openclaw
Version:
Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations
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Markdown
summary: "OpenClaw reconnaissance threats (AML.TA0002): T-RECON-001, T-RECON-002"
title: "Reconnaissance (AML.TA0002)"
read_when:
- Reviewing reconnaissance threats against an OpenClaw deployment
- Working on mitigations for T-RECON-001, T-RECON-002
Threats in the reconnaissance tactic (AML.TA0002) of the [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations.
The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the [threat model index](/security/THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS), which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping.
## T-RECON-001: Agent endpoint discovery
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0006 - Active Scanning |
| **Description** | Attacker scans for exposed OpenClaw gateway endpoints |
| **Attack vector** | Network scanning, Shodan queries, DNS enumeration |
| **Affected components** | Gateway, exposed API endpoints |
| **Current mitigations** | Tailscale auth option, bind to loopback by default |
| **Residual risk** | Medium - public gateways discoverable |
| **Recommendations** | Document secure deployment, add rate limiting on discovery endpoints |
## T-RECON-002: Channel integration probing
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0006 - Active Scanning |
| **Description** | Attacker probes messaging channels to identify AI-managed accounts |
| **Attack vector** | Sending test messages, observing response patterns |
| **Affected components** | All channel integrations |
| **Current mitigations** | None specific |
| **Residual risk** | Low - limited value from discovery alone |
| **Recommendations** | Consider response timing randomization |