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kestrel.markets

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A typed, token-efficient language + runtime for agentic trading: agents author bounded plans, the runtime fires them at the tick. CLI + typed library + MCP server.

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/** * # adapters/broker/ibkr/contract — the CONTRACT-RESOLUTION layer (kestrel-7o2.6) * * The one place a **Kestrel identity** (an already-resolved {@link OrderIntent}: an instrument, and * — for an option — a strike + a right, ADR-0017) is mapped onto the **broker's own definition** of * that instrument. It answers exactly one question: *which contract at the venue IS this leg?* * * ## Two entry points, and the type is what keeps them apart (kestrel-7o2.24) * {@link resolveContract} is the ORDER path: it returns an {@link IbkrContract}, the TRADABLE union * (`STK` | `OPT`). {@link resolveUnderlier} is the READ path: it returns an * {@link IbkrUnderlierContract} (`STK` | `IND`) — what a chain hangs off and what a feed's spot line * reads. An INDEX (`IND` — the NDX/XND/SPX class of cash-settled index options) is a number, not an * instrument: it lives only in the second union, so the order path cannot be handed one and `tsc` * says so. A structural exclusion, not a runtime guard that could go un-wired. * * ## TRANSMITTER, never a re-pricer (the core doctrine) * The engine has already resolved the price before the intent ever reaches a venue face (RUNTIME §4: * a silent mid is forbidden; the intent carries its price-resolution receipt). So this layer NEVER * reads, derives, rounds, or improves a price — it does not touch `intent.px`, and the * {@link IbkrContract} it returns carries **no price field of any kind** (no px / limit / bid / ask / * minTick). That is a TYPE-level guarantee, asserted structurally in `tests/ibkr.contract.test.ts`: * a contract is an IDENTITY, and a price that rode in on an identity is a price nobody authored. * * ## FAIL-CLOSED (never a guessed contract) * A half-specified leg (strike xor right), an option with no supplied expiry, no matching definition, * an incomplete definition, or — the trap this layer exists to catch — MORE THAN ONE matching * definition, all raise a LOUD typed {@link IbkrContractError} with a logged reason, which the caller * routes to STAND_DOWN. **Never a pick.** Two definitions that both "look right" (an a.m.- vs a * p.m.-settled class, two trading classes, two primary exchanges) are two different instruments; a * layer that silently chooses one has silently authored a trade the author never wrote. The gateway's * definition is the authority — an OCC local symbol, an expiry, an exchange are taken FROM it, never * hand-rolled toward it. * * ## Places NO orders * This module issues READ-ONLY definition lookups (`reqContractDetails`, `reqSecDefOptParams`). It * contains no order-submission path whatsoever, and the narrow {@link IbContractClient} surface it * speaks through declares none — so it cannot submit one even by reaching through the client. Order * submission is a later bead (7o2.8 paper / 7o2.10 live), behind the human-signed arm envelope * (7o2.9). The tests assert this at the source level and with a runtime spy. * * ## One socket, determinism at the edge * The IB client is INJECTED (as the transport injects it), so unit tests drive an in-memory double * with no real socket and no real timer; production passes {@link IbkrTransport}'s ONE shared client * via {@link contractClientOf} — never a second connection. The request-id minter and the deadline * scheduler are injected for the same reason. * * ## KNOWN INTERACTION with the transport's fatal-error rule (observed against the LIVE gateway) * The transport (7o2.5) degrades the shared session on ANY IB error `isNonFatalError` does not * whitelist — including **200 ("no security definition")**, which is REQUEST-scoped and entirely * expected on this layer's fail-closed path (a bogus strike is *supposed* to be refused). So an * `unresolvable` refusal ALSO degrades the transport, and the next lookup throws * {@link IbkrConnectionError} until the session reconnects. The direction is safe — it fails MORE * closed, never less, and STAND_DOWN is exactly where both paths route — but a request-scoped error * should not fell the socket. Tuning that classification is the transport's call (the IBKR hardening * bead), NOT this layer's: nothing here may quietly re-open or re-classify a session the transport * has declared dead. */ import { EventName, SecType, OptionType, isNonFatalError } from "@stoqey/ib"; import type { Contract, ContractDetails } from "@stoqey/ib"; import { redactAccount } from "./config.ts"; import { IbkrContractError } from "./errors.ts"; import type { IbkrTransport, Scheduler, TimerHandle } from "./transport.ts"; import type { OrderIntent } from "../../../engine/index.ts"; import type { Right } from "../../../bus/index.ts"; /** IB's "No security definition has been found for the request" (error 200) — the venue's own way of * saying the identity does not exist. `@stoqey/ib`'s {@link import("@stoqey/ib").ErrorCode} enum has * no member for it, so it is named here rather than left as a bare literal at the branch. */ export const IB_NO_SECURITY_DEFINITION = 200; /** Publication-safe routing defaults (ARCHITECTURE §7: nothing here reveals an application). SMART * is IB's own documented default router and USD the listing currency of