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openclaw

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Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations

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--- summary: "OpenClaw reconnaissance threats (AML.TA0002): T-RECON-001, T-RECON-002" title: "Reconnaissance (AML.TA0002)" read_when: - Reviewing reconnaissance threats against an OpenClaw deployment - Working on mitigations for T-RECON-001, T-RECON-002 --- Threats in the reconnaissance tactic (AML.TA0002) of the [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations. The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the [threat model index](/security/THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS), which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping. ## T-RECON-001: Agent endpoint discovery | Attribute | Value | | ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0006 - Active Scanning | | **Description** | Attacker scans for exposed OpenClaw gateway endpoints | | **Attack vector** | Network scanning, Shodan queries, DNS enumeration | | **Affected components** | Gateway, exposed API endpoints | | **Current mitigations** | Tailscale auth option, bind to loopback by default | | **Residual risk** | Medium - public gateways discoverable | | **Recommendations** | Document secure deployment, add rate limiting on discovery endpoints | <a id="t-recon-002-channel-integration-probing" /> ## T-RECON-002: Channel integration discovery | Attribute | Value | | ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------ | | **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0006 - Active Scanning | | **Description** | Attacker checks messaging channels to identify AI-managed accounts | | **Attack vector** | Sending test messages, observing response patterns | | **Affected components** | All channel integrations | | **Current mitigations** | None specific | | **Residual risk** | Low - limited value from discovery alone | | **Recommendations** | Consider response timing randomization |