homebridge-unifi-protect/dist/settings.js

Homebridge UniFi Protect plugin providing complete HomeKit integration for the entire UniFi Protect ecosystem with full support for most features including HomeKit Secure Video, multiple controllers, blazing fast performance, and much more.

/* Copyright(C) 2022-2026, HJD (https://github.com/hjdhjd). All rights reserved.
 *
 * settings.ts: Settings and constants for homebridge-unifi-protect.
 */
// The name of our plugin.
export const PLUGIN_NAME = "homebridge-unifi-protect";
// The platform the plugin creates.
export const PLATFORM_NAME = "UniFi Protect";
// Maximum number of consecutive authentication failures tolerated while establishing the initial connection before we stop retrying. A controller that is still sorting
// out its own authentication state at startup recovers within this budget, while genuinely-incorrect credentials fail fast instead of looping forever. Any non-
// authentication fault (network, transient) resets the budget, so a slow-to-appear controller is retried without bound until it answers. The unifi-protect client owns
// the periodic device refresh through its StateStore refresh failsafe. The plugin's own connect() method orchestrates the initial connection's retry and backoff through
// createConnectRetryPolicy and the homebridge-plugin-utils retry() utility, using this constant to bound the authentication-failure budget.
export const PROTECT_AUTH_FAILURE_LIMIT = 3;
// Default delay, in seconds, before removing Protect devices that no longer exist.
export const PROTECT_DEVICE_REMOVAL_DELAY_INTERVAL = 60;
// Default duration, in milliseconds, of the authentication contact sensor for a Protect doorbell, primarily for automation purposes.
export const PROTECT_DOORBELL_AUTHSENSOR_DURATION = 5000;
// Default duration, in milliseconds, of a physical digital chime attached to a Protect doorbell. This value comes from UniFi Protect itself.
export const PROTECT_DOORBELL_CHIME_DURATION_DIGITAL = 1000;
// Default duration, in milliseconds, to wait before allowing another trigger of the buzzer or speaker on the chime.
export const PROTECT_DOORBELL_CHIME_SPEAKER_DURATION = 3500;
// Default duration, in milliseconds, of the trigger switch for a Protect doorbell, primarily for automation purposes.
export const PROTECT_DOORBELL_TRIGGER_DURATION = 5000;
// FFmpeg afftdn audio filter defaults - this setting uses FFTs to reduce noise in an audio signal by the number of decibels below.
export const PROTECT_FFMPEG_AUDIO_FILTER_FFTNR = 14;
// FFmpeg highpass audio filter defaults - this setting attenuates (eliminates) frequencies below the value.
export const PROTECT_FFMPEG_AUDIO_FILTER_HIGHPASS = 150;
// FFmpeg lowpass audio filter defaults - this setting attenuates (eliminates) frequencies above the value.
export const PROTECT_FFMPEG_AUDIO_FILTER_LOWPASS = 9000;
// Protect's native I-frame interval can vary, but the livestream API seems to default to 5 seconds at most, though it depends on camera type and stream quality selected.
export const PROTECT_LIVESTREAM_API_IDR_INTERVAL = 5;
// Protect fMP4 segment resolution, in milliseconds. This defines the resolution of our buffer. It should never be less than 100ms or greater than 1500ms.
export const PROTECT_SEGMENT_RESOLUTION = 100;
// Livestream recovery urgency the timeshift buffer declares to the unifi-protect library's livestream pool while a recording is in flight, in milliseconds.