the generic US tickers the * package ships fixtures for; both are always overridable per-call. Never a guessed EXPIRY, though — * an expiry has no safe default, so it is required from the caller (see {@link IbkrContractDeps}). */ export const IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE = "SMART"; export const IBKR_DEFAULT_CURRENCY = "USD"; const DEFAULT_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000; // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // The resolved contract — an IDENTITY. No price rides on it. // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** The fields every resolved contract carries, whatever the asset class. Note what is ABSENT and * always will be: any price. The contract layer is a transmitter, never a re-pricer. */ interface IbkrContractBase { /** IB's unique contract id — the authoritative handle a later order face transmits against. */ readonly conId: number; readonly symbol: string; /** The destination exchange the gateway's definition names (e.g. `SMART`). */ readonly exchange: string; readonly currency: string; /** The gateway's OWN local symbol (for an option, the OCC symbol) — never hand-rolled. */ readonly localSymbol: string; /** The gateway's own trading class, when it named one (e.g. `SPY`) — the disambiguator. */ readonly tradingClass: string | undefined; } /** A resolved SPOT/EQUITY contract (ADR-0017: strike AND right both absent on the leg). */ export interface IbkrEquityContract extends IbkrContractBase { readonly kind: "equity"; readonly secType: "STK"; /** Shares are 1:1 — the multiplier is carried for a uniform sizing surface, not derived. */ readonly multiplier: 1; /** The listing exchange the gateway names for a SMART-routed equity (e.g. `ARCA`), when known. */ readonly primaryExchange: string | undefined; } /** * A resolved INDEX contract (`secType: IND`) — the underlier of a **cash-settled index option** * (NDX/XND/SPX class), and the thing a chain hangs off. * * ## It is NOT a member of {@link IbkrContract}, and that is the whole point * An index is a NUMBER, not an instrument: it cannot be bought, sold, held, or delivered. So it is * deliberately kept OUT of the tradable {@link IbkrContract} union rather than admitted and then * guarded. {@link resolveContract} — the ORDER path's entry point — can never return one, and the * order face's {@link IbkrContract}-typed surfaces (the contract book, `submit`, `preflight`) cannot * be handed one: `tsc` refuses. That is a STRUCTURAL guarantee, not a runtime check that could be * forgotten, mis-wired, or deleted. A feed subscribes to an index (that is where the spot the strike * window centres on comes from — see {@link IbkrUnderlierContract}); an order path never touches one. * * Note what is ABSENT: no `multiplier`, no `primaryExchange`. An index has no contract multiplier * (there is no contract), so the field that would let it be SIZED does not exist to be read. */ export interface IbkrIndexContract extends IbkrContractBase { readonly kind: "index"; readonly secType: "IND"; } /** * What an option chain can hang off, and what a feed's SPOT line can be: an equity/ETF underlier * (`STK`) or an index underlier (`IND`). Which one a symbol IS is never inferred from the symbol — * `XND` could be anything — it is stated by the caller ({@link resolveUnderlier}'s `secType`). */ export type IbkrUnderlierContract = IbkrEquityContract | IbkrIndexContract; /** Anything the FEED may subscribe to for a quote — an underlier (equity or index) or an option leg. * Strictly wider than {@link IbkrContract} (the TRADABLE union): a quote is not a trade. */ export type IbkrQuotedContract = IbkrUnderlierContract | IbkrOptionContract; /** Which asset class an underlier IS. Never guessed from the symbol: stated by the caller. */ export type UnderlierSecType = "STK" | "IND"; /** A resolved OPTION contract (ADR-0017: strike AND right both present on the leg). Every field is * the GATEWAY's, taken from its definition — the expiry, the multiplier, the OCC local symbol. */ export interface IbkrOptionContract extends IbkrContractBase { readonly kind: "option"; readonly secType: "OPT"; /** Contract multiplier as the venue defines it (dollars per point). Read, never assumed. */ readonly multiplier: number; /** The venue's last-trading-day, `YYYYMMDD`. Never guessed — echoed from the definition. */ readonly expiry: string; readonly strike: number; readonly right: Right; } /** * A **TRADABLE** broker contract resolved from a Kestrel identity (kestrel-7o2.6) — the discriminated * union a venue face transmits against. It carries NO price: not `px`, not a limit, not a quote, not * a tick size. The price on the {@link OrderIntent} is the engine's, already resolved with a receipt; * this layer never reads it and never lets a venue-side number impersonate one. * * {@link IbkrIndexContract} is NOT a member: an index is not tradable, so the order path's own type * excludes it and no guard is needed to keep it out (see that type's docblock). Widen to * {@link IbkrQuotedContract} for the read-only feed side, never here. */ export type IbkrContract = IbkrEquityContract | IbkrOptionContract; /** The gateway's option chain for one underlier + trading class — the definition source a caller * picks a strike/expiry FROM (it does not pick for them). Carries no price. */ export interface IbkrOptionChain { readonly symbol: string; readonly exchange: string; readonly tradingClass: string; readonly multiplier: