lightningdevkit
Version:
Lightning Development Kit
395 lines • 24.2 kB
JavaScript
import { HTLCDescriptor } from '../structs/HTLCDescriptor.mjs';
import { Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ } from '../structs/Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.mjs';
import { Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ } from '../structs/Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.mjs';
import { CommitmentTransaction } from '../structs/CommitmentTransaction.mjs';
import { HolderCommitmentTransaction } from '../structs/HolderCommitmentTransaction.mjs';
import { HTLCOutputInCommitment } from '../structs/HTLCOutputInCommitment.mjs';
import { ClosingTransaction } from '../structs/ClosingTransaction.mjs';
import { UnsignedChannelAnnouncement } from '../structs/UnsignedChannelAnnouncement.mjs';
import { ChannelSigner } from '../structs/ChannelSigner.mjs';
import { CommonBase } from './CommonBase.mjs';
import * as bindings from '../bindings.mjs';
class LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder {
constructor() {
this.held = null;
}
}
/**
* A trait to sign Lightning channel transactions as described in
* [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/03-transactions.md).
*
* Signing services could be implemented on a hardware wallet and should implement signing
* policies in order to be secure. Please refer to the [VLS Policy
* Controls](https://gitlab.com/lightning-signer/validating-lightning-signer/-/blob/main/docs/policy-controls.md)
* for an example of such policies.
*
* Like [`ChannelSigner`], many of the methods allow errors to be returned to support async
* signing. In such cases, the signing operation can be replayed by calling
* [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`] or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] (see individual
* method documentation for which method should be called) once the result is ready, at which
* point the channel operation will resume.
*
* [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
export class EcdsaChannelSigner extends CommonBase {
/* @internal */
constructor(_dummy, ptr) {
super(ptr, bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_free);
this.bindings_instance = null;
}
/** Creates a new instance of EcdsaChannelSigner from a given implementation */
static new_impl(arg, channelSigner_impl, pubkeys) {
const impl_holder = new LDKEcdsaChannelSignerHolder();
let structImplementation = {
sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages) {
const commitment_tx_hu_conv = new CommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx);
const inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len = bindings.getArrayLength(inbound_htlc_preimages);
const inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr = new Array(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len).fill(null);
for (var m = 0; m < inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len; m++) {
const inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12 = bindings.getU32ArrayElem(inbound_htlc_preimages, m);
const inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12);
inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr[m] = inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_conv;
}
bindings.freeWasmMemory(inbound_htlc_preimages);
const outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len = bindings.getArrayLength(outbound_htlc_preimages);
const outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr = new Array(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len).fill(null);
for (var m = 0; m < outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_len; m++) {
const outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12 = bindings.getU32ArrayElem(outbound_htlc_preimages, m);
const outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12);
outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr[m] = outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_conv;
}
bindings.freeWasmMemory(outbound_htlc_preimages);
const ret = arg.sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv, inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr, outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12_arr);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx) {
const commitment_tx_hu_conv = new HolderCommitmentTransaction(null, commitment_tx);
const ret = arg.sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key) {
const justice_tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(justice_tx);
const per_commitment_key_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(per_commitment_key);
const ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx_conv, input, amount, per_commitment_key_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc) {
const justice_tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(justice_tx);
const per_commitment_key_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(per_commitment_key);
const htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc);
const ret = arg.sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx_conv, input, amount, per_commitment_key_conv, htlc_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor) {
const htlc_tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(htlc_tx);
const htlc_descriptor_hu_conv = new HTLCDescriptor(null, htlc_descriptor);
const ret = arg.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx_conv, input, htlc_descriptor_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc) {
const htlc_tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(htlc_tx);
const per_commitment_point_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(per_commitment_point);
const htlc_hu_conv = new HTLCOutputInCommitment(null, htlc);
