matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api/index.d.ts

Matrix Client-Server SDK for Javascript

import type { SecretsBundle } from "@matrix-org/matrix-sdk-crypto-wasm";
import type { IMegolmSessionData } from "../@types/crypto.ts";
import type { ToDeviceBatch, ToDevicePayload } from "../models/ToDeviceMessage.ts";
import { type Room } from "../models/room.ts";
import { type DeviceMap } from "../models/device.ts";
import { type UIAuthCallback } from "../interactive-auth.ts";
import { type PassphraseInfo, type SecretStorageKey, type SecretStorageKeyDescription } from "../secret-storage.ts";
import { type VerificationRequest } from "./verification.ts";
import { type BackupTrustInfo, type KeyBackupCheck, type KeyBackupInfo, type KeyBackupRestoreOpts, type KeyBackupRestoreResult } from "./keybackup.ts";
import { type ISignatures } from "../@types/signed.ts";
import { type MatrixEvent } from "../models/event.ts";
/**
 * `matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api`: End-to-end encryption support.
 *
 * The most important type is {@link CryptoApi}, an instance of which can be retrieved via
 * {@link MatrixClient.getCrypto}.
 *
 * @packageDocumentation
 */
/**
 * The options to start device dehydration.
 */
export interface StartDehydrationOpts {
    /**
     * Force creation of a new dehydration key, even if there is already an
     * existing dehydration key. If `false`, and `onlyIfKeyCached` is `false`, a
     * new key will be created if there is no existing dehydration key, whether
     * already cached in our local storage or stored in Secret Storage.
     *
     * Checking for the presence of the key in Secret Storage may result in the
     * `getSecretStorageKey` callback being called.
     *
     * Defaults to `false`.
     */
    createNewKey?: boolean;
    /**
     * Only start dehydration if we have a dehydration key cached in our local
     * storage. If `true`, Secret Storage will not be checked. Defaults to
     * `false`.
     */
    onlyIfKeyCached?: boolean;
    /**
     * Try to rehydrate a device before creating a new dehydrated device.
     * Setting this to `false` may be useful for situations where the client is
     * known to pre-date the dehydrated device, and so rehydration is
     * unnecessary. Defaults to `true`.
     */
    rehydrate?: boolean;
}
/**
 * Public interface to the cryptography parts of the js-sdk
 *
 * @remarks Currently, this is a work-in-progress. In time, more methods will be added here.
 */
export interface CryptoApi {
    /**
     * Global override for whether the client should ever send encrypted
     * messages to unverified devices. This provides the default for rooms which
     * do not specify a value.
     *
     * If true, all unverified devices will be blacklisted by default
     */
    globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices: boolean;
    /**
     * The {@link DeviceIsolationMode} mode to use.
     */
    setDeviceIsolationMode(isolationMode: DeviceIsolationMode): void;
    /**
     * Return the current version of the crypto module.
     * For example: `Rust SDK ${versions.matrix_sdk_crypto} (${versions.git_sha}), Vodozemac ${versions.vodozemac}`.
     * @returns the formatted version
     */
    getVersion(): string;
    /**
     * Get the public part of the device keys for the current device.
     *
     * @returns The public device keys.
     */
    getOwnDeviceKeys(): Promise<OwnDeviceKeys>;
    /**
     * Check if we believe the given room to be encrypted.
     *
     * This method returns true if the room has been configured with encryption. The setting is persistent, so that
     * even if the encryption event is removed from the room state, it still returns true. This helps to guard against
     * a downgrade attack wherein a server admin attempts to remove encryption.
     *
     * @returns `true` if the room with the supplied ID is encrypted. `false` if the room is not encrypted, or is unknown to
     * us.
     */
    isEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Check if we believe the given room supports encrypted state events.
     */
    isStateEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
     * send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
     *
     * @param room - the room the event is in
     */
    prepareToEncrypt(room: Room): void;
    /**
     * Discard any existing megolm session for the given room.
     *
     * This will ensure that a new session is created on the next call to {@link prepareToEncrypt},
     * or the next time a message is sent.
     *
     * This should not normally be necessary: it should only be used as a debugging tool if there has been a
     * problem with encryption.
     *
     * @param roomId - the room to discard sessions for
     */
    forceDiscardSession(roomId: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Get a list containing all of the room keys
     *
     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
     *
     * @returns a promise which resolves to a list of
     *    session export objects
     */
    exportRoomKeys(): Promise<IMegolmSessionData[]>;
    /**
     * Get a JSON list containing all of the room keys
     *
     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
     *
     * @returns a promise which resolves to a JSON string
     *    encoding a list of session export objects,
     *    each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
     */
    exportRoomKeysAsJson(): Promise<string>;
    /**
     * Import a list of room keys previously exported by exportRoomKeys
     *
     * @param keys - a list of session export objects
     * @param opts - options object
     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
     */
    importRoomKeys(keys: IMegolmSessionData[], opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Import a JSON string encoding a list of room keys previously
     * exported by exportRoomKeysAsJson
     *
     * @param keys - a JSON string encoding a list of session export
     *    objects, each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
     * @param opts - options object
     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
     */
    importRoomKeysAsJson(keys: string, opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Check if the given user has published cross-signing keys.