number; /** Sorted ascending — the same gateway reply always yields the same order (determinism at the edge). */ readonly expirations: readonly string[]; /** Sorted ascending. */ readonly strikes: readonly number[]; } // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // Injected seams — the narrow READ-ONLY definition surface of the shared IB client. // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** A listener over the IB event bus (the transport's convention — concrete closures are wrapped at * the registration site, so the `never[]` never escapes into a handler body). */ type IbListener = (...args: never[]) => void; /** * The NARROW structural surface of the shared IB client this layer speaks through: the two READ-ONLY * contract-definition requests and the event bus. It declares NO order-submission method at all — the * contract layer cannot transmit an order even by reaching through the client (order submission is * 7o2.8/7o2.10, behind the 7o2.9 arm envelope). A test injects a double implementing exactly this; * production passes the transport's ONE shared client (a structural superset) via * {@link contractClientOf} — never a second socket. */ export interface IbContractClient { /** Ask the gateway for every definition matching a (possibly partial) contract query. */ reqContractDetails(reqId: number, contract: Contract): unknown; /** Ask the gateway for an underlier's option-chain parameters (expirations/strikes/multiplier). */ reqSecDefOptParams( reqId: number, underlyingSymbol: string, futFopExchange: string, underlyingSecType: string, underlyingConId: number, ): unknown; on(event: EventName, listener: IbListener): unknown; removeListener(event: EventName, listener: IbListener): unknown; } /** Everything {@link resolveContract} is wired with. Every non-determinism source (the socket, the * request-id minter, the deadline timer) is injected, so unit tests run with none of them. */ export interface IbkrContractDeps { /** The shared IB client — the transport's ONE session in production (see {@link contractClientOf}). */ readonly client: IbContractClient; /** Mints a unique IB request id per lookup. Defaults to a module-local monotone counter (a counter, * never an RNG — this is the edge, and it still must not be a source of nondeterminism). */ readonly nextReqId?: (() => number) | undefined; /** The OPTION expiry to resolve (`YYYYMMDD`). REQUIRED for an option leg and REFUSED-if-absent — * an expiry is never inferred from a clock or a chain, because "the nearest one" is a trade the * author did not write. Ignored (and unnecessary) for a spot/equity leg. */ readonly expiry?: string | undefined; /** Destination exchange for the query (default {@link IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE}). */ readonly exchange?: string | undefined; /** Trading currency for the query (default {@link IBKR_DEFAULT_CURRENCY}). */ readonly currency?: string | undefined; /** Trading class to pin — the ONLY sanctioned way to disambiguate two classes on one underlier * (e.g. an a.m.- vs a p.m.-settled index class). Absent + two matches ⇒ a typed refusal, never a pick. */ readonly tradingClass?: string | undefined; /** Lookup deadline (ms). A lapse is a typed `lookup-failed`, never a hang. */ readonly timeoutMs?: number | undefined; /** Deadline scheduler — injected so tests fire it by hand (no real timer). */ readonly scheduler?: Scheduler | undefined; /** The session account, used ONLY to stamp a REDACTED marker on diagnostics (as the transport * redacts it). The full id never reaches a message. */ readonly account?: string | undefined; /** Redacted-diagnostic sink (default no-op). Receives only already-redacted strings. */ readonly log?: ((line: string) => void) | undefined; } /** Which underlier + class an option chain is being pulled for. */ export interface IbkrChainQuery { readonly symbol: string; /** The underlier's IB conId — resolve the underlier ({@link resolveUnderlier}) first, then hand its * conId here. */ readonly underlyingConId: number; /** What the underlier IS. `reqSecDefOptParams` takes the underlier's own secType, and an INDEX * underlier asked about as `STK` returns NO chain at all — the NDX/XND blocker. Defaults to `STK`, * which is what every equity/ETF caller has always meant; an index caller must say `IND`. Not a * guess in either direction: the caller states it (same rule as {@link resolveUnderlier}). */ readonly underlyingSecType?: UnderlierSecType | undefined; /** Pin a trading class; absent + several classes on the exchange ⇒ a typed `ambiguous` refusal. */ readonly tradingClass?: string | undefined; } // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // resolveContract — the seam. // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** * Map a resolved {@link OrderIntent} onto exactly ONE broker contract (kestrel-7o2.6). * * Routing is ADR-0017's rule and nothing else: **strike AND right both present ⇒ an OPTION; both * absent ⇒ a SPOT/EQUITY**. Anything in between is not an instrument identity and is refused before * the gateway is even asked (a right is never guessed from a side; a strike is never guessed from a * price — indeed no price is ever read). * * The resolved contract is the GATEWAY's own definition: its conId, its OCC local symbol, its * multiplier, its exchange, its currency, its expiry. Zero, several, incomplete, or unanswered ⇒ a * LOUD {@link IbkrContractError} the caller logs and STANDs DOWN on. * * @throws {IbkrContractError} `unsupported` | `unresolvable` | `ambiguous` | `lookup-failed`. */ export async function resolveContract( intent: OrderIntent, deps: IbkrContractDeps, ): Promise<IbkrContract> { const hasStrike = intent.strike !