const ret = arg.sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx_conv, input, amount, per_commitment_point_conv, htlc_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx) {
const closing_tx_hu_conv = new ClosingTransaction(null, closing_tx);
const ret = arg.sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input) {
const anchor_tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(anchor_tx);
const ret = arg.sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx_conv, input);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg) {
const msg_hu_conv = new UnsignedChannelAnnouncement(null, msg);
const ret = arg.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg_hu_conv);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
sign_splicing_funding_input(tx, input_index, input_value) {
const tx_conv = bindings.decodeUint8Array(tx);
const ret = arg.sign_splicing_funding_input(tx_conv, input_index, input_value);
const result = ret.clone_ptr();
return result;
},
};
const channelSigner = ChannelSigner.new_impl(channelSigner_impl, pubkeys);
const ptr_idx = bindings.LDKEcdsaChannelSigner_new(structImplementation, channelSigner.instance_idx, pubkeys.clone_ptr());
impl_holder.held = new EcdsaChannelSigner(null, ptr_idx[0]);
impl_holder.held.instance_idx = ptr_idx[1];
impl_holder.held.bindings_instance = structImplementation;
impl_holder.held.ptrs_to.push(channelSigner);
return impl_holder.held;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a counterparty's commitment transaction and associated HTLC transactions.
*
* Policy checks should be implemented in this function, including checking the amount
* sent to us and checking the HTLCs.
*
* The preimages of outbound and inbound HTLCs that were fulfilled since the last commitment
* are provided. A validating signer should ensure that an outbound HTLC output is removed
* only when the matching preimage is provided and after the corresponding inbound HTLC has
* been removed for forwarded payments.
*
* Note that all the relevant preimages will be provided, but there may also be additional
* irrelevant or duplicate preimages.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`] must be called.
*
* [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_counterparty_commitment(commitment_tx, inbound_htlc_preimages, outbound_htlc_preimages) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_commitment(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(commitment_tx), bindings.encodeUint32Array(inbound_htlc_preimages.map(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12 => bindings.encodeUint8Array(inbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12))), bindings.encodeUint32Array(outbound_htlc_preimages.map(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12 => bindings.encodeUint8Array(outbound_htlc_preimages_conv_12))));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_C2Tuple_ECDSASignatureCVec_ECDSASignatureZZNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, commitment_tx);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Creates a signature for a holder's commitment transaction.
*
* This will be called
* - with a non-revoked `commitment_tx`.
* - with the latest `commitment_tx` when we initiate a force-close.
*
* This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
*
* An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_holder_commitment(commitment_tx) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_commitment(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(commitment_tx));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, commitment_tx);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC transaction output
* or a commitment transaction `to_local` output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* Amount is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder `revocation_secret` to do
* so).
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_justice_revoked_output(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_output(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(per_commitment_key));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending a commitment transaction
* HTLC output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
*
* A justice transaction may claim multiple outputs at the same time if timelocks are
* similar, but only a signature for the input at index `input` should be signed for here.
* It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is needed with regards
* to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `amount` is the value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143
* signature.
*
* `per_commitment_key` is revocation secret which was provided by our counterparty when they
* revoked the state which they eventually broadcast. It's not a _holder_ secret key and does
* not allow the spending of any funds by itself (you need our holder revocation_secret to do
* so).
*
* `htlc` holds HTLC elements (hash, timelock), thus changing the format of the witness script
* (which is committed to in the BIP 143 signatures).
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_justice_revoked_htlc(justice_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_key, htlc) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_justice_revoked_htlc(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(justice_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(per_commitment_key), CommonBase.get_ptr_of(htlc));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, htlc);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's HTLC output used as an input within
* `htlc_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction at index `input`. The signature returned
* must be be computed using [`EcdsaSighashType::All`].
