accounts
Version:
Tempo Accounts SDK
140 lines (127 loc) • 5.36 kB
text/typescript
import type { Address, Hex } from 'ox'
import type {
Account as TempoAccount,
KeyAuthorizationManager as TempoKeyAuthorizationManager,
} from 'viem/tempo'
import type { MaybePromise } from '../internal/types.js'
import { webCryptoP256 } from './keystores/webCryptoP256.js'
/**
* Keystores backing locally generated access keys: one {@link Keystore} per
* key type. When none are configured, {@link defaults} applies.
*/
export type Keystores = {
/** Keystore used to create and rehydrate `p256` access keys. */
p256?: Keystore | undefined
/** Keystore used to create and rehydrate `secp256k1` access keys. */
secp256k1?: Keystore | undefined
}
/** Key types keystores can be configured for. */
export type KeyType = keyof Keystores
/**
* Opaque key reference persisted verbatim alongside the access-key record.
* `kind` marks which keystore wrote it; the remaining fields are owned by
* that keystore and must survive its declared persistence format.
*/
export type Handle = { kind: string; [key: string]: unknown }
/**
* Single-key-type access-key backend.
*
* A keystore owns access-key material end to end: `createKey` provisions a
* key and returns an opaque `handle` that the SDK persists verbatim alongside
* the access-key record; `toAccount` turns a persisted record back into a
* signing account. The handle's schema is owned by whichever keystore wrote
* it, so backends can be heterogeneous per device (e.g. hardware-backed keys
* with a software fallback composed behind one keystore).
*
* Records carrying `privateKey` or `keyPair` material hydrate without
* consulting the keystore.
*/
export type Keystore = {
/**
* Whether this keystore's handles hold live objects (e.g. a `CryptoKey`)
* that persist only through structured-clone storage (`Storage.idb`,
* `Storage.memory`). On other storage the handle is stripped at persist
* time, making the key session-only.
*
* When `false` (default), handles must survive JSON serialization —
* portable across all storage adapters.
*
* @default false
*/
requiresStructuredClone?: boolean | undefined
/**
* Creates access-key material. `handle` is opaque and persisted verbatim.
*
* Must fail loudly when the keystore's runtime prerequisites are missing
* (e.g. no Secure Enclave, no `crypto.subtle`) so provisioning errors
* surface at authorization time, not at first sign.
*/
createKey: () => Promise<createKey.ReturnType>
/**
* Turns a persisted access-key record back into a signing account.
*
* Called lazily when a stored record is first used after hydration; the
* SDK caches the result per record.
*
* Throw {@link KeyUnavailableError} when the key behind the handle is
* permanently gone (e.g. hardware key deleted) — the SDK evicts the record
* so callers fall back to authorizing a fresh key. Throw any other error
* for handles the keystore does not recognize or transient failures (e.g.
* device locked): the record is kept and retried on next use.
*/
toAccount: (
record: toAccount.Record,
context: toAccount.Context,
) => MaybePromise<TempoAccount.AccessKeyAccount>
}
export declare namespace createKey {
/** Created access-key material. */
type ReturnType = {
/** Opaque handle for the created key. Persisted verbatim; schema owned by the keystore that wrote it. */
handle: Handle
/** Public key of the created key. */
publicKey: Hex.Hex
}
}
export declare namespace toAccount {
/** Persisted access-key record fields passed to {@link Keystore.toAccount}. */
type Record = {
/** Opaque handle persisted by {@link Keystore.createKey}. */
handle: Handle
/** Key type. */
keyType: string
/** Public key backing the access key. */
publicKey: Hex.Hex
}
/** Account construction context passed to {@link Keystore.toAccount}. */
type Context = {
/** Root account address the access key signs for. */
access: Address.Address
/** Pending key authorization manager to thread into the account. */
keyAuthorizationManager: TempoKeyAuthorizationManager.KeyAuthorizationManager
}
}
/**
* Signals that the key behind a persisted handle is permanently gone
* (e.g. hardware key deleted, app keychain wiped). Thrown from
* {@link Keystore.toAccount}, it evicts the access-key record so callers fall
* back to authorizing a fresh key. Keystores composing multiple backends
* should treat it as an ownership claim: do not route the handle to another
* backend.
*/
export class KeyUnavailableError extends Error {
constructor(message?: string, options?: { cause?: unknown | undefined }) {
super(message ?? 'Keystore key material is permanently unavailable.', options)
this.name = 'Keystore.KeyUnavailableError'
}
}
/** Returns whether an error signals permanently unavailable key material. */
export function isKeyUnavailableError(error: unknown): error is KeyUnavailableError {
if (error instanceof KeyUnavailableError) return true
return error instanceof Error && error.name === 'Keystore.KeyUnavailableError'
}
export { p256 } from './keystores/p256.js'
export { secp256k1 } from './keystores/secp256k1.js'
export { webCryptoP256 }
/** Built-in default keystores used when none are configured. */
export const defaults: Keystores = { p256: webCryptoP256() }