     *
     * - If the user is tracked, a `/keys/query` request is made to update locally the cross signing keys.
     * - If the user is not tracked locally and downloadUncached is set to true,
     *   a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve the cross signing keys.
     * - Otherwise, return false
     *
     * @param userId - the user ID to check. Defaults to the local user.
     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case `false` will be returned for such users.
     *
     * @returns true if the cross signing keys are available.
     */
    userHasCrossSigningKeys(userId?: string, downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Get the device information for the given list of users.
     *
     * For any users whose device lists are cached (due to sharing an encrypted room with the user), the
     * cached device data is returned.
     *
     * If there are uncached users, and the `downloadUncached` parameter is set to `true`,
     * a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve these devices.
     *
     * @param userIds - The users to fetch.
     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case such users will not appear at all in the result map.
     *
     * @returns A map `{@link DeviceMap}`.
     */
    getUserDeviceInfo(userIds: string[], downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<DeviceMap>;
    /**
     * Set whether to trust other user's signatures of their devices.
     *
     * If false, devices will only be considered 'verified' if we have
     * verified that device individually (effectively disabling cross-signing).
     *
     * `true` by default.
     *
     * @param val - the new value
     */
    setTrustCrossSignedDevices(val: boolean): void;
    /**
     * Return whether we trust other user's signatures of their devices.
     *
     * @see {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}
     *
     * @returns `true` if we trust cross-signed devices, otherwise `false`.
     */
    getTrustCrossSignedDevices(): boolean;
    /**
     * Get the verification status of a given user.
     *
     * @param userId - The ID of the user to check.
     *
     */
    getUserVerificationStatus(userId: string): Promise<UserVerificationStatus>;
    /**
     * "Pin" the current identity of the given user, accepting it as genuine.
     *
     * This is useful if the user has changed identity since we first saw them (leading to
     * {@link UserVerificationStatus.needsUserApproval}), and we are now accepting their new identity.
     *
     * Throws an error if called on our own user ID, or on a user ID that we don't have an identity for.
     */
    pinCurrentUserIdentity(userId: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified, and pin it.
     *
     * This is useful if the user was previously verified but is not anymore
     * ({@link UserVerificationStatus.wasCrossSigningVerified}) and it is not possible to verify him again now.
     *
     */
    withdrawVerificationRequirement(userId: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Get the verification status of a given device.
     *
     * @param userId - The ID of the user whose device is to be checked.
     * @param deviceId - The ID of the device to check
     *
     * @returns `null` if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys (implying it does not support
     *     encryption); otherwise the verification status of the device.
     */
    getDeviceVerificationStatus(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<DeviceVerificationStatus | null>;
    /**
     * Mark the given device as locally verified.
     *
     * Marking a device as locally verified has much the same effect as completing the verification dance, or receiving
     * a cross-signing signature for it.
     *
     * @param userId - owner of the device
     * @param deviceId - unique identifier for the device.
     * @param verified - whether to mark the device as verified. Defaults to 'true'.
     *
     * @throws an error if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys.
     */
    setDeviceVerified(userId: string, deviceId: string, verified?: boolean): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Cross-sign one of our own devices.
     *
     * This will create a signature for the device using our self-signing key, and publish that signature.
     * Cross-signing a device indicates, to our other devices and to other users, that we have verified that it really
     * belongs to us.
     *
     * Requires that cross-signing has been set up on this device (normally by calling {@link bootstrapCrossSigning}).
     *
     * *Note*: Do not call this unless you have verified, somehow, that the device is genuine!
     *
     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to be signed.
     */
    crossSignDevice(deviceId: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Checks whether cross signing:
     * - is enabled on this account and trusted by this device
     * - has private keys either cached locally or stored in secret storage
     *
     * If this function returns false, {@link bootstrapCrossSigning()} can be used
     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
     * `bootstrapCrossSigning()` completes successfully, this function should
     * return true.
     *
     * @returns True if cross-signing is ready to be used on this device
     *
     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
     */
    isCrossSigningReady(): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Get the ID of one of the user's cross-signing keys, if both private and matching
     * public parts of that key are available (ie. cached in the local crypto store).
     *
     * The public part may not be available if a `/keys/query` request has not yet been
     * performed, or if the device that created the keys failed to publish them.
     *
     * If either part of the keypair is not available, this will return `null`.
     *
     * @param type - The type of key to get the ID of.  One of `CrossSigningKey.Master`, `CrossSigningKey.SelfSigning`,
     *     or `CrossSigningKey.UserSigning`.  Defaults to `CrossSigningKey.Master`.