// Zero is strictly below the recovery policy's SOFT_DEFER_STEP_MS (1000ms) active/idle threshold, so an active recording is classified latency-sensitive and
// reconnects immediately rather than easing off a stressed controller - the parity behavior for an in-flight HKSV recording.
export const PROTECT_LIVESTREAM_ACTIVE_TOLERANCE_MS = 0;
// Livestream recovery urgency the timeshift buffer declares to the unifi-protect library's livestream pool while idle (prebuffering, not transmitting), in
// milliseconds. This is strictly above the recovery policy's SOFT_DEFER_STEP_MS (1000ms) threshold, so an idle prebuffer is classified latency-tolerant and
// eases off a stressed-but-reachable controller rather than piling reconnects onto it. It is also the parity ceiling: the unifi-protect library's media-stall
// detection floors at max(urgency, 2000ms), so 2000ms holds idle detection exactly at the established 2-second stall window - a larger value would loosen idle
// stall detection past that window.
export const PROTECT_LIVESTREAM_IDLE_TOLERANCE_MS = 2000;
// Shadow reserve-depth urgency telemetry parameters for HKSV recovery. These constants are NOT a live recovery policy: they exist only so the telemetry
// teardown log can report, side by side with the shipped fixed urgency, what a reserve-depth-adaptive urgency would have declared given the reserve depth the
// event actually observed. The shadow formula is reserveMs = meanReserve * segmentLength; shadowUrgency = clamp(reserveMs - reconnectTime - safety, FLOOR,
// reserveMs). It models the idea that the recovery tolerance could be derived from how deep the FFmpeg-produced-but-unpulled reserve ran during the event - the
// deeper the reserve, the longer a stall the recording could absorb, and the more tolerance the pool could be granted. A maintainer compares the shadow urgency
// against the shipped fixed urgency to evaluate whether such a design is worth pursuing. It is an offline estimate computed at teardown for comparison only and
// never feeds the live recovery-await derivation.
// Shadow reconnect-floor term, in milliseconds. We mirror the unifi-protect library's pool AWAIT_MIN_MS (3000ms) reconnect floor: any tolerance we would grant
// must first cover the minimum time the pool takes to re-establish a livestream, otherwise the recording would drain its reserve before the wire recovered.
export const PROTECT_HKSV_SHADOW_RECONNECT_MS = 3000;
// Shadow jitter-margin term, in milliseconds. A small additional cushion subtracted alongside the reconnect floor to absorb scheduling and poll-granularity jitter in
// the reconnect timing, so the shadow tolerance does not assume a perfectly punctual recovery.
export const PROTECT_HKSV_SHADOW_SAFETY_MS = 500;
// Shadow tolerance floor, in milliseconds. The minimum tolerance the shadow formula will ever report, matching the active-recording tolerance floor (0ms) so a
// shallow reserve clamps to "reconnect immediately" exactly as the shipped active urgency does, rather than going negative.
export const PROTECT_HKSV_SHADOW_FLOOR_MS = PROTECT_LIVESTREAM_ACTIVE_TOLERANCE_MS;
// Standing timeshift buffer depth, in milliseconds. Sized at twice the livestream API's I-frame interval so the rolling buffer always retains at least one keyframe for
// every consumer it feeds - HomeKit Secure Video event look-back, buffer-backed live views, and snapshots.
export const PROTECT_TIMESHIFT_BUFFER_MAXDURATION = PROTECT_LIVESTREAM_API_IDR_INTERVAL * 1000 * 2;
// The channel-selection target for a pixel-constrained hardware encoder (such as a Raspberry Pi): the substrate channel policy picks the highest-quality channel at or
// below this on such a host. Deliberately not named with "RESOLUTION" - in this file that word denotes the buffer's time-granularity, not a pixel dimension.
export const PROTECT_TIMESHIFT_CONSTRAINED_HOST_TARGET = { height: 1080, width: 1920 };
// Default port to use to publish an M3U playlist for use in other apps that can consume one to make camera livestreams available, such as Channels DVR.
export const PROTECT_M3U_PLAYLIST_PORT = 10110;
// Default duration, in seconds, of motion events. Setting this too low will potentially cause a lot of notification spam.
