agentfootprint
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The explainable agent framework — backtrack a wrong answer to the exact context that caused it (evidence, not guesses). Built on footprintjs.
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JavaScript
/**
* identity — outbound credential vending for agent tools.
*
* The {@link CredentialProvider} port + adapters. A tool calls
* `provider.getCredential({ service })` to get a token for a downstream service;
* `agentCoreIdentity()` backs it with AWS Bedrock AgentCore Identity, or
* `staticTokens()` for dev/test.
*
* SECURITY: a vended token is a secret — use it locally inside a tool's
* `execute` (e.g. an HTTP header); never write it to tracked scope. See
* `./identity/types` for the full invariant.
*
* @example
* ```ts
* import { agentCoreIdentity } from 'agentfootprint/security';
*
* const credentials = agentCoreIdentity({ region: 'us-east-1' });
* const r = await credentials.getCredential({ service: 'github', mode: 'user', scopes: ['repo'] });
* if (r.status === 'authorization-required') {
* // surface r.authorizationUrl to the user (e.g. pause the run), then retry.
* } else {
* callGitHub({ headers: r.credential.toHeaders() }); // universal applicator
* }
* ```
*
* Not an import path of its own since 9.0.0. This is the implementation barrel
* behind `agentfootprint/security`, which re-exports every name here — same
* symbols, one door. Import from the door.
*/
export { isCredentialIssued, unconfiguredCredentialProvider } from './identity/types.js';
export { bearer, apiKey, basic, headers, } from './identity/kinds.js';
export { staticTokens } from './identity/staticTokens.js';
// Credentials from the INCOMING REQUEST: the host seals the request's secrets
// per run (`requestContext`), and `requestCredentials` vends them to a tool's
// declared `needs` — only for the run that carries them, failing closed by name.
export { requestContext, isRequestContext, } from './identity/requestContext.js';
export { requestCredentials, asBearer, asApiKey, decodedWith, RequestCredentialError, } from './identity/requestCredentials.js';
export { CredentialConsentRequiredError, } from './identity/CredentialConsentRequiredError.js';
export { withCredentialRetry, } from './identity/withCredentialRetry.js';
export { agentCoreIdentity,
// The consent handshake (9.66.0) — called from YOUR callback route, not from
// the agent run, which is why it is a function of its own rather than a
// method on the provider that route never sees.
completeAgentCoreAuthorization, } from './adapters/identity/agentcore.js';
// HashiCorp-Vault-compatible KV v2, over plain HTTP (9.8.0) — no SDK, no
// vendor client. V1 is token auth + KV v2 + no leases, and every other shape
// is refused by name rather than guessed at; see the module docstring.
export { vaultCredentials } from './adapters/identity/vault.js';
// Google access tokens from whatever credential the environment already has
// (ADC, workload identity, an impersonated service account). Narrow on
// purpose: it vends the DEPLOYMENT's identity, and `mode: 'user'` is refused
// by name rather than quietly downgraded to a machine token.
export { googleIdentity, CLOUD_PLATFORM_SCOPE, } from './adapters/identity/google.js';
// Entra ID tokens from whatever credential the environment already has —
// DefaultAzureCredential's chain (env service principal, workload identity,
// managed identity, VS Code, az CLI), or any TokenCredential you built
// (9.74.0). Same narrowness as googleIdentity: it vends the DEPLOYMENT's
// identity; `mode: 'user'` and per-request user tokens are refused by name
// until an OBO surface exists. AZURE_AI_SCOPE vs AZURE_MANAGEMENT_SCOPE
// matters — a token for one audience does not work on the other, which is
// why both constants are exported instead of one "azure scope".
export { entraIdentity, AZURE_AI_SCOPE, AZURE_MANAGEMENT_SCOPE, AZURE_COGNITIVE_SERVICES_SCOPE, } from './adapters/identity/azure.js';
// Verifying WHO is calling (9.26.0) — the other half of identity. The rest of
// this door vends credentials for calls the agent makes OUTWARD;
// `jwksIdentity` checks the credential a caller presents INWARD, against an
// identity provider's published key set. Wire it at the hosting door:
// `standingAgent({ …, identity: { verify: jwksIdentity({ … }).verify } })`.
export { jwksIdentity, MissingJwksSupportError, } from './adapters/identity/jwks.js';
// Sign-in strategies picked by CONFIG (the identity-strategies design). One
// strategy per deployment, judged once at boot: `identityFromConfig` refuses a
// wrong or missing setting by name, and production must name its strategy.
// `oidcIdentity` is the `oidc-token` verifier: jwksIdentity's checks plus
// discovery, AD FS's second issuer, and the PERSON test — an application's own
// token is not an employee.
export { oidcIdentity, } from './adapters/identity/oidc.js';
// Browser sign-in for oidc-token: the authorization-code flow through
// `openid-client` (optional peer). PENDING INDEPENDENT REVIEW before a company
// install. The person is read from an ACCESS token by the strategy's own verify.
export { MissingOpenIdClientError, OidcSignInSetupError, oidcSignIn, } from './adapters/identity/oidcSignIn.js';
export { identityFromConfig, } from './adapters/identity/strategies/choose.js';
// `directory-password`: Active Directory over LDAPS — bind, RFC 4532
// Who-am-I, exactly one entry, its objectGUID. `ldapts` is an optional peer.
export { directoryPasswords, } from './adapters/identity/directory/directoryPasswords.js';
export { ldapDirectory, MissingLdaptsError, } from './adapters/identity/directory/ldapDirectory.js';
export { adSubCodeName, escapeFilterValue, } from './adapters/identity/directory/port.js';
// `local-password` (development, tests, demos; refused in production): hashed
// entries only, scrypt from node:crypto. `hashPassword` makes an entry.
export { hashPassword, localPasswords, LocalPasswordConfigError, SCRYPT_DEFAULT, SCRYPT_FLOOR, } from './adapters/identity/localPassword.js';
export { identityConfigFromEnv, IdentityConfigError, } from './adapters/identity/strategies/config.js';
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