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openclaw

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Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations

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--- summary: "OpenClaw defense evasion threats (AML.TA0007): T-EVADE-001, T-EVADE-002" title: "Defense evasion (AML.TA0007)" read_when: - Reviewing defense evasion threats against an OpenClaw deployment - Working on mitigations for T-EVADE-001, T-EVADE-002 --- Threats in the defense evasion tactic (AML.TA0007) of the [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations. The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the [threat model index](/security/THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS), which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping. ## T-EVADE-001: Moderation pattern bypass | Attribute | Value | | ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data | | **Description** | Attacker crafts skill content to evade ClawHub moderation checks | | **Attack vector** | Unicode homoglyphs, encoding tricks, dynamic loading | | **Affected components** | ClawHub moderation/scanning pipeline | | **Current mitigations** | Static pattern rules, AST-adjacent code scanning, LLM agentic-risk review, VirusTotal | | **Residual risk** | Medium - novel obfuscation can still slip past layered heuristics | | **Recommendations** | Continue expanding the pattern/behavioral corpus as new evasions are found | ## T-EVADE-002: Content wrapper escape | Attribute | Value | | ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data | | **Description** | Attacker crafts content that escapes the external-content wrapper context | | **Attack vector** | Tag manipulation, context confusion, instruction override | | **Affected components** | External content wrapping | | **Current mitigations** | Random-boundary XML-style markers + security notice, plus homoglyph/whitespace-variant marker-spoof detection | | **Residual risk** | Medium - novel escapes discovered regularly | | **Recommendations** | Output-side validation in addition to input-side wrapping |