export const PROTECT_MOTION_DURATION = 10;
// Default MQTT topic to use when publishing events. This is in the form of: unifi/protect/camera/event
export const PROTECT_MQTT_TOPIC = "unifi/protect";
// Duration, in milliseconds, after which an unconfirmed relay-output toggle intent is dropped. A relay output has only a faithful toggle primitive that is write-through:
// the plugin records the state it is driving an output toward so a rapid second tap decides against where the output is headed rather than the pre-toggle controller
// value that lags until the broadcast lands. This is the bounded safety window for that recorded intent - if the controller never confirms it within this window (a lost
// broadcast), the intent is dropped so a stuck record can never wedge the switch. A few seconds comfortably covers the observed write-through latency plus margin.
export const PROTECT_RELAY_COMMAND_TIMEOUT = 5000;
// Default duration, in seconds, of occupancy events.
export const PROTECT_OCCUPANCY_DURATION = 300;
// Minimum required GPU memory on a Raspberry Pi for hardware acceleration.
export const PROTECT_RPI_GPU_MINIMUM = 128;
// Bitrate, in kilobits per second, to use when transcoding to local clients.
export const PROTECT_TRANSCODE_BITRATE = 2000;
// Default interval, in hours, for scheduled NVR reboots when enabled.
export const PROTECT_NVR_REBOOT_INTERVAL = 6;
// Minimum interval, in hours, allowed for scheduled NVR reboots.
export const PROTECT_NVR_REBOOT_MIN_INTERVAL = 1;
// Settle delay, in milliseconds, before a globally-disabled controller unregisters its cached accessories. A named thirty-second settle window gives all the
// accessories a chance to finish loading at startup before we tear them down.
export const PROTECT_NVR_CONTROLLER_DISABLED_SETTLE_DELAY = 30000;
// Grace period, in milliseconds, to confirm a reboot command actually took effect. A genuine reboot drops the controller's realtime connection within seconds, so 60 s
// is generous headroom over the real drop latency yet far below the recovery track's first probe. This is a "did the command take effect" latency, NOT a recovery
// deadline: if, after this grace, the connection is still perfectly healthy, the controller never restarted (a silent no-op accept) and we resume normal monitoring.
export const PROTECT_NVR_REBOOT_CONFIRM_GRACE_MS = 60000;
// Maximum cumulative duration, in seconds, that a scheduled reboot may be deferred while cameras are actively recording HKSV events. Once this elapses, the
// reboot fires regardless of in-flight recordings - we cannot let an open-ended series of HKSV events postpone a controller reboot indefinitely.
export const PROTECT_NVR_REBOOT_DEFERRAL_MAX = 15 * 60;
// Window, in milliseconds, after the plugin observes a controller reboot within which a per-camera livestream interruption is treated as that reboot's tail -
// quieted to debug, since a reboot blips every camera and is already narrated once at the controller level - rather than a genuine single-camera drop that
// warns. Measured from our OWN observation of the reboot (the library's jitter-thresholded `controllerRebooted` event), not the controller's self-reported boot
// time. The live trace showed roughly twelve seconds from the observed reboot to the camera's re-establishment edge, so sixty seconds covers slower
// re-establishment while keeping the suppression window tight (the accepted false-negative: a genuinely dead camera's "interrupted" warn is held for this
// window after a reboot, which is exactly when a camera most often fails to return; a tight window minimizes that, and a dead camera is surfaced elsewhere
// through reachability and the HKSV deferred-offline warn).
export const PROTECT_NVR_REBOOT_RECENCY_MS = 60000;
// Minimum duration, in milliseconds, that the controller must be continuously available and healthy before the plugin will perform any destructive device
// removal. A fixed safety floor (not user-configurable): no device is removed until the controller has been in a good state this long, so a freshly-recovered
// or freshly-rebooted controller never triggers a removal while it is still settling and re-adopting its devices.
export const PROTECT_NVR_REMOVAL_STABILITY_WINDOW = 600000;
// Bitrate, in kilobits per second, to use when transcoding to high-latency clients.
export const PROTECT_TRANSCODE_HIGH_LATENCY_BITRATE = 1000;
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