*
* Note that this may be called for HTLCs in the penultimate commitment transaction if a
* [`ChannelMonitor`] [replica](https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/blob/main/GLOSSARY.md#monitor-replicas)
* broadcasts it before receiving the update for the latest commitment transaction.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`EcdsaSighashType::All`]: bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType::All
* [`ChannelMonitor`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_holder_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, htlc_descriptor) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(htlc_descriptor));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, htlc_descriptor);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a claiming transaction for a HTLC output on a counterparty's commitment
* transaction, either offered or received.
*
* Such a transaction may claim multiples offered outputs at same time if we know the
* preimage for each when we create it, but only the input at index `input` should be
* signed for here. It may be called multiple times for same output(s) if a fee-bump is
* needed with regards to an upcoming timelock expiration.
*
* `witness_script` is either an offered or received script as defined in BOLT3 for HTLC
* outputs.
*
* `amount` is value of the output spent by this input, committed to in the BIP 143 signature.
*
* `per_commitment_point` is the dynamic point corresponding to the channel state
* detected onchain. It has been generated by our counterparty and is used to derive
* channel state keys, which are then included in the witness script and committed to in the
* BIP 143 signature.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(htlc_tx, input, amount, per_commitment_point, htlc) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_counterparty_htlc_transaction(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(htlc_tx), input, amount, bindings.encodeUint8Array(per_commitment_point), CommonBase.get_ptr_of(htlc));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, htlc);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Create a signature for a (proposed) closing transaction.
*
* Note that, due to rounding, there may be one \"missing\" satoshi, and either party may have
* chosen to forgo their output as dust.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`] must be called.
*
* [`ChannelManager::signer_unblocked`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_closing_transaction(closing_tx) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_closing_transaction(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(closing_tx));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, closing_tx);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Computes the signature for a commitment transaction's anchor output used as an
* input within `anchor_tx`, which spends the commitment transaction, at index `input`.
*
* An `Err` can be returned to signal that the signer is unavailable/cannot produce a valid
* signature and should be retried later. Once the signer is ready to provide a signature after
* previously returning an `Err`, [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`] must be called on its
* monitor or [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`] called to attempt unblocking all monitors.
*
* [`ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor::signer_unblocked
* [`ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::signer_unblocked
*/
sign_holder_anchor_input(anchor_tx, input) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_holder_anchor_input(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(anchor_tx), input);
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Signs a channel announcement message with our funding key proving it comes from one of the
* channel participants.
*
* Channel announcements also require a signature from each node's network key. Our node
* signature is computed through [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`].
*
* This method is *not* asynchronous. If an `Err` is returned, the channel will not be
* publicly announced and our counterparty may (though likely will not) close the channel on
* us for violating the protocol.
*
* [`NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message`]: crate::sign::NodeSigner::sign_gossip_message
*/
sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(msg) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(this.ptr, CommonBase.get_ptr_of(msg));
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(this, msg);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
/**
* Signs the input of a splicing funding transaction with our funding key.
*
* In splicing, the previous funding transaction output is spent as the input of
* the new funding transaction, and is a 2-of-2 multisig.
*
* `input_index`: The index of the input within the new funding transaction `tx`,
* spending the previous funding transaction's output
*
* `input_value`: The value of the previous funding transaction output.
*
* This method is *not* asynchronous. If an `Err` is returned, the channel will be immediately
* closed.
*/
sign_splicing_funding_input(tx, input_index, input_value) {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_sign_splicing_funding_input(this.ptr, bindings.encodeUint8Array(tx), input_index, input_value);
const ret_hu_conv = Result_ECDSASignatureNoneZ.constr_from_ptr(ret);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
clone_ptr() {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_clone_ptr(this.ptr);
return ret;
}
/**
* Creates a copy of a EcdsaChannelSigner
*/
clone() {
const ret = bindings.EcdsaChannelSigner_clone(this.ptr);
const ret_hu_conv = new EcdsaChannelSigner(null, ret);
CommonBase.add_ref_from(ret_hu_conv, this);
return ret_hu_conv;
}
}
//# sourceMappingURL=EcdsaChannelSigner.mjs.map