mcp-server-semgrep
Version:
MCP Server for Semgrep Integration - static code analysis with AI
132 lines (131 loc) • 3.71 kB
YAML
rules:
- id: no-iam-priv-esc-roles
patterns:
- pattern-either:
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
resource $TYPE "..." {
...
policy = jsonencode({
...
Statement = [
...
]
...
})
...
}
- pattern-not-inside: |
resource $TYPE "..." {
...
policy = jsonencode({
...
Statement = [
...,
{... Effect = "Deny" ...},
...
]
...
})
...
}
- pattern: |
Action = $ACTION
- metavariable-pattern:
metavariable: $TYPE
pattern-either:
- pattern: |
"aws_iam_role_policy"
- pattern: |
"aws_iam_policy"
- pattern: |
"aws_iam_user_policy"
- pattern: |
"aws_iam_group_policy"
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
data aws_iam_policy_document "..." {
...
statement {
...
}
...
}
- pattern-not-inside: |
data aws_iam_policy_document "..." {
...
statement {
...
effect = "Deny"
...
}
...
}
- pattern: |
actions = $ACTION
- metavariable-pattern:
metavariable: $ACTION
pattern-either:
# TODO: this is a hack because generic currently doesn't work with [..., $ACTION, ...]
# we will replace this once full support for terraform gets released.
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "sts:AssumeRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy", ...]
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:PassRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "lambda:CreateFunction", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "lambda:InvokeFunction", ...]
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:PassRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "lambda:CreateFunction", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping", ...]
- pattern: |
"lambda:UpdateFunctionCode"
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:PassRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "glue:CreateDevEndpoint", ...]
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:PassRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "cloudformation:CreateStack", ...]
- patterns:
- pattern: |
[..., "iam:PassRole", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "datapipeline:CreatePipeline", ...]
- pattern: |
[..., "datapipeline:PutPipelineDefinition", ...]
message: >-
Ensure that groups of actions that include iam:PassRole and could result in privilege escalation
are not all allowed for the same user. These actions could result in an attacker gaining full admin
access of an AWS account. Try not to use these actions in conjuction.
metadata:
references:
- https://cloudsplaining.readthedocs.io/en/latest/glossary/privilege-escalation/
- https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/
category: security
cwe:
- 'CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management'
technology:
- terraform
- aws
owasp:
- A04:2021 - Insecure Design
subcategory:
- audit
likelihood: LOW
impact: LOW
confidence: LOW
languages: [hcl]
severity: WARNING