openclaw/dist/sibling-temp-CLpkwDtX.js

Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations

import { c as assertAsyncDirectoryGuard, n as registerTempPathForExit, s as withAsyncDirectoryGuards, t as serializePathWrite, u as createAsyncDirectoryGuard } from "./write-queue-C9nceBqy.js";
import { a as root, o as getFsSafeTestHooks, t as resolveSecureTempRoot } from "./secure-temp-dir-XAWcZnE2.js";
import { t as assertSafePathPrefix } from "./safe-path-segment-BEYqpzSe.js";
import path from "node:path";
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import crypto, { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
//#region node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/filename.js
function sanitizeUntrustedFileName(fileName, fallbackName) {
	const trimmed = typeof fileName === "string" ? fileName.trim() : "";
	if (!trimmed) return fallbackName;
	let base = path.posix.basename(trimmed);
	base = path.win32.basename(base);
	let cleaned = "";
	for (let i = 0; i < base.length; i++) {
		const code = base.charCodeAt(i);
		if (code < 32 || code === 127) continue;
		cleaned += base[i];
	}
	base = cleaned.trim();
	if (!base || base === "." || base === "..") return fallbackName;
	if (base.length > 200) base = base.slice(0, 200);
	return base;
}
//#endregion
//#region node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/sibling-temp.js
function buildTempPath(dir, tempPrefix) {
	const safePrefix = assertSafePathPrefix(tempPrefix ?? ".fs-safe-stream", { label: "sibling temp prefix" });
	return path.join(dir, `${safePrefix}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`);
}
async function syncFileBestEffort(filePath) {
	const handle = await fs.open(filePath, "r+");
	try {
		await handle.sync();
	} catch (error) {
		if (error.code !== "EPERM") throw error;
	} finally {
		await handle.close();
	}
}
async function syncDirectoryBestEffort(dirPath) {
	let handle;
	try {
		handle = await fs.open(dirPath, "r");
		await handle.sync();
	} catch {} finally {
		await handle?.close().catch(() => void 0);
	}
}
function assertFinalPathIsSibling(dir, filePath) {
	const resolvedDir = path.resolve(dir);
	const resolvedFile = path.resolve(filePath);
	if (path.dirname(resolvedFile) !== resolvedDir) throw new Error("Final path must be in the sibling temp directory.");
}
async function writeSiblingTempFile(options) {
	const dir = path.resolve(options.dir);
	await fs.mkdir(dir, {
		recursive: true,
		mode: options.dirMode ?? 448
	});
	if (options.chmodDir !== false) await fs.chmod(dir, options.dirMode ?? 448).catch(() => void 0);
	const dirGuard = await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(dir);
	const tempPath = buildTempPath(dir, options.tempPrefix);
	const unregisterTempPath = registerTempPathForExit(tempPath);
	let tempExists = false;
	try {
		tempExists = true;
		const result = await options.writeTemp(tempPath);
		if (options.mode !== void 0) await fs.chmod(tempPath, options.mode).catch(() => void 0);
		if (options.syncTempFile) await syncFileBestEffort(tempPath);
		const filePath = path.resolve(options.resolveFinalPath(result));
		assertFinalPathIsSibling(dir, filePath);
		await serializePathWrite(filePath, async () => {
			await withAsyncDirectoryGuards([dirGuard], async () => {
				await fs.rename(tempPath, filePath);
			});
			tempExists = false;
			unregisterTempPath();
			if (options.mode !== void 0) await fs.chmod(filePath, options.mode).catch(() => void 0);
			if (options.syncParentDir) await syncDirectoryBestEffort(dir);
		});
		return {
			filePath,
			result
		};
	} finally {
		if (tempExists) await fs.rm(tempPath, { force: true }).catch(() => void 0);
		unregisterTempPath();
	}
}
function buildSiblingTempPath(params) {
	const id = crypto.randomUUID();
	const safePrefix = assertSafePathPrefix(params.tempPrefix, { label: "sibling temp prefix" });
	const safeTail = sanitizeUntrustedFileName(path.basename(params.targetPath), params.fallbackFileName);
	return path.join(path.dirname(params.targetPath), `${safePrefix}${id}-${safeTail}.part`);
}
async function writeViaSiblingTempPath(params) {
	const rootDir = await fs.realpath(path.resolve(params.rootDir)).catch(() => path.resolve(params.rootDir));
	const requestedTargetPath = path.resolve(params.targetPath);
	const targetPath = await fs.realpath(path.dirname(requestedTargetPath)).then((realDir) => path.join(realDir, path.basename(requestedTargetPath))).catch(() => requestedTargetPath);
	const relativeTargetPath = path.relative(rootDir, targetPath);
	if (!relativeTargetPath || relativeTargetPath === ".." || relativeTargetPath.startsWith(`..${path.sep}`) || path.isAbsolute(relativeTargetPath)) throw new Error("Target path is outside the allowed root");
	const rootGuard = await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(rootDir);
	const tempDir = await fs.mkdtemp(path.join(resolveSecureTempRoot({
		fallbackPrefix: "fs-safe-output",
		unsafeFallbackLabel: "sibling temp output dir",
		warn: () => void 0
	}), "fs-safe-output-"));
	const tempPath = buildSiblingTempPath({
		targetPath: path.join(tempDir, path.basename(targetPath)),
		fallbackFileName: params.fallbackFileName ?? "output.bin",
		tempPrefix: params.tempPrefix ?? ".fs-safe-output-"
	});
	const unregisterTempPath = registerTempPathForExit(tempDir, { recursive: true });
	try {
		await getFsSafeTestHooks()?.beforeSiblingTempWrite?.(tempPath);
		await params.writeTemp(tempPath);
		await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(rootGuard);
		await (await root(rootDir)).copyIn(relativeTargetPath, tempPath, { mkdir: false });
		await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(rootGuard);
	} finally {
		await fs.rm(tempDir, {
			recursive: true,
			force: true
		}).catch(() => {});
		unregisterTempPath();
	}
}
//#endregion
export { writeViaSiblingTempPath as n, sanitizeUntrustedFileName as r, writeSiblingTempFile as t };