mcp-server-semgrep
Version:
MCP Server for Semgrep Integration - static code analysis with AI
164 lines (163 loc) • 6.45 kB
YAML
rules:
- id: dangerous-subprocess-use
mode: taint
options:
symbolic_propagation: true
pattern-sources:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: flask.request.form.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.form[...]
- pattern: flask.request.args.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.args[...]
- pattern: flask.request.values.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.values[...]
- pattern: flask.request.cookies.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.cookies[...]
- pattern: flask.request.stream
- pattern: flask.request.headers.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.headers[...]
- pattern: flask.request.data
- pattern: flask.request.full_path
- pattern: flask.request.url
- pattern: flask.request.json
- pattern: flask.request.get_json()
- pattern: flask.request.view_args.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.view_args[...]
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
@$APP.route(...)
def $FUNC(..., $ROUTEVAR, ...):
...
- focus-metavariable: $ROUTEVAR
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
def $FUNC(request, ...):
...
- pattern-either:
- pattern: request.$PROPERTY.get(...)
- pattern: request.$PROPERTY[...]
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
@rest_framework.decorators.api_view(...)
def $FUNC($REQ, ...):
...
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
class $VIEW(..., rest_framework.views.APIView, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $VIEW(..., rest_framework.generics.GenericAPIView, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
def $METHOD(self, $REQ, ...):
...
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $METHOD
regex: (get|post|put|patch|delete|head)
- pattern-either:
- pattern: $REQ.POST.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.POST[...]
- pattern: $REQ.FILES.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.FILES[...]
- pattern: $REQ.DATA.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.DATA[...]
- pattern: $REQ.QUERY_PARAMS.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.QUERY_PARAMS[...]
- pattern: $REQ.data.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.data[...]
- pattern: $REQ.query_params.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.query_params[...]
- pattern: $REQ.content_type
- pattern: $REQ.content_type
- pattern: $REQ.stream
- pattern: $REQ.stream
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.StreamRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.DatagramRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-either:
- pattern: self.requestline
- pattern: self.path
- pattern: self.headers[...]
- pattern: self.headers.get(...)
- pattern: self.rfile
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
@pyramid.view.view_config( ... )
def $VIEW($REQ):
...
- pattern: $REQ.$ANYTHING
- pattern-not: $REQ.dbsession
pattern-sinks:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- patterns:
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC("...", ...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(["...",...], ...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(("...",...), ...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.CalledProcessError(...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.SubprocessError(...)
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC($CMD, ...)
- patterns:
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c","...",...)
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c", $CMD)
- patterns:
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(["=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c","...",...],...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c","...",...),...)
- pattern-either:
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC(["=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c", $CMD], ...)
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC(("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c", $CMD), ...)
- patterns:
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC("=~/(python)/","...",...)
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC("=~/(python)/", $CMD)
- patterns:
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(["=~/(python)/","...",...],...)
- pattern-not: subprocess.$FUNC(("=~/(python)/","...",...),...)
- pattern-either:
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC(["=~/(python)/", $CMD],...)
- pattern: subprocess.$FUNC(("=~/(python)/", $CMD),...)
- focus-metavariable: $CMD
message: >-
Detected subprocess function '$FUNC' with user controlled data. A malicious actor
could leverage this to perform command injection.
You may consider using 'shlex.escape()'.
metadata:
owasp:
- A01:2017 - Injection
- A03:2021 - Injection
cwe:
- "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')"
asvs:
section: 'V5: Validation, Sanitization and Encoding Verification Requirements'
control_id: 5.3.8 OS Command Injection
control_url: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x13-V5-Validation-Sanitization-Encoding.md#v53-output-encoding-and-injection-prevention-requirements
version: '4'
references:
- https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3172470/actual-meaning-of-shell-true-in-subprocess
- https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html
- https://docs.python.org/3/library/shlex.html
- https://semgrep.dev/docs/cheat-sheets/python-command-injection/
category: security
technology:
- python
confidence: MEDIUM
cwe2022-top25: true
cwe2021-top25: true
subcategory:
- vuln
likelihood: MEDIUM
impact: HIGH
languages: [python]
severity: ERROR