     *
     * @returns If cross-signing has been initialised on this device, the ID of the given key. Otherwise, null
     */
    getCrossSigningKeyId(type?: CrossSigningKey): Promise<string | null>;
    /**
     * Bootstrap cross-signing by creating keys if needed.
     *
     * If everything is already set up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure
     * cross-signing is ready for use.
     *
     * This function:
     * - creates new cross-signing keys if they are not found locally cached nor in
     *   secret storage (if it has been set up)
     * - publishes the public keys to the server if they are not already published
     * - stores the private keys in secret storage if secret storage is set up.
     *
     * @param opts - options object
     */
    bootstrapCrossSigning(opts: BootstrapCrossSigningOpts): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Checks whether secret storage:
     * - is enabled on this account
     * - is storing cross-signing private keys
     * - is storing session backup key (if enabled)
     *
     * If this function returns false, {@link bootstrapSecretStorage()} can be used
     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
     * `bootstrapSecretStorage()` completes successfully, this function should
     * return true.
     *
     * @returns True if secret storage is ready to be used on this device
     */
    isSecretStorageReady(): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Inspect the status of secret storage, in more detail than {@link isSecretStorageReady}.
     */
    getSecretStorageStatus(): Promise<SecretStorageStatus>;
    /**
     * Bootstrap [secret storage](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#storage).
     *
     * - If secret storage is not already set up, or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.setupNewSecretStorage} is set:
     *   * Calls {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.createSecretStorageKey} to generate a new key.
     *   * Stores the metadata of the new key in account data and sets it as the default secret storage key.
     *   * Calls {@link CryptoCallbacks.cacheSecretStorageKey} if provided.
     * - Stores the private cross signing keys in the secret storage if they are known, and they are not
     *   already stored in secret storage.
     * - If {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.setupNewKeyBackup} is set, calls {@link CryptoApi.resetKeyBackup}; otherwise,
     *   stores the key backup decryption key in secret storage if it is known, and it is not
     *   already stored in secret storage.
     *
     * Note that there may be multiple accesses to secret storage during the course of this call, each of which will
     * result in a call to {@link CryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey}.
     *
     * @param opts - Options object.
     */
    bootstrapSecretStorage(opts: CreateSecretStorageOpts): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Get the status of our cross-signing keys.
     *
     * @returns The current status of cross-signing keys: whether we have public and private keys cached locally, and
     * whether the private keys are in secret storage.
     *
     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
     */
    getCrossSigningStatus(): Promise<CrossSigningStatus>;
    /**
     * Create a recovery key (ie, a key suitable for use with server-side secret storage).
     *
     * The key can either be based on a user-supplied passphrase, or just created randomly.
     *
     * @param password - Optional passphrase string to use to derive the key,
     *      which can later be entered by the user as an alternative to entering the
     *      recovery key itself. If omitted, a key is generated randomly.
     *
     * @returns Object including recovery key and server upload parameters.
     *      The private key should be disposed of after displaying to the use.
     */
    createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase(password?: string): Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
    /**
     * Get information about the encryption of the given event.
     *
     * @param event - the event to get information for
     *
     * @returns `null` if the event is not encrypted, or has not (yet) been successfully decrypted. Otherwise, an
     *      object with information about the encryption of the event.
     */
    getEncryptionInfoForEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<EventEncryptionInfo | null>;
    /**
     * Encrypts a given payload object via Olm to-device messages to a given
     * set of devices.
     *
     * @param eventType - the type of the event to send.
     * @param devices - an array of devices to encrypt the payload for.
     * @param payload - the payload to encrypt.
     *
     * @returns the batch of encrypted payloads which can then be sent via {@link matrix.MatrixClient#queueToDevice}.
     */
    encryptToDeviceMessages(eventType: string, devices: {
        userId: string;
        deviceId: string;
    }[], payload: ToDevicePayload): Promise<ToDeviceBatch>;
    /**
     * Reset the encryption of the user by going through the following steps:
     * - Remove the dehydrated device and stop the periodic creation of dehydrated devices.
     * - Disable backing up room keys and delete any existing backups.
     * - Remove the default secret storage key from the account data (ie: the recovery key).
     * - Reset the cross-signing keys.
     * - Create a new key backup.
     *
     * Note that the dehydrated device will be removed, but will not be replaced
     * and it will not schedule creating new dehydrated devices.  To do this,
     * {@link startDehydration} should be called after a new secret storage key
     * is created.
     *
     * @param authUploadDeviceSigningKeys - Callback to authenticate the upload of device signing keys.
     *      Used when resetting the cross signing keys.
     *      See {@link BootstrapCrossSigningOpts#authUploadDeviceSigningKeys}.
     */
    resetEncryption(authUploadDeviceSigningKeys: UIAuthCallback<void>): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Returns to-device verification requests that are already in progress for the given user id.
