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Open-source legal template filling CLI and library

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# System Operations — CC 7.1–7.5 Per-criterion audit guidance for configuration management, monitoring, incident response, and recovery. ## CC 7.1 — Configuration and baseline monitoring **Priority**: Critical | **NIST**: CM-6, RA-5 | **ISO**: A.8.9, A.8.8 Auditors verify that production systems run from documented, approved configurations and that drift from baselines is detected. This means infrastructure-as-code, golden images, or documented configuration standards — not ad-hoc server setup. **What auditors test**: - Configuration baselines exist for production systems (OS hardening, application settings, network rules) - Drift detection: mechanism to identify when running config diverges from approved baseline - Configuration changes follow the change management process (CC 8.1) - Default credentials and unnecessary services are removed from production systems - Firewall rules and security group configurations are reviewed at least quarterly **Evidence to prepare**: ```bash # GCP: firewall rules gcloud compute firewall-rules list --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, direction, allowed, sourceRanges, targetTags}' # GCP: instance configurations gcloud compute instances list --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, machineType, zone, status}' # Azure: NSG rules az network nsg list --output json | jq '.[] | {name, location, securityRules: [.securityRules[] | {name, access, direction, sourceAddressPrefix, destinationPortRange}]}' # GitHub: infrastructure-as-code repos (Terraform, Pulumi, etc.) gh repo list {org} --json name,description --jq '.[] | select(.name | test("infra|terraform|pulumi|deploy"))' ``` - Infrastructure-as-code repository with version history - CIS benchmark assessment results (if available) - Configuration review records from most recent quarterly review **Startup pitfalls**: - Production servers configured manually via SSH — no reproducible baseline exists - Security groups with 0.0.0.0/0 inbound rules left from early development - No documentation of what "production configuration" actually is --- ## CC 7.2 — Anomaly detection and monitoring **Priority**: Critical | **NIST**: AU-6, SI-4 | **ISO**: A.8.15, A.8.16 Auditors assess whether the organization collects, centralizes, and actively monitors logs for security-relevant events. Passive log collection is insufficient — there must be alerting rules that trigger investigation when anomalies occur. **What auditors test**: - Log centralization: security events from all systems flow to a single platform (SIEM or log aggregator) - Alert rules configured for: authentication failures, privilege escalation, unauthorized access attempts, configuration changes - Sample 2-3 recent alerts: verify each was investigated and documented with a resolution - Log retention covers the full audit period (typically 12 months for Type II) - Log integrity: logs are protected from tampering (write-once storage or separate account) **Evidence to prepare**: ```bash # GCP: alerting policies gcloud monitoring policies list --format=json | jq '.[].displayName' # GCP: log sinks (centralization) gcloud logging sinks list --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, destination, filter}' # GCP: log retention settings gcloud logging buckets list --location=global --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, retentionDays}' # Azure: alert rules az monitor metrics alert list --output json | jq '.[] | {name, enabled, severity}' # Azure: diagnostic settings (log forwarding) az monitor diagnostic-settings list --resource {resource_id} --output json ``` - SIEM dashboard screenshot showing active alert rules - Sample alert investigation records (ticket or incident log) - Log retention policy document **Startup pitfalls**: - Logs exist in cloud provider but nobody monitors them — no alert rules configured - Alert fatigue: hundreds of alerts firing daily, all ignored - Log retention set to default 30 days — insufficient for a 12-month audit period --- ## CC 7.3 — Incident response **Priority**: Critical | **NIST**: IR-4 | **ISO**: A.5.24, A.5.25 Auditors verify that the organization has a defined, tested process for responding to security incidents. The plan must exist before the audit period — writing it during the audit is a finding. Expect auditors to walk through a recent incident or tabletop exercise. **What auditors test**: - Incident response plan exists, is approved by management, and was in effect during the audit period - Plan covers: identification, containment, eradication, recovery, and lessons learned - Roles and responsibilities are defined (who leads response, who communicates, who escalates) - Plan has been tested: tabletop exercise or response to actual incident within the audit period - Post-incident reviews are conducted and documented with action items **Evidence to prepare**: - Incident response plan document (with version date proving it predates the audit period) - Tabletop exercise records: scenario, participants, decisions made, findings - Post-incident review reports (if real incidents occurred) - On-call rotation or escalation contact list - Incident severity classification matrix **Startup pitfalls**: - No written plan — "we'd just figure it out" is a guaranteed finding - Plan exists but has never been tested — auditors expect at least one tabletop exercise per year - No post-incident review process — incidents happen but lessons aren't captured - Incident response plan written by one person and unknown to the rest of the team --- ## CC 7.4 — Incident communication **Priority**: High | **NIST**: IR-5, IR-6 | **ISO**: A.5.25, A.5.26 Beyond responding to incidents internally, auditors check whether the organization communicates appropriately with affected parties — customers, regulators, and management. Notification timelines and channels should be predefined, not improvised. **What auditors test**: - Communication plan: who gets notified, through what channel, within what timeframe - Customer notification SLAs match contractual commitments (check customer agreements for breach notification terms) - Regulatory notification requirements identified by jurisdiction (e.g., 72 hours for GDPR, state breach laws) - Management receives periodic incident summaries (at least quarterly) - Status page or customer communication channel for service-affecting incidents **Evidence to prepare**: - Incident communication procedures (section of IR plan or standalone document) - Sample customer notification (if a reportable incident occurred during audit period) - Regulatory notification requirements matrix (jurisdiction × data type × timeline) - Management incident summary reports - Status page URL and historical incident postings --- ## CC 7.5 — Recovery operations **Priority**: Critical | **NIST**: CP-4, CP-9, CP-10 | **ISO**: A.5.30, A.8.13 Auditors verify that the organization can recover from incidents and disasters — not just that backups exist, but that recovery has been tested and meets defined objectives. Untested backups are assumed to be non-functional. **What auditors test**: - Backup configuration: automated, encrypted, and stored separately from production (different region or account) - Backup frequency matches RPO (recovery point objective) — if RPO is 1 hour, daily backups fail - Restore testing: at least one successful restore test during the audit period, documented with results - RTO/RPO defined for critical systems and achievable based on test results - Disaster recovery plan covering major failure scenarios (region outage, data corruption, ransomware) **Evidence to prepare**: ```bash # GCP: Cloud SQL backup configuration gcloud sql instances describe {instance} --format=json | jq '{backupConfiguration, settings: {backupConfiguration}}' # GCP: recent backups gcloud sql backups list --instance={instance} --limit=10 --format=json | jq '.[0:5] | .[] | {id, startTime, status, type}' # Azure: backup status az backup item list --resource-group {rg} --vault-name {vault} --output json | jq '.[] | {name, properties: {lastBackupTime, protectionState}}' # GCP: snapshot policies gcloud compute resource-policies list --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, snapshotSchedulePolicy}' ``` - Backup restore test report (date, scope, time to restore, success/failure, issues encountered) - RTO/RPO definitions per critical system - Disaster recovery plan document - Business impact analysis identifying critical systems and acceptable downtime **Startup pitfalls**: - Cloud provider "handles backups" — but automated backups may not be enabled or may not cover all services - Backups exist but have never been restored — first restore attempt during a real outage reveals corruption - No defined RTO/RPO — "as fast as possible" is not measurable - DR plan is a copy-paste template that doesn't match actual infrastructure