openclaw
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Multi-channel AI gateway with extensible messaging integrations
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Markdown
summary: "OpenClaw defense evasion threats (AML.TA0007): T-EVADE-001, T-EVADE-002"
title: "Defense evasion (AML.TA0007)"
read_when:
- Reviewing defense evasion threats against an OpenClaw deployment
- Working on mitigations for T-EVADE-001, T-EVADE-002
Threats in the defense evasion tactic (AML.TA0007) of the [MITRE ATLAS](https://atlas.mitre.org/) framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations.
The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the [threat model index](/security/THREAT-MODEL-ATLAS), which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping.
## T-EVADE-001: Moderation pattern bypass
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data |
| **Description** | Attacker crafts skill content to evade ClawHub moderation checks |
| **Attack vector** | Unicode homoglyphs, encoding tricks, dynamic loading |
| **Affected components** | ClawHub moderation/scanning pipeline |
| **Current mitigations** | Static pattern rules, AST-adjacent code scanning, LLM agentic-risk review, VirusTotal |
| **Residual risk** | Medium - novel obfuscation can still slip past layered heuristics |
| **Recommendations** | Continue expanding the pattern/behavioral corpus as new evasions are found |
## T-EVADE-002: Content wrapper escape
| Attribute | Value |
| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **ATLAS ID** | AML.T0043 - Craft Adversarial Data |
| **Description** | Attacker crafts content that escapes the external-content wrapper context |
| **Attack vector** | Tag manipulation, context confusion, instruction override |
| **Affected components** | External content wrapping |
| **Current mitigations** | Random-boundary XML-style markers + security notice, plus homoglyph/whitespace-variant marker-spoof detection |
| **Residual risk** | Medium - novel escapes discovered regularly |
| **Recommendations** | Output-side validation in addition to input-side wrapping |