== undefined; const hasRight = intent.right !== undefined; const exchange = deps.exchange ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE; const currency = deps.currency ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_CURRENCY; // ADR-0017's routing rule, enforced as a GATE. A half-specified leg is not an instrument. if (hasStrike !== hasRight) { throw refuse( deps, "unsupported", `leg ${describeLeg(intent)} specifies ${hasStrike ? "a strike with NO right" : "a right with NO strike"} — an option identity needs BOTH (ADR-0017), and neither is ever invented`, ); } // A spot ORDER leg is an EQUITY and only ever an equity. An index (`IND`) is not tradable, so the // order path does not route to it — its resolver is {@link resolveUnderlier}, whose return type // this function's does not include. Nothing to guard: the type is the guard. if (!hasStrike) return resolveEquity(intent.instrument, describeLeg(intent), deps, exchange, currency); const expiry = nonEmpty(deps.expiry); if (expiry === undefined) { throw refuse( deps, "unsupported", `option leg ${describeLeg(intent)} has NO supplied expiry — the contract layer never guesses an expiry (a "nearest" one is a trade nobody authored)`, ); } const strike = intent.strike as number; const right = intent.right as Right; const query: Contract = { symbol: intent.instrument, secType: SecType.OPT, exchange, currency, lastTradeDateOrContractMonth: expiry, strike, right: right === "C" ? OptionType.Call : OptionType.Put, ...(deps.tradingClass === undefined ? {} : { tradingClass: deps.tradingClass }), }; const details = await requestDefinitions(deps, query, describeLeg(intent, expiry)); const matches = details.filter((d) => matchesOption(d.contract, intent.instrument, expiry, strike, right, deps.tradingClass), ); const only = exactlyOne(deps, matches, describeLeg(intent, expiry)); return buildOption(deps, only.contract, describeLeg(intent, expiry)); } async function resolveEquity( symbol: string, label: string, deps: IbkrContractDeps, exchange: string, currency: string, ): Promise<IbkrEquityContract> { // A spot leg writes NO fictional strike/right onto the wire (ADR-0017) and needs no expiry. const query: Contract = { symbol, secType: SecType.STK, exchange, currency, }; const details = await requestDefinitions(deps, query, label); const matches = details.filter( (d) => d.contract.secType === SecType.STK && d.contract.symbol === symbol, ); const only = exactlyOne(deps, matches, label); const c = only.contract; const conId = c.conId; const localSymbol = nonEmpty(c.localSymbol); const venueExchange = nonEmpty(c.exchange) ?? exchange; const venueCurrency = nonEmpty(c.currency); if (conId === undefined || localSymbol === undefined || venueCurrency === undefined) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway's definition for ${label} is incomplete (conId/localSymbol/currency missing) — a partial definition is never completed by hand`, ); } return { kind: "equity", secType: "STK", conId, symbol, exchange: venueExchange, primaryExchange: nonEmpty(c.primaryExch), currency: venueCurrency, localSymbol, tradingClass: nonEmpty(c.tradingClass), multiplier: 1, }; } /** * Resolve the UNDERLIER a chain hangs off / a feed's spot line reads (kestrel-7o2.24) — an equity/ETF * (`STK`) or an **index** (`IND`, the NDX/XND/SPX class of cash-settled index options). * * `secType` is REQUIRED and never inferred. A symbol does not say what it is: `XND` is an index at * Nasdaq and could be an ETF's ticker anywhere else, and an adapter that sniffed the class would be * guessing an identity — precisely what this layer exists not to do. The caller states it; the * gateway's definition confirms it, or the lookup refuses. * * The result is an {@link IbkrUnderlierContract}, which is NOT an {@link IbkrContract}: an index is * not tradable and the type says so, so nothing resolved here can be handed to the order path. * * ## EXCHANGE: pinned, or left OPEN — never defaulted to SMART for an index * An equity is SMART-routed and defaults to {@link IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE} as it always has. An index * is NOT: `SMART` is a router, and indices are published by their listing venue (NDX on `NASDAQ`, SPX * on `CBOE`). So for `IND` the query's exchange is the caller's pin if there is one, and otherwise * LEFT OPEN — asking the venue "which listings of this index do you have?" rather than asserting a * wrong one. Open + exactly one listing ⇒ resolved. Open + several ⇒ a LOUD `ambiguous` refusal that * NAMES the exchanges, so the operator learns exactly what to pin. Both are fail-closed; the open * query is merely the one that fails INFORMATIVELY instead of as a flat `unresolvable`. * * @throws {IbkrContractError} `unresolvable` | `ambiguous` | `lookup-failed`. */ export async function resolveUnderlier( query: { readonly symbol: string; readonly secType: UnderlierSecType }, deps: IbkrContractDeps, ): Promise<IbkrUnderlierContract> { const currency = deps.currency ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_CURRENCY; if (query.secType === "STK") { const exchange = deps.exchange ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE; return resolveEquity(query.symbol, `${query.symbol} (spot/equity)`, deps, exchange, currency); } return