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# Change Management Rules Per-control audit guidance for SDLC, configuration management, and change control. ## A.8.25 — Secure Development Lifecycle **Tier**: Critical | **NIST**: SA-3, SA-8 Establish rules for secure development of software and systems. Apply security requirements throughout the SDLC — design, development, testing, deployment, and maintenance. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors want to see SDLC DOCUMENTED, not just practiced informally - They'll check: threat modeling (even lightweight), secure coding guidelines, pre-deployment security checks - For startups: a documented PR review checklist that includes security considerations is sufficient - "We do code review" is not enough — show that security is part of the review criteria **Evidence collection**: ```bash # GitHub: branch protection requires reviews gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/{branch}/protection | jq '{ required_pull_request_reviews: .required_pull_request_reviews.required_approving_review_count, enforce_admins: .enforce_admins.enabled, required_status_checks: .required_status_checks.contexts }' # GitHub: recent PRs showing review process gh pr list --state merged --limit 10 --json number,title,reviewDecision,mergedAt ``` --- ## A.8.26 — Application Security Requirements **Tier**: Relevant | **NIST**: SA-3 Define and document security requirements for applications, including authentication, authorization, input validation, and data protection requirements. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors check if security requirements are captured BEFORE development, not added after - For web apps: OWASP Top 10 coverage is expected - API security requirements should address authentication, rate limiting, and input validation - If you use third-party libraries, security requirements should cover dependency management --- ## A.8.27 — Secure System Architecture and Engineering Principles **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: SA-8 Apply secure engineering principles to system architecture. Design systems with defense in depth, least privilege, and fail-secure defaults. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors look for architecture documentation that shows security considerations - Network segmentation (or VPC design) is the most common check - Zero trust principles are increasingly expected but not yet required - For cloud: show that environments are isolated (dev/staging/prod separation) --- ## A.8.28 — Secure Coding **Tier**: Relevant | **NIST**: SI-10, SI-11 Apply secure coding practices to minimize vulnerabilities. Address input validation, output encoding, error handling, and cryptographic usage in code. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors may review a recent security-relevant code change to verify practices - SAST (static analysis) tool usage is strong evidence — even a free tool like Semgrep or CodeQL - Dependency scanning (Dependabot, Snyk) counts as part of secure coding - Error messages should not leak internal details (stack traces, SQL queries, file paths) **Evidence collection**: ```bash # GitHub: code scanning alerts (CodeQL/SAST) gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/code-scanning/alerts --paginate | jq 'length' # GitHub: Dependabot alerts gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/dependabot/alerts?state=open | jq 'length' ``` --- ## A.8.29 — Security Testing in Development and Acceptance **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: SA-11 Define and implement security testing processes during development and before production deployment. This includes functional security testing, vulnerability scanning, and penetration testing. **Auditor hints**: - Annual penetration test is expected for SOC 2 and increasingly for ISO - For startups: automated security scanning in CI/CD is acceptable evidence between annual pentests - Acceptance testing should include security test cases, not just functional tests - Bug bounty programs count as continuous security testing --- ## A.8.30 — Outsourced Development **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: SR-5 When development is outsourced, define and enforce security requirements with the external party. Monitor compliance and ensure secure handover. **Auditor hints**: - If you use contractors for development, auditors check: NDAs, access provisioning/deprovisioning, code ownership - Contractor access should be time-limited and revoked at contract end - Code review requirements should apply equally to internal and external developers --- ## A.8.31 — Separation of Development, Test, and Production Environments **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: SA-3 Separate development, testing, and production environments to reduce the risk of unauthorized access or changes to production systems. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors check: can a developer push directly to production? Is prod data used in dev? - Environment separation means: different accounts/projects/subscriptions, not just different folders - Database access: dev should NOT have production database credentials - CI/CD pipeline should be the ONLY path to production **Evidence collection**: ```bash # GCP: list projects (should show separate dev/staging/prod) gcloud projects list --format="json(projectId,name)" # Azure: list subscriptions az account list --output json | jq '.[].{name, id, state}' ``` --- ## A.8.32 — Change Management **Tier**: Critical | **NIST**: CM-3, SA-10 Manage changes to information processing facilities and systems through a formal change management process. Changes should be requested, assessed, approved, implemented, and reviewed. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors want to see a CHANGE RECORD for every production change — git history is excellent evidence - They'll sample 5-10 recent changes and check: was there a request, review, approval, and implementation record? - Emergency changes ("hotfixes") must have retroactive review — skipping the process is acceptable if documented - Rollback capability should exist — auditors may ask "what happens if this change fails?" **Evidence collection**: ```bash # GitHub: recent merged PRs (change records) gh pr list --state merged --limit 20 --json number,title,author,reviewDecision,mergedAt,mergedBy # GitHub: branch protection (prevents unreviewed changes) gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/branches/main/protection | jq '{ required_reviews: .required_pull_request_reviews.required_approving_review_count, dismiss_stale_reviews: .required_pull_request_reviews.dismiss_stale_reviews }' # GitHub: deployment history gh api repos/{owner}/{repo}/deployments --paginate | jq '.[0:10] | .[] | {environment, created_at, sha: .sha[0:8]}' ``` --- ## A.8.33 — Test Information **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: SA-11 Ensure test data is adequately protected, especially when production data is used for testing. Anonymize or mask production data before use in non-production environments. **Auditor hints**: - If you use production data for testing, it must be masked — this is where many startups fail - Synthetic test data is always preferred - Test databases should have the same access controls as the environment warrants - Automated tests should not contain hardcoded credentials or real PII --- ## A.8.34 — Protection of Information Systems During Audit Testing **Tier**: Checkbox | **NIST**: CA-2 Protect production systems from disruption during audit testing. Audit activities (vulnerability scans, penetration tests) should be planned and authorized to minimize business impact. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors check that THEIR OWN testing is authorized and scoped — they'll ask you to sign off on the test plan - Penetration tests should have written authorization (Rules of Engagement document) - Vulnerability scans on production should be scheduled during low-traffic periods --- ## A.8.9 — Configuration Management **Tier**: Critical | **NIST**: CM-1, CM-2, CM-3, CM-4, CM-6, CM-7, SA-10, SI-7 Define, document, and maintain secure configurations for hardware, software, and network components. Establish baselines and monitor for drift. **Auditor hints**: - Auditors want to see BASELINE CONFIGURATIONS — what is the "known good" state of your systems? - For cloud: Infrastructure as Code (Terraform, CloudFormation) IS your configuration baseline - Configuration drift detection is increasingly expected — even a weekly diff of IaC vs. deployed state - Container images should be built from documented base images with pinned versions **Evidence collection**: ```bash # Terraform: show current state terraform state list | head -20 # GCP: export compute instance configurations gcloud compute instances list --format=json | jq '.[] | {name, machineType, status}' # Docker: list base images docker image ls --format "table {{.Repository}}\t{{.Tag}}\t{{.Size}}" ```