mcp-server-semgrep/semgrep-rules/java/lang/security/audit/command-injection-formatted-runtime-call.yaml

MCP Server for Semgrep Integration - static code analysis with AI

rules:
- id: command-injection-formatted-runtime-call
  patterns:
  - metavariable-pattern:
      metavariable: $RUNTIME
      patterns:
      - pattern-either:
        - pattern: (java.lang.Runtime $R)
        - pattern: java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime(...)
  - pattern-either:
    - pattern: $RUNTIME.exec($X + $Y);
    - pattern: $RUNTIME.exec(String.format(...));
    - pattern: $RUNTIME.loadLibrary($X + $Y);
    - pattern: $RUNTIME.loadLibrary(String.format(...));
    - patterns:
      - pattern-either:
        - pattern: | 
            $RUNTIME.exec("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/", "-c", $ARG,...)
        - pattern: |
            $RUNTIME.exec(Arrays.asList("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c",$ARG,...),...)
        - pattern: |
            $RUNTIME.exec(new String[]{"=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/","-c",$ARG,...},...)
        - patterns:
          - pattern-either:
            - pattern: |
                $RUNTIME.exec($CMD,"-c",$ARG,...)
            - pattern: |
                $RUNTIME.exec(Arrays.asList($CMD,"-c",$ARG,...),...)
            - pattern: |
                $RUNTIME.exec(new String[]{$CMD,"-c",$ARG,...},...)
          - pattern-inside: |
              $CMD = "=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/";
              ...
        - patterns:
          - pattern-either:
            - pattern: |
                $RUNTIME.exec($CMD, $EXECUTE, $ARG, ...)
          - pattern-inside: |
              $CMD = new String[]{"=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/", ...};
              ...
        - patterns:
            - pattern-either:
                - pattern: | 
                    $RUNTIME.exec("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/", $BASH, $ARG,...)
                - pattern: |
                    $RUNTIME.exec(Arrays.asList("=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/",$BASH,$ARG,...),...)
                - pattern: |
                    $RUNTIME.exec(new String[]{"=~/(sh|bash|ksh|csh|tcsh|zsh)/",$BASH,$ARG,...},...)
            - pattern-inside: |
                $BASH = new String[]{"=~/(-c)/", ...};
                ...
      - pattern-not-inside: |
          $ARG = "...";
          ...
      - pattern-not: |
          $RUNTIME.exec("...","...","...",...)
      - pattern-not: |
          $RUNTIME.exec(new String[]{"...","...","...",...},...)
      - pattern-not: |
          $RUNTIME.exec(Arrays.asList("...","...","...",...),...)
  message: >-
    A formatted or concatenated string was detected as input to a java.lang.Runtime
    call.
    This is dangerous if a variable is controlled by user input and could result in
    a
    command injection. Ensure your variables are not controlled by users or sufficiently
    sanitized.
  metadata:
    cwe:
    - "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')"
    owasp:
    - A01:2017 - Injection
    - A03:2021 - Injection
    source-rule-url: https://find-sec-bugs.github.io/bugs.htm#COMMAND_INJECTION.
    category: security
    technology:
    - java
    references:
    - https://owasp.org/Top10/A03_2021-Injection
    cwe2022-top25: true
    cwe2021-top25: true
    subcategory:
    - audit
    likelihood: LOW
    impact: HIGH
    confidence: LOW
  severity: ERROR
  languages:
  - java