openclaw/dist/dangerous-tools-Caeym4XK.js

Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations

import { t as AUTOMATIONS_TOOL_NAME } from "./automations-tool-name-DBMZPbPL.js";
//#region src/security/dangerous-tools.ts
/**
* Tools denied via Gateway HTTP `POST /tools/invoke` by default.
* These are high-risk because they enable session orchestration, control-plane actions,
* or interactive flows that don't make sense over a non-interactive HTTP surface.
*/
const DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY = [
	"exec",
	"spawn",
	"shell",
	"fs_write",
	"fs_delete",
	"fs_move",
	"apply_patch",
	"terminal",
	"portal",
	"sessions_spawn",
	"sessions_send",
	"conversations_list",
	"conversations_send",
	"conversations_turn",
	AUTOMATIONS_TOOL_NAME,
	"gateway",
	"nodes",
	"computer",
	"mobile_ui",
	"openclaw"
];
/**
* Sensitive control-plane tools. `automations` can persist scheduled runs; `gateway`
* exposes configuration/schema details and an owner-only self-update action.
*/
const GATEWAY_CONTROL_PLANE_TOOLS = [AUTOMATIONS_TOOL_NAME, "gateway"];
/**
* Core tools that require sender owner identity on Gateway-scoped surfaces.
* `gateway.tools.allow` can remove the default HTTP deny only for owner/trusted-operator
* callers; non-owner identity-bearing callers must not receive server-credential wrappers.
*/
const GATEWAY_OWNER_ONLY_CORE_TOOLS = [
	...GATEWAY_CONTROL_PLANE_TOOLS,
	"sessions",
	"screen",
	"terminal",
	"portal",
	"conversations_list",
	"conversations_send",
	"conversations_turn",
	"nodes",
	"computer",
	"mobile_ui",
	"openclaw"
];
//#endregion
export { GATEWAY_CONTROL_PLANE_TOOLS as n, GATEWAY_OWNER_ONLY_CORE_TOOLS as r, DEFAULT_GATEWAY_HTTP_TOOL_DENY as t };