resolveIndex(query.symbol, deps, currency); } /** The `IND` half of {@link resolveUnderlier}. Same fail-closed spine as every other lookup: the * gateway's OWN definition, exactly one match or a typed refusal, no field hand-completed. */ async function resolveIndex( symbol: string, deps: IbkrContractDeps, currency: string, ): Promise<IbkrIndexContract> { // Pinned, or OPEN — never SMART (see resolveUnderlier's docblock). `tradingClass` is deliberately // NOT forwarded: a trading class names an OPTION series (`XND`, `SPXW`), not an index, and putting // an option's class on an index query asks for a contract that does not exist. const pinned = nonEmpty(deps.exchange); const label = `${symbol} (index/IND)${pinned === undefined ? " [exchange OPEN]" : `@${pinned}`}`; const query: Contract = { symbol, secType: SecType.IND, currency, ...(pinned === undefined ? {} : { exchange: pinned }), }; const details = await requestDefinitions(deps, query, label); // The secType filter is load-bearing, not decoration: an `IND` question answered with a `STK` // definition (a same-ticker ETF) is a DIFFERENT instrument, and accepting it would silently swap // the thing the strike window centres on. const matches = details.filter( (d) => d.contract.secType === SecType.IND && nonEmpty(d.contract.symbol) === symbol && (pinned === undefined || nonEmpty(d.contract.exchange) === pinned), ); const only = exactlyOne(deps, matches, label); const c = only.contract; const conId = c.conId; const localSymbol = nonEmpty(c.localSymbol); const venueExchange = nonEmpty(c.exchange); const venueCurrency = nonEmpty(c.currency); if ( conId === undefined || localSymbol === undefined || venueExchange === undefined || venueCurrency === undefined ) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway's definition for ${label} is incomplete (conId/localSymbol/exchange/currency missing) — a partial definition is never completed by hand`, ); } return { kind: "index", secType: "IND", conId, symbol, exchange: venueExchange, currency: venueCurrency, localSymbol, tradingClass: nonEmpty(c.tradingClass), }; } /** Build the option contract from the gateway's ONE matching definition. Every field is READ from * the venue — an incomplete definition is refused, never hand-completed (no hand-rolled OCC symbol, * no assumed 100x multiplier). No price is read: `minTick`, `marketName`, and every other decoration * on the {@link ContractDetails} is deliberately dropped on the floor. */ function buildOption(deps: IbkrContractDeps, c: Contract, leg: string): IbkrOptionContract { const conId = c.conId; const localSymbol = nonEmpty(c.localSymbol); const multiplier = numberish(c.multiplier); const expiry = expiryOf(c); // the venue decorates its own date — normalise, never re-format by hand const strike = numberish(c.strike); const right = rightOf(c.right); const currency = nonEmpty(c.currency); const exchange = nonEmpty(c.exchange); if ( conId === undefined || localSymbol === undefined || multiplier === undefined || expiry === undefined || strike === undefined || right === undefined || currency === undefined || exchange === undefined ) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway's definition for ${leg} is incomplete (missing conId/localSymbol/multiplier/expiry/strike/right/currency/exchange) — a partial definition is never completed by hand`, ); } return { kind: "option", secType: "OPT", conId, symbol: nonEmpty(c.symbol) ?? "", exchange, currency, localSymbol, tradingClass: nonEmpty(c.tradingClass), multiplier, expiry, strike, right, }; } // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // resolveOptionChain — the gateway's own strike/expiry grid (a definition lookup, not a quote). // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** * Pull the gateway's option-chain parameters for an underlier (kestrel-7o2.6) — the expirations, the * strike grid, and the multiplier IB itself publishes for one exchange + trading class. This is a * DEFINITION lookup (`reqSecDefOptParams`), not market data: it carries no quote and no price. * * A caller uses it to pick a strike/expiry from what the venue actually lists (rather than inventing * one) and then hands that identity back to {@link resolveContract}. Fail-closed: an empty chain is * `unresolvable`; several trading classes on the requested exchange with none pinned is `ambiguous` * (never a pick — two classes are two instruments). * * @throws {IbkrContractError} `unresolvable` | `ambiguous` | `lookup-failed`. */ export async function resolveOptionChain( query: IbkrChainQuery, deps: IbkrContractDeps, ): Promise<IbkrOptionChain> { const exchange = deps.exchange ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE; const wanted = query.tradingClass ?? deps.tradingClass; const label = `option chain for ${query.symbol}@${exchange}${wanted === undefined ? "" : ` class=${wanted}`}`; const rows = await requestChain(deps, query, label); const onExchange = rows.filter( (r) => r.exchange === exchange && (wanted === undefined || r.tradingClass === wanted), ); if (onExchange.length === 0) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway lists NO ${label} — an expiry/strike grid is never invented`, { candidates: 0 }, ); } if (onExchange.length > 1) { throw refuse( deps, "ambiguous", `the gateway lists ${onExchange.length} trading classes for ${label} (${onExchange.map((r) => r.tradingClass).join(", ")}) — ambiguous; pin one with \`tradingClass\` rather