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Deployment tool and support utility for AI context. Copies agents, skills, commands, rules, and behaviors into the paths each AI platform reads (Claude Code, Codex, Copilot, Cursor, Warp, OpenClaw, and 6 more) so one source of truth works across 10 platfo

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# Remediation Plan > This plan defines the actions required to contain, eradicate, and recover from the incident, > and to improve defenses to prevent recurrence. Actions are organized by priority and timeframe. > Each action includes a verification procedure to confirm it has been completed successfully. --- ## Investigation Summary | Field | Value | |-------|-------| | Case ID | `{{case_id}}` | | Target System | `{{hostname}}` | | Overall Severity | `{{overall_severity}}` | | Investigation Date | `{{investigation_date}}` | | Lead Investigator | `{{investigator_name}}` | | Plan Owner | `{{plan_owner}}` | | Plan Created | `{{plan_created_date}}` | | Plan Version | `{{plan_version}}` | | Classification | `{{classification}}` | ### Incident Summary `{{incident_summary}}` *(2-3 sentences describing what happened, what was compromised, and what the confirmed impact was.)* ### Confirmed Root Cause `{{root_cause}}` --- ## Immediate Actions (Complete within 24 hours) These actions address active threats and prevent ongoing damage. Complete before any other remediation work. | ID | Priority | Action | Target | Owner | Status | Completed Date | Notes | |----|----------|--------|--------|-------|--------|---------------|-------| | IA-001 | P1 | `{{immediate_action_1}}` | `{{target_1}}` | `{{owner_1}}` | `{{status_1}}` | `{{completed_1}}` | `{{notes_1}}` | | IA-002 | P1 | `{{immediate_action_2}}` | `{{target_2}}` | `{{owner_2}}` | `{{status_2}}` | `{{completed_2}}` | `{{notes_2}}` | | IA-003 | P1 | `{{immediate_action_3}}` | `{{target_3}}` | `{{owner_3}}` | `{{status_3}}` | `{{completed_3}}` | `{{notes_3}}` | ### Standard Immediate Actions (Apply Unless Documented as Not Applicable) - [ ] **Isolate affected system** — Remove from network or apply firewall block rules if live investigation is complete - [ ] **Revoke compromised credentials** — Rotate passwords and SSH keys for all accounts confirmed or suspected compromised - [ ] **Disable unauthorized accounts** — Disable or remove any accounts created by the attacker - [ ] **Terminate active attacker sessions** — Kill any confirmed attacker processes or sessions - [ ] **Preserve evidence** — Confirm all evidence is collected and hashed before making system changes - [ ] **Notify stakeholders** — Inform system owner, security team, and management per incident response policy - [ ] **Block confirmed IOCs** — Add attacker IPs, domains, and file hashes to blocklists ### Immediate Action: Credential Rotation Commands ```bash # Force password change for compromised accounts passwd {{compromised_user}} chage -d 0 {{compromised_user}} # Force change on next login # Revoke and regenerate SSH host keys (if host keys compromised) rm /etc/ssh/ssh_host_* dpkg-reconfigure openssh-server # Debian/Ubuntu # or: ssh-keygen -A # Generic # Remove attacker SSH authorized keys # Review and clean: cat /home/{{compromised_user}}/.ssh/authorized_keys # Remove specific key: sed -i '/{{attacker_key_fragment}}/d' /home/{{compromised_user}}/.ssh/authorized_keys # Disable compromised account usermod -L {{compromised_user}} ``` --- ## Short-term Remediations (Complete within 1-7 days) Actions to eradicate attacker artifacts and restore system integrity. | ID | Action | Finding Reference | Owner | Due Date | Status | Verification Method | |----|--------|------------------|-------|----------|--------|-------------------| | ST-001 | `{{short_action_1}}` | `{{finding_ref_1}}` | `{{st_owner_1}}` | `{{st_due_1}}` | `{{st_status_1}}` | `{{st_verify_1}}` | | ST-002 | `{{short_action_2}}` | `{{finding_ref_2}}` | `{{st_owner_2}}` | `{{st_due_2}}` | `{{st_status_2}}` | `{{st_verify_2}}` | | ST-003 | `{{short_action_3}}` | `{{finding_ref_3}}` | `{{st_owner_3}}` | `{{st_due_3}}` | `{{st_status_3}}` | `{{st_verify_3}}` | ### Standard Short-term Actions - [ ] **Remove persistence mechanisms** — Delete unauthorized cron jobs, systemd units, startup scripts, and SUID binaries - [ ] **Patch exploited vulnerabilities** — Apply patches for any CVEs or misconfigurations exploited during the incident - [ ] **Rebuild from known-good baseline** — If system integrity is in question, redeploy from clean image - [ ] **Audit and clean authorized_keys** — Remove all unauthorized SSH public keys across all