openclaw/dist/sanitize-env-vars-Bsu9AQgI.js

Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations

//#region src/agents/sandbox/sanitize-env-vars.ts
/**
* Filters environment variables before they cross into sandbox runtimes.
*
* The default path blocks common credential names and suspicious value shapes while allowing
* ordinary process environment needed for shells and Node-based tools.
*/
const BLOCKED_ENV_VAR_PATTERNS = [
	/^ANTHROPIC_API_KEY$/i,
	/^OPENAI_API_KEY$/i,
	/^GEMINI_API_KEY$/i,
	/^OPENROUTER_API_KEY$/i,
	/^MINIMAX_API_KEY$/i,
	/^ELEVENLABS_API_KEY$/i,
	/^SYNTHETIC_API_KEY$/i,
	/^TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN$/i,
	/^DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN$/i,
	/^SLACK_(BOT|APP)_TOKEN$/i,
	/^LINE_CHANNEL_SECRET$/i,
	/^LINE_CHANNEL_ACCESS_TOKEN$/i,
	/^OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_(TOKEN|PASSWORD)$/i,
	/^AWS_(SECRET_ACCESS_KEY|SECRET_KEY|SESSION_TOKEN)$/i,
	/^(GH|GITHUB)_TOKEN$/i,
	/^(AZURE|AZURE_OPENAI|COHERE|AI_GATEWAY|OPENROUTER)_API_KEY$/i,
	/_?(API_KEY|TOKEN|PASSWORD|PRIVATE_KEY|SECRET)$/i
];
const ALLOWED_ENV_VAR_PATTERNS = [
	/^LANG$/,
	/^LC_.*$/i,
	/^PATH$/i,
	/^HOME$/i,
	/^USER$/i,
	/^SHELL$/i,
	/^TERM$/i,
	/^TZ$/i,
	/^NODE_ENV$/i
];
/** Returns a warning or block reason for environment values that look unsafe to forward. */
function validateEnvVarValue(value) {
	if (value.includes("\0")) return "Contains null bytes";
	if (value.length > 32768) return "Value exceeds maximum length";
	if (/^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]{80,}$/.test(value)) return "Value looks like base64-encoded credential data";
}
function matchesAnyPattern(value, patterns) {
	return patterns.some((pattern) => pattern.test(value));
}
/** Sanitizes inherited environment variables for automatic sandbox propagation. */
function sanitizeEnvVars(envVars, options = {}) {
	const allowed = {};
	const blocked = [];
	const warnings = [];
	const blockedPatterns = [...BLOCKED_ENV_VAR_PATTERNS, ...options.customBlockedPatterns ?? []];
	const allowedPatterns = [...ALLOWED_ENV_VAR_PATTERNS, ...options.customAllowedPatterns ?? []];
	for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(envVars)) {
		const key = rawKey.trim();
		if (!key || value === void 0) continue;
		if (matchesAnyPattern(key, blockedPatterns)) {
			blocked.push(key);
			continue;
		}
		if (options.strictMode && !matchesAnyPattern(key, allowedPatterns)) {
			blocked.push(key);
			continue;
		}
		const warning = validateEnvVarValue(value);
		if (warning) {
			if (warning === "Contains null bytes") {
				blocked.push(key);
				continue;
			}
			warnings.push(`${key}: ${warning}`);
		}
		allowed[key] = value;
	}
	return {
		allowed,
		blocked,
		warnings
	};
}
/** Sanitizes env vars explicitly requested by config, preserving names but still validating values. */
function sanitizeExplicitSandboxEnvVars(envVars) {
	const allowed = {};
	const blocked = [];
	const warnings = [];
	for (const [rawKey, value] of Object.entries(envVars)) {
		const key = rawKey.trim();
		if (!key || value === void 0) continue;
		const warning = validateEnvVarValue(value);
		if (warning) {
			if (warning === "Contains null bytes") {
				blocked.push(key);
				continue;
			}
			warnings.push(`${key}: ${warning}`);
		}
		allowed[key] = value;
	}
	return {
		allowed,
		blocked,
		warnings
	};
}
//#endregion
export { sanitizeExplicitSandboxEnvVars as n, validateEnvVarValue as r, sanitizeEnvVars as t };