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next-auth

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Authentication for Next.js

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import { createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto" import type { InternalOptions } from "../types" interface CreateCSRFTokenParams { options: InternalOptions cookieValue?: string isPost: boolean bodyValue?: string } /** * Ensure CSRF Token cookie is set for any subsequent requests. * Used as part of the strategy for mitigation for CSRF tokens. * * Creates a cookie like 'next-auth.csrf-token' with the value 'token|hash', * where 'token' is the CSRF token and 'hash' is a hash made of the token and * the secret, and the two values are joined by a pipe '|'. By storing the * value and the hash of the value (with the secret used as a salt) we can * verify the cookie was set by the server and not by a malicous attacker. * * For more details, see the following OWASP links: * https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#double-submit-cookie * https://owasp.org/www-chapter-london/assets/slides/David_Johansson-Double_Defeat_of_Double-Submit_Cookie.pdf */ export function createCSRFToken({ options, cookieValue, isPost, bodyValue, }: CreateCSRFTokenParams) { if (cookieValue) { const [csrfToken, csrfTokenHash] = cookieValue.split("|") const expectedCsrfTokenHash = createHash("sha256") .update(`${csrfToken}${options.secret}`) .digest("hex") if (csrfTokenHash === expectedCsrfTokenHash) { // If hash matches then we trust the CSRF token value // If this is a POST request and the CSRF Token in the POST request matches // the cookie we have already verified is the one we have set, then the token is verified! const csrfTokenVerified = isPost && csrfToken === bodyValue return { csrfTokenVerified, csrfToken } } } // New CSRF token const csrfToken = randomBytes(32).toString("hex") const csrfTokenHash = createHash("sha256") .update(`${csrfToken}${options.secret}`) .digest("hex") const cookie = `${csrfToken}|${csrfTokenHash}` return { cookie, csrfToken } }