UNPKG

major-ai-skills

Version:

Installable agentic skills / AI agent skills (SKILL.md) for Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI, Gemini CLI & Antigravity - 402+ professional app, token-efficiency, and common-sense skills. SEO/GEO ready.

111 lines (85 loc) 3.75 kB
--- name: trivy description: "Scan containers, filesystems, repositories, and infrastructure code with Trivy, then triage CVEs and configure CI thresholds." category: devops risk: safe source: self source_type: self date_added: "2026-08-26" tags: ["trivy", "security", "cve", "container-scan", "iac", "sbom"] tools: ["claude", "cursor", "gemini", "codex"] --- # Aqua Trivy Vulnerability Scanning AI Skill Guide ## Overview Trivy scans container images, filesystems, Git repos, Kubernetes manifests, and Terraform/CloudFormation for OS packages, language libraries, secrets, and misconfigurations. It is widely used as a CI gate. Agents should report **actionable** findings (fixable base, upgraded package) and avoid failing builds on unfixed noise without a documented policy. ``` Target (image | fs | repo | k8s) | v Trivy DB + checks | +--> vulnerabilities (CVE) +--> misconfig / secrets +--> SBOM (optional) ``` ## When to use - Scanning images before registry push or cluster deploy - Adding CI security gates with severity thresholds - Generating SBOM artifacts for compliance - Triaging whether a CVE is reachable / fixed upstream ## Operational directives 1. Pin Trivy version in CI; cache the vulnerability DB between jobs. 2. Fail on `CRITICAL`/`HIGH` by policy; document ignores with expiry reasons. 3. Prefer scanning by image digest, not mutable tags. 4. Separate vuln results from misconfig/secret scanners in reports. 5. Never suppress secrets findings without rotating the leaked credential. ## Concrete examples ### Image and filesystem scans ```bash trivy image ghcr.io/example/api:1.4.2 trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --exit-code 1 ghcr.io/example/api@sha256:... trivy fs --scanners vuln,secret,misconfig . trivy repo --severity HIGH,CRITICAL https://github.com/example/api ``` ### CI-friendly JSON + SARIF ```bash trivy image -f json -o trivy.json ghcr.io/example/api:1.4.2 trivy image -f sarif -o trivy.sarif ghcr.io/example/api:1.4.2 trivy image --format spdx-json -o sbom.spdx.json ghcr.io/example/api:1.4.2 ``` ### Ignore file (time-boxed) ```yaml # .trivyignore.yaml vulnerabilities: - id: CVE-2024-12345 paths: - "usr/lib/libexample.so" expired_at: "2026-09-30" statement: "Waiting on upstream base image 1.5; tracked in JIRA-100" ``` ### Kubernetes / config ```bash trivy k8s cluster --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --report summary trivy config ./deploy/k8s ``` ## Triage table | Finding type | Typical remediations | | :--- | :--- | | Distro package CVE | Rebuild on newer base (`alpine:3.20`, distroless) | | App library CVE | Bump lockfile dependency; rebuild | | Secret in image | Rotate; rewrite history/layers; use BuildKit secrets | | K8s misconfig | Fix securityContext, capabilities, root FS | ## Best practices 1. Scan both build images and final runtime images (multi-stage). 2. Publish SBOM beside the image digest in the registry/CI artifacts. 3. Track mean-time-to-remediate for CRITICAL separately from informational noise. 4. Combine with admission policy (optional) - Trivy alone is not runtime enforcement. ## Limitations - Not all CVEs are exploitable in context; still require human risk acceptance. - DB freshness matters - stale caches miss new advisories. - IaC checks are heuristics; not a full cloud security posture platform. ## Related skills - `docker` - rebuild images after base/package bumps - `kubernetes` - workload hardening after `trivy k8s` findings - `packer` - scan golden images/AMIs via filesystem export where applicable - `argocd` / `fluxcd` - block bad digests before sync