mcp-server-semgrep
Version:
MCP Server for Semgrep Integration - static code analysis with AI
156 lines (155 loc) • 5.25 kB
YAML
rules:
- id: dangerous-interactive-code-run
mode: taint
options:
symbolic_propagation: true
pattern-sources:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern: flask.request.form.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.form[...]
- pattern: flask.request.args.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.args[...]
- pattern: flask.request.values.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.values[...]
- pattern: flask.request.cookies.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.cookies[...]
- pattern: flask.request.stream
- pattern: flask.request.headers.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.headers[...]
- pattern: flask.request.data
- pattern: flask.request.full_path
- pattern: flask.request.url
- pattern: flask.request.json
- pattern: flask.request.get_json()
- pattern: flask.request.view_args.get(...)
- pattern: flask.request.view_args[...]
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
@$APP.route(...)
def $FUNC(..., $ROUTEVAR, ...):
...
- focus-metavariable: $ROUTEVAR
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
def $FUNC(request, ...):
...
- pattern-either:
- pattern: request.$PROPERTY.get(...)
- pattern: request.$PROPERTY[...]
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
@rest_framework.decorators.api_view(...)
def $FUNC($REQ, ...):
...
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
class $VIEW(..., rest_framework.views.APIView, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $VIEW(..., rest_framework.generics.GenericAPIView, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
def $METHOD(self, $REQ, ...):
...
- metavariable-regex:
metavariable: $METHOD
regex: (get|post|put|patch|delete|head)
- pattern-either:
- pattern: $REQ.POST.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.POST[...]
- pattern: $REQ.FILES.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.FILES[...]
- pattern: $REQ.DATA.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.DATA[...]
- pattern: $REQ.QUERY_PARAMS.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.QUERY_PARAMS[...]
- pattern: $REQ.data.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.data[...]
- pattern: $REQ.query_params.get(...)
- pattern: $REQ.query_params[...]
- pattern: $REQ.content_type
- pattern: $REQ.content_type
- pattern: $REQ.stream
- pattern: $REQ.stream
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.StreamRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-inside: |
class $SERVER(..., http.server.DatagramRequestHandler, ...):
...
- pattern-either:
- pattern: self.requestline
- pattern: self.path
- pattern: self.headers[...]
- pattern: self.headers.get(...)
- pattern: self.rfile
- patterns:
- pattern-inside: |
@pyramid.view.view_config( ... )
def $VIEW($REQ):
...
- pattern: $REQ.$ANYTHING
- pattern-not: $REQ.dbsession
pattern-sinks:
- patterns:
- pattern-either:
- pattern-inside: |
$X = code.InteractiveConsole(...)
...
- pattern-inside: |
$X = code.InteractiveInterpreter(...)
...
- pattern-either:
- pattern: |
$X.push($PAYLOAD,...)
- pattern: |
$X.runsource($PAYLOAD,...)
- pattern: |
$X.runcode(code.compile_command($PAYLOAD),...)
- pattern: |
$PL = code.compile_command($PAYLOAD,...)
...
$X.runcode($PL,...)
- focus-metavariable: $PAYLOAD
- pattern-not: |
$X.push("...",...)
- pattern-not: |
$X.runsource("...",...)
- pattern-not: |
$X.runcode(code.compile_command("..."),...)
- pattern-not: |
$PL = code.compile_command("...",...)
...
$X.runcode($PL,...)
message: >-
Found user controlled data inside InteractiveConsole/InteractiveInterpreter method.
This is dangerous if external data can reach this function call because it allows
a malicious actor to run arbitrary Python code.
metadata:
cwe:
- "CWE-95: Improper Neutralization of Directives in Dynamically Evaluated Code ('Eval Injection')"
owasp:
- A03:2021 - Injection
references:
- https://semgrep.dev/docs/cheat-sheets/python-command-injection/
category: security
technology:
- python
confidence: MEDIUM
subcategory:
- vuln
likelihood: MEDIUM
impact: HIGH
severity: WARNING
languages:
- python