     *
     * @param userId - the ID of the user to query
     *
     * @returns the VerificationRequests that are in progress
     */
    getVerificationRequestsToDeviceInProgress(userId: string): VerificationRequest[];
    /**
     * Finds a DM verification request that is already in progress for the given room and user.
     *
     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
     * @param userId - search for a verification request for the given user.
     *
     * @returns the VerificationRequest that is in progress, if any.
     */
    findVerificationRequestDMInProgress(roomId: string, userId?: string): VerificationRequest | undefined;
    /**
     * Request a key verification from another user, using a DM.
     *
     * @param userId - the user to request verification with.
     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
     *
     * @returns resolves to a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
     */
    requestVerificationDM(userId: string, roomId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
    /**
     * Send a verification request to our other devices.
     *
     * This is normally used when the current device is new, and we want to ask another of our devices to cross-sign.
     *
     * If an all-devices verification is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
     *
     * To control the methods offered, set {@link matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
     * `MatrixClient`.
     *
     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
     */
    requestOwnUserVerification(): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
    /**
     * Request an interactive verification with the given device.
     *
     * This is normally used on one of our own devices, when the current device is already cross-signed, and we want to
     * validate another device.
     *
     * If a verification for this user/device is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
     *
     * To control the methods offered, set {@link  matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
     * `MatrixClient`.
     *
     * @param userId - ID of the owner of the device to verify
     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to verify
     *
     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
     */
    requestDeviceVerification(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
    /**
     * Fetch the backup decryption key we have saved in our store.
     *
     * This can be used for gossiping the key to other devices.
     *
     * @returns the key, if any, or null
     */
    getSessionBackupPrivateKey(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
    /**
     * Store the backup decryption key.
     *
     * This should be called if the client has received the key from another device via secret sharing (gossiping).
     * It is the responsability of the caller to check that the decryption key is valid for the given backup version.
     *
     * @param key - the backup decryption key
     * @param version - the backup version corresponding to this decryption key
     */
    storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key: Uint8Array, version: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Attempt to fetch the backup decryption key from secret storage.
     *
     * If the key is found in secret storage, checks it against the latest backup on the server;
     * if they match, stores the key in the crypto store by calling {@link storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
     * which enables automatic restore of individual keys when an Unable-to-decrypt error is encountered.
     *
     * If the backup decryption key from secret storage does not match the
     * latest backup on the server, we throw a {@link DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError}.
     *
     * If we are unable to fetch the key from secret storage or there is no backup on the server,
     * we throw an exception.
     */
    loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage(): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Get the current status of key backup.
     *
     * @returns If automatic key backups are enabled, the `version` of the active backup. Otherwise, `null`.
     */
    getActiveSessionBackupVersion(): Promise<string | null>;
    /**
     * Determine if a key backup can be trusted.
     *
     * @param info - key backup info dict from {@link CryptoApi.getKeyBackupInfo}.
     */
    isKeyBackupTrusted(info: KeyBackupInfo): Promise<BackupTrustInfo>;
    /**
     * Return the details of the latest backup on the server, when we last checked.
     *
     * This normally returns a cached value, but if we haven't yet made a request to the server, it will fire one off.
     * It will always return the details of the active backup if key backup is enabled.
     *
     * Return null if there is no backup.
     *
     * @returns the key backup information
     */
    getKeyBackupInfo(): Promise<KeyBackupInfo | null>;
    /**
     * Force a re-check of the key backup and enable/disable it as appropriate.
     *
     * Fetches the current backup information from the server. If there is a backup, and it is trusted, starts
     * backing up to it; otherwise, disables backups.
     *
     * @returns `null` if there is no backup on the server. Otherwise, data on the backup as returned by the server,
     *   and trust information (as returned by {@link isKeyBackupTrusted}).
     */
    checkKeyBackupAndEnable(): Promise<KeyBackupCheck | null>;
    /**
     * Creates a new key backup version.
     *
     * If there are existing backups they will be replaced.
     *
     * If secret storage is set up, the new decryption key will be saved (the {@link CryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey}
     * callback will be called to obtain the secret storage key).
     *
     * The backup engine will be started using the new backup version (i.e., {@link checkKeyBackupAndEnable} is called).
     */
    resetKeyBackup(): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Disables server-side key storage and deletes server-side backups.
     *  * Deletes the current key backup version, if any (but not any previous versions).
     *  * Disables 4S, deleting the info for the default key, the default key pointer itself and any
     *    known 4S data (cross-signing keys and the megolm key backup key).
     *  * Deletes any dehydrated devices.
     *  * Sets the "m.org.matrix.custom.backup_disabled" account data flag to indicate that the user has disabled backups.
     */
    disableKeyStorage(): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Deletes the given key backup.
     *
     * @param version - The backup version to delete.