than have the layer pick`, { candidates: onExchange.length }, ); } const row = onExchange[0] as ChainRow; const multiplier = numberish(row.multiplier); if (multiplier === undefined) { throw refuse(deps, "unresolvable", `the ${label} came back with no multiplier — incomplete`); } return { symbol: query.symbol, exchange: row.exchange, tradingClass: row.tradingClass, multiplier, // Sorted so the same gateway reply always yields the same grid, whatever order the socket // delivered it in (determinism at the edge — a caller's "nearest expiry" pick must be stable). expirations: [...row.expirations].sort(), strikes: [...row.strikes].sort((a, b) => a - b), }; } /** * The strikes the gateway ACTUALLY LISTS for one expiry + right (kestrel-7o2.6) — a definition * lookup (`reqContractDetails` with the strike left OPEN), not market data: no quote, no price. * * Why it exists beside {@link resolveOptionChain}: `reqSecDefOptParams` returns the UNION of strikes * across every expiry of an underlier, so a strike from that grid may not be listed on the expiry a * caller actually wants (the near-dated series is far narrower than the union — verified against the * live gateway). Picking from the union would therefore invent an identity the venue does not list. * This asks the venue what it lists for THAT expiry, so a caller picks from the truth. * * @throws {IbkrContractError} `unresolvable` (the venue lists no strike for it) | `lookup-failed`. */ export async function listOptionStrikes( query: { symbol: string; expiry: string; right: Right; tradingClass?: string | undefined }, deps: IbkrContractDeps, ): Promise<readonly number[]> { const exchange = deps.exchange ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_EXCHANGE; const currency = deps.currency ?? IBKR_DEFAULT_CURRENCY; const tradingClass = query.tradingClass ?? deps.tradingClass; const label = `listed ${query.symbol} ${query.expiry} ${query.right} strikes@${exchange}`; // The strike is deliberately LEFT OPEN — that is the whole request: "which strikes do you list?" const open: Contract = { symbol: query.symbol, secType: SecType.OPT, exchange, currency, lastTradeDateOrContractMonth: query.expiry, right: query.right === "C" ? OptionType.Call : OptionType.Put, ...(tradingClass === undefined ? {} : { tradingClass }), }; const details = await requestDefinitions(deps, open, label); const strikes = new Set<number>(); for (const d of details) { const c = d.contract; if (c.secType !== SecType.OPT) continue; if (nonEmpty(c.symbol) !== query.symbol) continue; if (expiryOf(c) !== query.expiry) continue; if (rightOf(c.right) !== query.right) continue; if (tradingClass !== undefined && nonEmpty(c.tradingClass) !== tradingClass) continue; const s = numberish(c.strike); if (s !== undefined) strikes.add(s); } if (strikes.size === 0) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway lists NO strikes for ${label} — a strike grid is never invented`, { candidates: 0 }, ); } return [...strikes].sort((a, b) => a - b); } // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // The shared-session bridge. // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── /** * The ONE shared IB session, viewed through the READ-ONLY definition surface (kestrel-7o2.6). The * transport hands out its single guarded client (throwing the typed connection error if the session * is not connected or has gone degraded, so a contract can never be resolved over a dead socket); * this re-views it as an {@link IbContractClient}. The cast NARROWS toward the two definition * requests — the real `IBApi` is a structural superset of both views, and neither view can submit an * order. There is never a second socket. */ export function contractClientOf(transport: IbkrTransport): IbContractClient { return transport.client() as unknown as IbContractClient; } // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── // Internals — the request/response plumbing (listeners, deadline, teardown). // ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── interface ChainRow { readonly exchange: string; readonly tradingClass: string; readonly multiplier: string; readonly expirations: readonly string[]; readonly strikes: readonly number[]; } /** Ask the gateway for every definition matching `query`, collecting until `contractDetailsEnd`. A * fatal IB error on OUR request id, or a deadline lapse, is a typed refusal — never a hang and never * an empty-result-by-silence (which would look like "no such contract" when the socket merely died). */ function requestDefinitions( deps: IbkrContractDeps, query: Contract, label: string, ): Promise<ContractDetails[]> { return request<ContractDetails[]>(deps, label, (reqId, ctx) => { const collected: ContractDetails[] = []; ctx.listen(EventName.contractDetails, (id: number, details: ContractDetails) => { if (id === reqId) collected.push(details); }); ctx.listen(EventName.contractDetailsEnd, (id: number) => { if (id === reqId) ctx.done(collected); }); deps.client.reqContractDetails(reqId, query); }); } /** Ask the gateway for an underlier's chain parameters, collecting until the end marker. */ function requestChain( deps: IbkrContractDeps, query: IbkrChainQuery, label: string, ): Promise<ChainRow[]> { return request<ChainRow[]>(deps, label, (reqId, ctx) => { const rows: ChainRow[] = []; ctx.listen( EventName.securityDefinitionOptionParameter, ( id: number, exchange: string, _underlyingConId: number, tradingClass: string, multiplier: string, expirations: