@sema-agent/core/dist/core/untrusted-egress.d.ts

Stateless, task-oriented AI agent core

import { type RedactionReport } from "./arg-summary.js";
export type { RedactionFinding, RedactionReport, RedactionConfidence, RedactionSource, SummarizableFinding, } from "./arg-summary.js";
export { summarizeRedactions } from "./arg-summary.js";
export declare function redactSecrets(s: string, report?: RedactionReport): string;
export declare function redactHostLeaks(s: string, report?: RedactionReport): string;
/** Secret-redact + size-bound (NO injection fence) — the SAME-PRINCIPAL tier: workflow outputs/results/errors
 *  riding back to the launching model/script, run rows behind scope-gated observe. Paths/URLs survive
 *  (the assertion pattern depends on them); secrets never do. */
export declare function boundedRedactedSummary(value: unknown, max: number): string;
/**
 * The FULL untrusted-egress transform (design/97 CORE-2): full host-leak redaction + size-bound + FENCE. Use
 * for any worker prompt/output (#5 transcript) or steer content (#6) shown to a HUMAN or exported beyond the
 * launching principal, so untrusted text can neither leak host internals nor pose as instructions.
 */
export declare function untrustedEgressForHuman(value: unknown, opts: {
    label: string;
    max: number;
}): string;