     */
    deleteKeyBackupVersion(version: string): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Download and restore the full key backup from the homeserver.
     *
     * Before calling this method, a decryption key, and the backup version to restore,
     * must have been saved in the crypto store. This happens in one of the following ways:
     *
     * - When a new backup version is created with {@link CryptoApi.resetKeyBackup}, a new key is created and cached.
     * - The key can be loaded from secret storage with {@link CryptoApi.loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage}.
     * - The key can be received from another device via secret sharing, typically as part of the interactive verification flow.
     * - The key and backup version can also be set explicitly via {@link CryptoApi.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
     *   though this is not expected to be a common operation.
     *
     * Warning: the full key backup may be quite large, so this operation may take several hours to complete.
     * Use of {@link KeyBackupRestoreOpts.progressCallback} is recommended.
     *
     * @param opts
     */
    restoreKeyBackup(opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
    /**
     * Restores a key backup using a passphrase.
     * The decoded key (derived from the passphrase) is stored locally by calling {@link CryptoApi#storeSessionBackupPrivateKey}.
     *
     * @param passphrase - The passphrase to use to restore the key backup.
     * @param opts
     *
     * @deprecated Deriving a backup key from a passphrase is not part of the matrix spec. Instead, a random key is generated and stored/shared via 4S.
     */
    restoreKeyBackupWithPassphrase(passphrase: string, opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
    /**
     * Returns whether MSC3814 dehydrated devices are supported by the crypto
     * backend and by the server.
     *
     * This should be called before calling `startDehydration`, and if this
     * returns `false`, `startDehydration` should not be called.
     */
    isDehydrationSupported(): Promise<boolean>;
    /**
     * Start using device dehydration.
     *
     * - Rehydrates a dehydrated device, if one is available and `opts.rehydrate`
     *   is `true`.
     * - Creates a new dehydration key, if necessary, and stores it in Secret
     *   Storage.
     *   - If `opts.createNewKey` is set to true, always creates a new key.
     *   - If a dehydration key is not available, creates a new one.
     * - Creates a new dehydrated device, and schedules periodically creating
     *   new dehydrated devices.
     *
     * This function must not be called unless `isDehydrationSupported` returns
     * `true`, and must not be called until after cross-signing and secret
     * storage have been set up.
     *
     * @param opts - options for device dehydration. For backwards compatibility
     *     with old code, a boolean can be given here, which will be treated as
     *     the `createNewKey` option. However, this is deprecated.
     */
    startDehydration(opts?: StartDehydrationOpts | boolean): Promise<void>;
    /**
     * Export secrets bundle for transmitting to another device as part of OIDC QR login
     */
    exportSecretsBundle?(): Promise<Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>>;
    /**
     * Import secrets bundle transmitted from another device.
     * @param secrets - The secrets bundle received from the other device
     */
    importSecretsBundle?(secrets: Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>): Promise<void>;
}
/** A reason code for a failure to decrypt an event. */
export declare enum DecryptionFailureCode {
    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session whose keys have not been shared with us. */
    MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID = "MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID",
    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key. */
    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD",
    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key, because the current device is unverified. */
    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE",
    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session which has been shared with us, but in a later ratchet state. */
    OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX = "OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX",
    /**
     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there is no key backup on the server, so this
     * decryption failure is expected.
     */
    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP",
    /**
     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a key backup on the server, but we don't
     * seem to have access to the backup. (Probably we don't have the right key.)
     */
    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED",
    /**
     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a (usable) key backup on the server, but we
     * still can't decrypt. (Either the session isn't in the backup, or we just haven't gotten around to checking yet.)
     */
    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP",
    /**
     * Message was sent when the user was not a member of the room.
     */
    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED",
    /**
     * The sender's identity is not verified, but was previously verified.
     */
    SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED = "SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED",
    /**
     * The sender device is not cross-signed.  This will only be used if the
     * device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
     */
    UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE",
    /**
     * We weren't able to link the message back to any known device.  This will
     * only be used if the device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
     */
    UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE",
    /** Unknown or unclassified error. */
    UNKNOWN_ERROR = "UNKNOWN_ERROR"
}
/** Base {@link DeviceIsolationMode} kind. */
export declare enum DeviceIsolationModeKind {
    AllDevicesIsolationMode = 0,
    OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode = 1
}
/**
 * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
 *
 * Message encryption keys are shared with all devices in the room, except in case of
 * verified user problems (see {@link errorOnVerifiedUserProblems}).
 *
 * Events from all senders are always decrypted (and should be decorated with message shields in case
 * of authenticity warnings, see {@link EventEncryptionInfo}).
 *
 * `AllDevicesIsolationMode` is used in the legacy, non-'exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web. It is not
 * recommended (see {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}).
