pi-lens/rules/tree-sitter-queries/ruby/ruby-string-eval.yml

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id: ruby-string-eval
name: eval/class_eval/instance_eval with String
severity: warning
category: security
defect_class: injection
inline_tier: blocking
language: ruby

message: "eval/class_eval/instance_eval with string argument — arbitrary code execution risk"

description: |
  Passing a string to eval, class_eval, or instance_eval executes it as Ruby
  code at runtime. If the string contains any user-controlled input, this is
  a remote code execution vulnerability.

  ✅ FIX: use block form of class_eval/instance_eval, or restructure to avoid
  dynamic code generation entirely.

  ❌ NEVER:
    eval(params[:code])
    klass.class_eval("def #{method_name}; #{body}; end")

  ✅ SAFE:
    klass.class_eval do
      define_method(method_name) { body_proc.call }
    end

query: |
  (call
    method: (identifier) @METHOD
    arguments: (argument_list
      [(string) (interpolated_string)] @ARG)
    (#match? @METHOD "^(eval|class_eval|module_eval|instance_eval)$")) @CALL

metavars:
  - METHOD
  - ARG
  - CALL

has_fix: false

tags:
  - ruby
  - security
  - eval
  - code-injection
  - cwe-95

examples:
  bad: |
    eval(user_input)
    User.class_eval("def #{attr}; @#{attr}; end")

  good: |
    User.class_eval do
      define_method(attr) { instance_variable_get(:"@#{attr}") }
    end