string[], strikes: number[], ) => { if (id === reqId) rows.push({ exchange, tradingClass, multiplier, expirations, strikes }); }, ); ctx.listen(EventName.securityDefinitionOptionParameterEnd, (id: number) => { if (id === reqId) ctx.done(rows); }); // `futFopExchange` is empty for an equity/ETF **and** an index underlier (IB's own convention — // it names a FUT/FOP exchange, which neither is). The underlier's secType is the caller's // (`STK` for an equity/ETF, `IND` for an index — an index asked about as STK returns NOTHING), // and its conId is the caller's already-resolved underlier contract. const underlyingSecType = query.underlyingSecType === "IND" ? SecType.IND : SecType.STK; deps.client.reqSecDefOptParams(reqId, query.symbol, "", underlyingSecType, query.underlyingConId); }); } /** The collector handed to a request body: register a listener (auto-torn-down) and settle. */ interface RequestCtx<T> { listen<A extends unknown[]>(event: EventName, listener: (...args: A) => void): void; done(value: T): void; } /** * The ONE request/response shape both definition lookups share: mint a request id, wire the reply + * error + deadline listeners, run the request, and ALWAYS tear every listener back off (on success * and on failure alike — a leaked listener on a shared socket is a cross-request bug). Non-fatal IB * info codes (2100–2999, market-data-farm chatter) are ignored, exactly as the transport ignores * them; a FATAL error on our own request id refuses, typed. */ function request<T>( deps: IbkrContractDeps, label: string, body: (reqId: number, ctx: RequestCtx<T>) => void, ): Promise<T> { const client = deps.client; const scheduler = deps.scheduler ?? defaultScheduler; const timeoutMs = deps.timeoutMs ?? DEFAULT_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS; const reqId = (deps.nextReqId ?? defaultNextReqId)(); return new Promise<T>((resolve, reject) => { const registered: Array<[EventName, IbListener]> = []; let settled = false; let deadline: TimerHandle | undefined; const teardown = (): void => { for (const [event, listener] of registered) client.removeListener(event, listener); registered.length = 0; if (deadline !== undefined) { scheduler.clearInterval(deadline); deadline = undefined; } }; const settle = (fn: () => void): void => { if (settled) return; settled = true; teardown(); fn(); }; const ctx: RequestCtx<T> = { listen: <A extends unknown[]>(event: EventName, listener: (...args: A) => void): void => { const wrapped = listener as unknown as IbListener; client.on(event, wrapped); registered.push([event, wrapped]); }, done: (value: T): void => { settle(() => { resolve(value); }); }, }; ctx.listen(EventName.error, (err: Error, code: number, id: number) => { if (id !== reqId) return; // another face's request on the shared socket — not ours to judge if (isNonFatalError(code, err)) { deps.log?.(`ib info during ${label} (code=${code})`); return; } settle(() => { reject( code === IB_NO_SECURITY_DEFINITION ? refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway has NO security definition for ${label} (IB 200) — an unknown strike/right/expiry/symbol is never rounded toward a nearby one`, { code, cause: err, candidates: 0 }, ) : refuse(deps, "lookup-failed", `the definition lookup for ${label} failed at the gateway (IB ${code})`, { code, cause: err, }), ); }); }); // The deadline: a gateway that never answers is a FAILED lookup, not an empty one. Fired through // the injected scheduler so tests trip it by hand (no real timer, no flake). deadline = scheduler.setInterval(() => { settle(() => { reject( refuse(deps, "lookup-failed", `the definition lookup for ${label} timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms`), ); }); }, timeoutMs); try { body(reqId, ctx); } catch (cause) { settle(() => { reject(refuse(deps, "lookup-failed", `the definition request for ${label} threw at the socket`, { cause })); }); } }); } /** Exactly one definition, or a typed refusal. The heart of the fail-closed doctrine: ZERO is * `unresolvable`, MORE THAN ONE is `ambiguous` — and the layer NEVER breaks the tie itself. */ function exactlyOne( deps: IbkrContractDeps, matches: readonly ContractDetails[], label: string, ): ContractDetails { if (matches.length === 0) { throw refuse( deps, "unresolvable", `the gateway matched NO definition for ${label} — an unknown strike/right/expiry/symbol never becomes a nearby guess`, { candidates: 0 }, ); } if (matches.length > 1) { throw refuse( deps, "ambiguous", `the gateway matched ${matches.length} definitions for ${label} (${matches .map((m) => describeCandidate(m.contract)) .join(" | ")}) — ambiguous, and picking one of several would route an order to a contract nobody authored; pin \`tradingClass\`/\`exchange\` instead`, { candidates: matches.length }, ); } return matches[0] as ContractDetails; } /** Build + log the typed refusal. The reason is already secret-free; the account (if any) is stamped * REDACTED, as the transport stamps it, so an operator recognises their own session without the id * ever reaching a log. */ function refuse( deps: IbkrContractDeps, failure: "unsupported" | "unresolvable" | "ambiguous" | "lookup-failed", reason: string, options: { code?: number | undefined; candidates?: number | undefined; cause?: unknown } = {}, ): IbkrContractError { const stamped = `${reason} [account=${redactAccount(deps.account)}]`; deps.log?.