 */
export declare class AllDevicesIsolationMode {
    readonly errorOnVerifiedUserProblems: boolean;
    readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.AllDevicesIsolationMode;
    /**
     *
     * @param errorOnVerifiedUserProblems - Behavior when sharing keys to remote devices.
     *
     * If set to `true`, sharing keys will fail (i.e. message sending will fail) with an error if:
     *   - The user was previously verified but is not anymore, or:
     *   - A verified user has some unverified devices (not cross-signed).
     *
     * If `false`, the keys will be distributed as usual. In this case, the client UX should display
     * warnings to inform the user about problematic devices/users, and stop them hitting this case.
     */
    constructor(errorOnVerifiedUserProblems: boolean);
}
/**
 * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
 *
 * Message encryption keys are only shared with devices that have been cross-signed by their owner.
 * Encryption will throw an error if a verified user replaces their identity.
 *
 * Events are decrypted only if they come from a cross-signed device. Other events will result in a decryption
 * failure. (To access the failure reason, see {@link MatrixEvent.decryptionFailureReason}.)
 *
 * `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode` corresponds to the 'Exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web, which is
 * recommended by {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}.
 */
export declare class OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode {
    readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
}
/**
 * DeviceIsolationMode represents the mode of device isolation used when encrypting or decrypting messages.
 * It can be one of two types: {@link AllDevicesIsolationMode} or {@link OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode}.
 *
 * Only supported by rust Crypto.
 */
export type DeviceIsolationMode = AllDevicesIsolationMode | OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
/**
 * Options object for `CryptoApi.bootstrapCrossSigning`.
 */
export interface BootstrapCrossSigningOpts {
    /** Optional. Reset the cross-signing keys even if keys already exist. */
    setupNewCrossSigning?: boolean;
    /**
     * An application callback to collect the authentication data for uploading the keys. If not given, the keys
     * will not be uploaded to the server (which seems like a bad thing?).
     */
    authUploadDeviceSigningKeys?: UIAuthCallback<void>;
}
/**
 * Represents the ways in which we trust a user
 */
export declare class UserVerificationStatus {
    private readonly crossSigningVerified;
    private readonly crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
    private readonly tofu;
    /**
     * Indicates if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
     *
     * This happens if the identity has changed since we first saw it, *unless* the new identity has also been verified
     * by our user (eg via an interactive verification).
     *
     * To rectify this, either:
     *
     *  * Conduct a verification of the new identity via {@link CryptoApi.requestVerificationDM}.
     *  * Pin the new identity, via {@link CryptoApi.pinCurrentUserIdentity}.
     *
     * @returns true if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
     */
    readonly needsUserApproval: boolean;
    constructor(crossSigningVerified: boolean, crossSigningVerifiedBefore: boolean, tofu: boolean, needsUserApproval?: boolean);
    /**
     * @returns true if this user is verified via any means
     */
    isVerified(): boolean;
    /**
     * @returns true if this user is verified via cross signing
     */
    isCrossSigningVerified(): boolean;
    /**
     * @returns true if we ever verified this user before (at least for
     * the history of verifications observed by this device).
     */
    wasCrossSigningVerified(): boolean;
    /**
     * @returns true if this user's key is trusted on first use
     *
     * @deprecated No longer supported, with the Rust crypto stack.
     */
    isTofu(): boolean;
}
export declare class DeviceVerificationStatus {
    /**
     * True if this device has been signed by its owner (and that signature verified).
     *
     * This doesn't necessarily mean that we have verified the device, since we may not have verified the
     * owner's cross-signing key.
     */
    readonly signedByOwner: boolean;
    /**
     * True if this device has been verified via cross signing.
     *
     * This does *not* take into account `trustCrossSignedDevices`.
     */
    readonly crossSigningVerified: boolean;
    /**
     * TODO: tofu magic wtf does this do?
     */
    readonly tofu: boolean;
    /**
     * True if the device has been marked as locally verified.
     */
    readonly localVerified: boolean;
    /**
     * True if the client has been configured to trust cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi#setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
     */
    private readonly trustCrossSignedDevices;
    constructor(opts: Partial<DeviceVerificationStatus> & {
        /**
         * True if cross-signed devices should be considered verified for {@link DeviceVerificationStatus#isVerified}.
         */
        trustCrossSignedDevices?: boolean;
    });
    /**
     * Check if we should consider this device "verified".
     *
     * A device is "verified" if either:
     *  * it has been manually marked as such via {@link CryptoApi.setDeviceVerified}.
     *  * it has been cross-signed with a verified signing key, **and** the client has been configured to trust
     *    cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
     *
     * @returns true if this device is verified via any means.
     */
    isVerified(): boolean;
}
/**
 * Enum representing the different stages of importing room keys.
 *
 * This is the type of the `stage` property of {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
 */
export declare enum ImportRoomKeyStage {
    /**
     * The stage where room keys are being fetched.
     *
     * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress}.
     */
    Fetch = "fetch",
    /**
     * The stage where room keys are being loaded.
