claude-flow
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Ruflo - Enterprise AI agent orchestration for Claude Code. Deploy 60+ specialized agents in coordinated swarms with self-learning, fault-tolerant consensus, vector memory, and MCP integration
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JavaScript
/**
* Safe GitHub CLI Helper — v1.0.0
*
* Prevents injection issues when using `gh` commands with untrusted content
* (PR bodies, issue bodies, comment bodies) by routing the body through a
* temp file and using `--body-file` rather than interpolating into shell args.
*
* ADR-127 Phase 2 hardening:
* - GITHUB_SAFE_VERSION exported for smoke assertions.
* - Explicit 256KB body cap: rejects oversized bodies before any temp-file
* write, matching the GitHub API `body` field limit.
* - Strict error handling: all execSync calls inside try/catch; cleanup in
* finally; non-zero exit on any error.
* - GITHUB_SAFE_DRY_RUN=1 env-var skips the actual `gh` exec for testing.
*
* Usage:
* ./github-safe.js issue comment 123 "Message with \`backticks\`"
* ./github-safe.js pr create --title "Title" --body "Complex body"
*/
import { execSync, execFileSync } from 'child_process';
import { writeFileSync, unlinkSync } from 'fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'os';
import { join } from 'path';
import { randomBytes } from 'crypto';
// Version constant — asserted by smoke-github-safe-injection.mjs.
export const GITHUB_SAFE_VERSION = '1.0.0';
// Maximum body size allowed (bytes). The GitHub API enforces 65536 chars for
// issue/PR bodies; the CLI is more lenient but the 256KB limit is a
// conservative safety cap that prevents accidental oversized writes.
const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 256 * 1024;
const args = process.argv.slice(2);
if (args.length < 2) {
console.log(`
Safe GitHub CLI Helper v${GITHUB_SAFE_VERSION}
Usage:
./github-safe.js issue comment <number> <body>
./github-safe.js pr comment <number> <body>
./github-safe.js issue create --title <title> --body <body>
./github-safe.js pr create --title <title> --body <body>
This helper prevents injection issues with special characters:
- Backticks in code examples
- Command substitution $(...)
- Semicolons and other shell metacharacters
- Oversized bodies (> 256 KB rejected)
`);
process.exit(1);
}
const [command, subcommand, ...restArgs] = args;
// Handle commands that need body content
if ((command === 'issue' || command === 'pr') &&
(subcommand === 'comment' || subcommand === 'create')) {
let bodyIndex = -1;
let body = '';
if (subcommand === 'comment' && restArgs.length >= 2) {
// Simple format: github-safe.js issue comment 123 "body"
body = restArgs[1];
bodyIndex = 1;
} else {
// Flag format: --body "content"
bodyIndex = restArgs.indexOf('--body');
if (bodyIndex !== -1 && bodyIndex < restArgs.length - 1) {
body = restArgs[bodyIndex + 1];
}
}
if (body) {
// Enforce 256KB cap before any file I/O.
const bodyBytes = Buffer.byteLength(body, 'utf8');
if (bodyBytes > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
console.error(
`[ERROR] Body exceeds maximum allowed size (${bodyBytes} bytes > ${MAX_BODY_BYTES} bytes). ` +
'GitHub API body fields are capped at 256KB. Truncate the body before passing it to github-safe.js.'
);
process.exit(1);
}
// Use temporary file for body content — never interpolate into argv.
const tmpFile = join(tmpdir(), `gh-body-${randomBytes(8).toString('hex')}.tmp`);
try {
writeFileSync(tmpFile, body, 'utf8');
// Build new command with --body-file
const newArgs = [...restArgs];
if (subcommand === 'comment' && bodyIndex === 1) {
// Replace positional body arg with --body-file
newArgs[1] = '--body-file';
newArgs.push(tmpFile);
} else if (bodyIndex !== -1) {
// Replace --body flag pair with --body-file
newArgs[bodyIndex] = '--body-file';
newArgs[bodyIndex + 1] = tmpFile;
}
// Skip actual gh exec in dry-run mode (used by smoke tests).
if (process.env.GITHUB_SAFE_DRY_RUN === '1') {
const ghArgs = [command, subcommand, ...newArgs];
console.log(`[DRY-RUN] gh ${ghArgs.join(' ')}`);
process.exit(0);
}
const ghArgv = [command, subcommand, ...newArgs];
console.log(`Executing: gh ${ghArgv.join(' ')}`);
// Use execFileSync to avoid shell interpolation — args are passed as an
// array so shell metacharacters in tmpFile path cannot be exploited.
execFileSync('gh', ghArgv, {
stdio: 'inherit',
timeout: 30000,
});
} catch (error) {
console.error('[ERROR]', error.message);
process.exit(1);
} finally {
// Always clean up the temp file.
try { unlinkSync(tmpFile); } catch (_) { /* ignore cleanup errors */ }
}
} else {
// No body content — execute normally (no injection risk for args).
if (process.env.GITHUB_SAFE_DRY_RUN === '1') {
console.log(`[DRY-RUN] gh ${args.join(' ')}`);
process.exit(0);
}
try {
execFileSync('gh', args, { stdio: 'inherit' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('[ERROR]', error.message);
process.exit(1);
}
}
} else {
// Non-body commands — execute normally.
if (process.env.GITHUB_SAFE_DRY_RUN === '1') {
console.log(`[DRY-RUN] gh ${args.join(' ')}`);
process.exit(0);
}
try {
execFileSync('gh', args, { stdio: 'inherit' });
} catch (error) {
console.error('[ERROR]', error.message);
process.exit(1);
}
}