(`contract refused [${failure}]: ${stamped}`); return new IbkrContractError(failure, stamped, options); } /** A secret-free, publication-safe description of the leg being resolved (generic symbol + identity * only — no price, ever). */ function describeLeg(intent: OrderIntent, expiry?: string): string { if (intent.strike === undefined || intent.right === undefined) { return intent.strike === undefined && intent.right === undefined ? `${intent.instrument} (spot/equity)` : `${intent.instrument} strike=${intent.strike ?? "-"} right=${intent.right ?? "-"}`; } return `${intent.instrument} ${expiry ?? "(no expiry)"} ${intent.strike}${intent.right}`; } /** How a single ambiguous candidate is named in the refusal — enough for an operator to see WHY the * two differ, never enough to constitute a pick. */ function describeCandidate(c: Contract): string { return `conId=${c.conId ?? "?"} class=${c.tradingClass ?? "?"} exch=${c.exchange ?? "?"}/${c.primaryExch ?? "-"} local=${c.localSymbol ?? "?"}`; } /** * Does the gateway's definition actually ANSWER the identity we asked about? A defence-in-depth * filter: a definition that drifts from the requested strike/right/expiry/symbol is not a match, and * a near-miss is never quietly accepted as one. * * ## The tradingClass pin is ENFORCED here, not merely REQUESTED on the wire * A pinned `tradingClass` rides on the query, but a pin that only rides on the query is a pin the * GATEWAY may ignore — and it does: `reqContractDetails` is a match-what-you-can lookup, and for a * multi-class underlier (`NDX` with `NDX` a.m.- and `NDXP` p.m.-settled; `SPX` with `SPXW`) IB has * been observed answering with every class on the strike. Filtering here is what makes the pin the * disambiguator {@link IbkrContractDeps.tradingClass} claims to be. Without it the pin is INERT: the * two classes both survive to {@link exactlyOne} and the lookup refuses `ambiguous` — fail-closed, * but the caller did everything right and still cannot resolve the leg, so XND/SPXW is unreachable. * (This mirrors {@link listOptionStrikes}, which has always filtered on the class.) * * Note the direction: this only ever REMOVES candidates. It cannot turn an ambiguity into a pick — * two definitions sharing the pinned class are still two definitions, and still refuse. */ function matchesOption( c: Contract, symbol: string, expiry: string, strike: number, right: Right, tradingClass: string | undefined, ): boolean { if (c.secType !== SecType.OPT) return false; if (nonEmpty(c.symbol) !== symbol) return false; if (expiryOf(c) !== expiry) return false; if (tradingClass !== undefined && nonEmpty(c.tradingClass) !== tradingClass) return false; const gotStrike = numberish(c.strike); if (gotStrike === undefined || Math.abs(gotStrike - strike) > 1e-9) return false; return rightOf(c.right) === right; } /** * The venue's LAST TRADING DAY as a bare `YYYYMMDD` (kestrel-7o2.6). * * A real-gateway fact the live acceptance caught: IB ANSWERS with a decorated * `lastTradeDateOrContractMonth` — `"20260714 16:15:00 US/Eastern"` — even though it is QUERIED with * the bare `"20260714"`. It also carries the clean date separately as `lastTradeDate`. Normalising * here is what lets the identity check stay STRICT (a definition whose expiry drifts from the one * asked for is not a match) without a string-format artefact rejecting every real definition. * * A 6-digit contract MONTH (`YYYYMM`, futures-style) is deliberately NOT accepted: we asked for a * day, so a month is not an answer to the question — it fails closed as an incomplete definition. */ function expiryOf(c: Contract): string | undefined { const raw = nonEmpty(c.lastTradeDate) ?? nonEmpty(c.lastTradeDateOrContractMonth); if (raw === undefined) return undefined; const head = raw.split(/\s+/)[0]; return head !== undefined && /^\d{8}$/.test(head) ? head : undefined; } /** IB delivers the right as `C`/`P` (and, on some paths, `CALL`/`PUT`). Anything else is UNKNOWN — * `undefined`, which fails closed upstream rather than defaulting to a call. */ function rightOf(right: unknown): Right | undefined { if (typeof right !== "string") return undefined; const r = right.trim().toUpperCase(); if (r === "C" || r === "CALL") return "C"; if (r === "P" || r === "PUT") return "P"; return undefined; } /** IB's wire types are loose (a multiplier arrives as `"100"` on some paths and `100` on others). * Normalise to a finite number, or `undefined` — never `NaN`, never a coerced zero. */ function numberish(v: unknown): number | undefined { if (typeof v === "number") return Number.isFinite(v) ? v : undefined; if (typeof v === "string") { const t = v.trim(); if (t.length === 0) return undefined; const n = Number(t); return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : undefined; } return undefined; } function nonEmpty(v: string | undefined): string | undefined { if (v === undefined) return undefined; const t = v.trim(); return t.length > 0 ? t : undefined; } /** The default request-id minter — a process-local monotone counter well clear of the transport's * order-id space. A counter, not an RNG: the edge may be async, but it is never random. */ let reqIdCounter = 9_000; const defaultNextReqId = (): number => ++reqIdCounter; /** The real deadline scheduler over global timers (the transport's own default, mirrored). Kept off * the deterministic core — only the edge adapter uses it. */ const defaultScheduler: Scheduler = { setInterval: (fn, ms) => setInterval(fn, ms), clearInterval: (handle) => { clearInterval(handle as ReturnType<typeof setInterval>); }, };