     *
     * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress}.
     */
    LoadKeys = "load_keys"
}
/**
 * Type representing the progress during the 'fetch' stage of the room key import process.
 *
 * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
 */
export type ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress = {
    /**
     * The current stage of the import process.
     */
    stage: ImportRoomKeyStage.Fetch;
};
/**
 * Type representing the progress during the 'load_keys' stage of the room key import process.
 *
 * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
 */
export type ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress = {
    /**
     * The current stage of the import process.
     */
    stage: ImportRoomKeyStage.LoadKeys;
    /**
     * The number of successfully loaded room keys so far.
     */
    successes: number;
    /**
     * The number of room keys that failed to load so far.
     */
    failures: number;
    /**
     * The total number of room keys being loaded.
     */
    total: number;
};
/**
 * Room key import progress report.
 * Used when calling {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys},
 * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson} or {@link CryptoApi#restoreKeyBackup} as the parameter of
 * the progressCallback. Used to display feedback.
 */
export type ImportRoomKeyProgressData = ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress | ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress;
/**
 * Options object for {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys} and
 * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson}.
 */
export interface ImportRoomKeysOpts {
    /** Reports ongoing progress of the import process. Can be used for feedback. */
    progressCallback?: (stage: ImportRoomKeyProgressData) => void;
    /** @deprecated not useful externally */
    source?: string;
}
/**
 * The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getCrossSigningStatus}.
 */
export interface CrossSigningStatus {
    /**
     * True if the public master, self signing and user signing keys are available on this device.
     */
    publicKeysOnDevice: boolean;
    /**
     * True if the private keys are stored in the secret storage.
     */
    privateKeysInSecretStorage: boolean;
    /**
     * True if the private keys are stored locally.
     */
    privateKeysCachedLocally: {
        masterKey: boolean;
        selfSigningKey: boolean;
        userSigningKey: boolean;
    };
}
/**
 * Crypto callbacks provided by the application
 */
export interface CryptoCallbacks {
    /**
     * Called to retrieve a secret storage encryption key.
     *
     * [Server-side secret storage](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#key-storage)
     * is, as the name implies, a mechanism for storing secrets which should be shared between
     * clients on the server. For example, it is typically used for storing the
     * [key backup decryption key](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#decryption-key)
     * and the private [cross-signing keys](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#cross-signing).
     *
     * The secret storage mechanism encrypts the secrets before uploading them to the server using a
     * secret storage key. The schema supports multiple keys, but in practice only one tends to be used
     * at once; this is the "default secret storage key" and may be known as the "recovery key" (or, sometimes,
     * the "security key").
     *
     * Secret storage can be set up by calling {@link CryptoApi.bootstrapSecretStorage}. Having done so, when
     * the crypto stack needs to access secret storage (for example, when setting up a new device, or to
     * store newly-generated secrets), it will use this callback (`getSecretStorageKey`).
     *
     * Note that the secret storage key may be needed several times in quick succession: it is recommended
     * that applications use a temporary cache to avoid prompting the user multiple times for the key. See
     * also {@link cacheSecretStorageKey} which is called when a new key is created.
     *
     * The helper method {@link deriveRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} may be useful if the secret storage key
     * was derived from a passphrase.
     *
     * @param opts - An options object.
     *
     * @param name - the name of the *secret* (NB: not the encryption key) being stored or retrieved.
     *    When the item is stored in account data, it will have this `type`.
     *
     * @returns a pair [`keyId`, `privateKey`], where `keyId` is one of the keys from the `keys` parameter,
     *    and `privateKey` is the raw private encryption key, as appropriate for the encryption algorithm.
     *    (For `m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2`, it is the input to an HKDF as defined in the
     *    [specification](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.6/client-server-api/#msecret_storagev1aes-hmac-sha2).)
     *
     *    Alternatively, if none of the keys are known, may return `null` — in which case the original
     *     operation that requires access to a secret in secret storage may fail with an exception.
     */
    getSecretStorageKey?: (opts: {
        /**
         * Details of the secret storage keys required: a map from the key ID
         * (excluding the `m.secret_storage.key.` prefix) to details of the key.
         *
         * When storing a secret, `keys` will contain exactly one entry.
         *
         * For secret retrieval, `keys` may contain several entries, and the application can return
         * any one of the requested keys. Unless your application specifically wants to offer the
         * user the ability to have more than one secret storage key active at a time, it is recommended
         * to call {@link matrix.SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage.getDefaultKeyId | ServerSideSecretStorage.getDefaultKeyId}
         * to figure out which is the current default key, and to return `null` if the default key is not listed in `keys`.
         */
        keys: Record<string, SecretStorageKeyDescription>;
    }, name: string) => Promise<[string, Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>] | null>;
    /**
     * Called by {@link CryptoApi.bootstrapSecretStorage} when a new default secret storage key is created.
