - subprocess
  - cwe-78

examples:
  bad: |
    import subprocess
    subprocess.run(f"ls {user_path}", shell=True)   # injection!
    subprocess.check_output("pip list", shell=True)

  good: |
    import subprocess
    subprocess.run(["ls", user_path], check=True)
    subprocess.check_output(["pip", "list"])