user accounts - [ ] **Review and tighten firewall rules** — Close unnecessary ports; restrict access to confirmed-needed sources only - [ ] **Audit installed packages** — Remove unauthorized packages installed during the incident - [ ] **Verify log integrity** — Confirm logging is functional and logs are being forwarded to a secure, separate system - [ ] **Scan for additional IOCs** — Run IOC-based scan across other systems in the environment --- ## Medium-term Improvements (Complete within 1-4 weeks) Structural improvements to address underlying weaknesses that enabled the incident. | ID | Improvement | Rationale | Owner | Due Date | Status | |----|-------------|-----------|-------|----------|--------| | MT-001 | `{{medium_improvement_1}}` | `{{mt_rationale_1}}` | `{{mt_owner_1}}` | `{{mt_due_1}}` | `{{mt_status_1}}` | | MT-002 | `{{medium_improvement_2}}` | `{{mt_rationale_2}}` | `{{mt_owner_2}}` | `{{mt_due_2}}` | `{{mt_status_2}}` | | MT-003 | `{{medium_improvement_3}}` | `{{mt_rationale_3}}` | `{{mt_owner_3}}` | `{{mt_due_3}}` | `{{mt_status_3}}` | --- ## Long-term Hardening (Complete within 1-3 months) Strategic improvements to reduce attack surface and improve detection capability. | ID | Initiative | Rationale | Owner | Target Date | Status | |----|-----------|-----------|-------|-------------|--------| | LT-001 | `{{long_initiative_1}}` | `{{lt_rationale_1}}` | `{{lt_owner_1}}` | `{{lt_date_1}}` | `{{lt_status_1}}` | | LT-002 | `{{long_initiative_2}}` | `{{lt_rationale_2}}` | `{{lt_owner_2}}` | `{{lt_date_2}}` | `{{lt_status_2}}` | | LT-003 | `{{long_initiative_3}}` | `{{lt_rationale_3}}` | `{{lt_owner_3}}` | `{{lt_date_3}}` | `{{lt_status_3}}` | --- ## Verification Procedures For each completed action, document how successful completion was confirmed. Untested remediations are incomplete remediations. | Action ID | Verification Method | Expected Result | Verified By | Verification Date | Result | |-----------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------|--------------------|--------| | IA-001 | `{{verify_method_ia1}}` | `{{verify_expected_ia1}}` | `{{verifier_ia1}}` | `{{verify_date_ia1}}` | `{{verify_result_ia1}}` | | ST-001 | `{{verify_method_st1}}` | `{{verify_expected_st1}}` | `{{verifier_st1}}` | `{{verify_date_st1}}` | `{{verify_result_st1}}` | ### Verification Commands ```bash # Confirm unauthorized cron jobs removed for user in $(cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd); do crontab -l -u $user 2>/dev/null | grep -v '^#' | grep -v '^$' done # Confirm unauthorized systemd services removed systemctl list-units --type=service --state=active | grep -v '{{expected_service_pattern}}' # Confirm SUID binaries match known-good list find / -perm /6000 -type f 2>/dev/null \ | grep -v '^/proc\|^/sys' | sort > /tmp/suid_post_remediation.txt diff {{known_good_suid_list}} /tmp/suid_post_remediation.txt # Confirm ld.so.preload is clear [[ -s /etc/ld.so.preload ]] && echo "WARNING: ld.so.preload still populated" || echo "CLEAR" # Confirm firewall rules are applied iptables -L -n -v nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null # Verify no attacker SSH keys remain for home in /home/* /root; do [[ -f "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]] && echo "=== $home ===" && cat "$home/.ssh/authorized_keys" done ``` --- ## Monitoring Recommendations Detection improvements to identify recurrence or similar attacks in the future. | Recommendation | Alert Trigger | Platform | Priority | |---------------|--------------|----------|---------| | `{{monitor_1}}` | `{{trigger_1}}` | `{{platform_1}}` | `{{priority_1}}` | | `{{monitor_2}}` | `{{trigger_2}}` | `{{platform_2}}` | `{{priority_2}}` | | `{{monitor_3}}` | `{{trigger_3}}` | `{{platform_3}}` | `{{priority_3}}` | ### Detection Rules Sigma rules covering the TTPs observed in this incident are documented in the IOC register and located in: `{{sigma_rules_path}}` --- ## Lessons Learned Complete this section after remediation is verified complete. Use findings to improve processes and defenses. ### What Was Detected Well ``` {{detection_strengths}} ``` ### What Was Missed or Detected Late ``` {{detection_gaps}} ``` ### Process Improvements | Gap | Proposed Process Change | Owner | Target Date | |-----|------------------------|-------|-------------| | `{{process_gap_1}}` | `{{process_change_1}}` | `{{process_owner_1}}` | `{{process_date_1}}` | | `{{process_gap_2}}` | `{{process_change_2}}` | `{{process_owner_2}}` | `{{process_date_2}}` | ### Tool / Coverage Gaps ``` {{tool_coverage_gaps}} ``` ### Training Recommendations ``` {{training_recommendations}} ```