     *
     * Applications can use this to (temporarily) cache the secret storage key, for later return by
     * {@link getSecretStorageKey}.
     *
     * @param keyId - secret storage key id
     * @param keyInfo - secret storage key info
     * @param key - private key to store
     */
    cacheSecretStorageKey?: (keyId: string, keyInfo: SecretStorageKeyDescription, key: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>) => void;
}
/**
 * The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getSecretStorageStatus}.
 */
export interface SecretStorageStatus {
    /** Whether secret storage is fully populated. The same as {@link CryptoApi.isSecretStorageReady}. */
    ready: boolean;
    /** The ID of the current default secret storage key. */
    defaultKeyId: string | null;
    /**
     * For each secret that we checked whether it is correctly stored in secret storage with the default secret storage key.
     *
     * Note that we will only check that the key backup key is stored if key backup is currently enabled (i.e. that
     * {@link CryptoApi.getActiveSessionBackupVersion} returns non-null). `m.megolm_backup.v1` will only be present in that case.
     *
     * (This is an object rather than a `Map` so that it JSON.stringify()s nicely, since its main purpose is to end up
     * in logs.)
     */
    secretStorageKeyValidityMap: {
        [P in SecretStorageKey]?: boolean;
    };
}
/**
 * Parameter of {@link CryptoApi#bootstrapSecretStorage}
 */
export interface CreateSecretStorageOpts {
    /**
     * Function called to await a secret storage key creation flow.
     * @returns Promise resolving to an object with public key metadata, encoded private
     *     recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
     *     and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
     */
    createSecretStorageKey?: () => Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
    /**
     * If true, a new key backup version will be
     * created and the private key stored in the new SSSS store. Ignored if keyBackupInfo
     * is supplied.
     */
    setupNewKeyBackup?: boolean;
    /**
     * Reset even if keys already exist.
     */
    setupNewSecretStorage?: boolean;
}
/** Types of cross-signing key */
export declare enum CrossSigningKey {
    Master = "master",
    SelfSigning = "self_signing",
    UserSigning = "user_signing"
}
/**
 * Information on one of the cross-signing keys.
 * @see https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload
 */
export interface CrossSigningKeyInfo {
    keys: {
        [algorithm: string]: string;
    };
    signatures?: ISignatures;
    usage: string[];
    user_id: string;
}
/**
 * Recovery key created by {@link CryptoApi#createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts#createSecretStorageKey}.
 */
export interface GeneratedSecretStorageKey {
    keyInfo?: {
        /** If the key was derived from a passphrase, information (algorithm, salt, etc) on that derivation. */
        passphrase?: PassphraseInfo;
        /** Optional human-readable name for the key, to be stored in account_data. */
        name?: string;
    };
    /** The raw generated private key. */
    privateKey: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
    /** The generated key, encoded for display to the user per https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#key-representation. */
    encodedPrivateKey?: string;
}
/**
 *  Result type of {@link CryptoApi#getEncryptionInfoForEvent}.
 */
export interface EventEncryptionInfo {
    /** "Shield" to be shown next to this event representing its verification status */
    shieldColour: EventShieldColour;
    /**
     * `null` if `shieldColour` is `EventShieldColour.NONE`; otherwise a reason code for the shield in `shieldColour`.
     */
    shieldReason: EventShieldReason | null;
}
/**
 * Types of shield to be shown for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldColour}.
 */
export declare enum EventShieldColour {
    NONE = 0,
    GREY = 1,
    RED = 2
}
/**
 * Reason codes for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldReason}.
 */
export declare enum EventShieldReason {
    /** An unknown reason from the crypto library (if you see this, it is a bug in matrix-js-sdk). */
    UNKNOWN = 0,
    /** "Encrypted by an unverified user." */
    UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY = 1,
    /** "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner." */
    UNSIGNED_DEVICE = 2,
    /** "Encrypted by an unknown or deleted device." */
    UNKNOWN_DEVICE = 3,
    /**
     * "The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
     *
     * ie: the key has been forwarded, or retrieved from an insecure backup.
     */
    AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED = 4,
    /**
     * The (deprecated) sender_key field in the event does not match the Ed25519 key of the device that sent us the
     * decryption keys.
     *
     * @deprecated The sender_key field is not checked by matrix-sdk-crypto, and this value is therefore unused since
     * the migration to matrix-sdk-crypto in v37.0.0.
     */
    MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY = 5,
    /**
     * The event was sent unencrypted in an encrypted room.
     *
     * @deprecated This has never been used. The fact it is here was due to a misunderstanding of the behaviour of
     * `matrix-sdk-crypto`.
     */
    SENT_IN_CLEAR = 6,
    /**
     * The sender was previously verified but changed their identity.
     */
    VERIFICATION_VIOLATION = 7,
    /**
     * The `sender` field on the ev