UNPKG

@sebastienrousseau/dotfiles

Version:

The Trusted Shell Platform — Universal dotfiles managed by Chezmoi. Features Bash & Zsh for macOS, Linux & WSL. Rust modern tooling & enterprise-grade security.

304 lines (215 loc) 8.21 kB
--- render_with_liquid: false --- # Key Rotation Guide This page tracks two distinct key lifecycles: 1. **Disclosure key** the GPG key reporters use to encrypt vulnerability reports to the maintainer. Single key, public, rotated annually or on compromise. Source of truth for the active fingerprint is `.github/SECURITY.md`. 2. **Secrets encryption keys** the Age and SOPS keys that protect encrypted dotfiles in this repo. Multiple keys, per-machine, rotated annually or on personnel / device change. Both sections live here so a single audit can confirm the project's posture across encrypted-disclosure-in and encrypted-secrets-at-rest. ## Disclosure Key (GPG) Closes the rotation half of [#870](https://github.com/sebastienrousseau/dotfiles/issues/870). ### Active key | Field | Value | |---|---| | Identity | `security@sebastienrousseau.com` | | Fingerprint | `55AFAD364FD9DB3819E61F0C8D688FAFA9144693` | | Algorithm | ED25519 signing primary + CV25519 encryption subkey | | Created | 2026-05-16 | | Expires | 2029-05-15 (3 years from creation) | | WKD URL | <https://sebastienrousseau.com/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/qpzqfwauiwxnu1xrf5h47bunsho44p6f> | | Cross-reference | matches the SSH signing key in `dot_config/git/allowed_signers.tmpl` | ### Rotation triggers | Trigger | Response time | Action | |---|---|---| | Annual cadence | Within 30 days of expiry | Generate new key, publish, sign transition statement with the old key, archive old key below. | | Suspected compromise | Same day | Revoke immediately, publish revocation cert to WKD, replay in-flight encrypted disclosures with the new key. | | Algorithm deprecation | Within 90 days of advisory | Generate replacement on a stronger algorithm; follow annual-cadence steps. | | Maintainer change | Same day as handover | Old maintainer signs a transition statement; old key revoked 30 days after handover. | ### Rotation procedure 1. Generate the new key (air-gapped where possible): ```sh gpg --quick-generate-key \ "Sebastien Rousseau (Security) <security@sebastienrousseau.com>" \ ed25519 sign 1y ``` 2. Sign a transition statement with the OLD key: ```sh gpg --clearsign <<EOF Transition statement, $(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ). The disclosure key for security@sebastienrousseau.com rotates from: OLD: <old-fingerprint> NEW: <new-fingerprint> Encrypted reports sent to either key during the 30-day overlap will be accepted. After <UTC-cutoff>, only the new key is honoured. EOF ``` 3. Publish the new key to: - `sebastienrousseau.com/.well-known/openpgpkey/hu/` (WKD) - the maintainer's keyoxide profile if applicable 4. Update the "Active key" table above with the new fingerprint and move the previous row into the "Historical disclosure keys" table below with the actual revocation date. 5. Commit, signing with both old and new keys during the overlap: ```sh git commit -S -m "security(key): rotate disclosure key $(date +%Y-%m)" \ -m "$(cat transition.asc)" ``` 6. After the 30-day overlap, revoke the old key and publish the revocation cert to the same WKD endpoint. ### Historical disclosure keys | From | Until | Fingerprint | Reason for rotation | |---|---|---|---| | *(none yet first key)* | *—* | *—* | *—* | --- ## Age Key Rotation ### When to Rotate - **Annually**: As a preventive measure - **After compromise**: If you suspect key exposure - **Personnel change**: When team members leave - **Device loss**: If a device with the key is lost/stolen ### Rotation Procedure #### 1. Generate New Key ```bash # Create new age key age-keygen -o ~/.config/chezmoi/key-new.txt # Note the public key (starts with "age1...") cat ~/.config/chezmoi/key-new.txt | grep "public key" ``` #### 2. Re-encrypt All Secrets ```bash # List all encrypted files chezmoi managed --include=encrypted # For each encrypted file, decrypt with old key and re-encrypt with new for file in $(chezmoi managed --include=encrypted); do # Decrypt with old key chezmoi cat "$file" > "/tmp/$(basename $file).dec" # Re-encrypt with new key (update chezmoi config first) # See step 3 done ``` #### 3. Update Chezmoi Configuration Edit `~/.config/chezmoi/chezmoi.toml`: ```toml [age] identity = "~/.config/chezmoi/key-new.txt" recipient = "age1your_new_public_key_here" ``` #### 4. Re-add Encrypted Files ```bash # Re-add each secret with new encryption chezmoi add --encrypt ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 chezmoi add --encrypt ~/.config/secrets/api-keys.env ``` #### 5. Verify and Clean Up ```bash # Verify decryption works chezmoi cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 # Archive old key (store securely offline) mv ~/.config/chezmoi/key.txt ~/.config/chezmoi/key-$(date +%Y%m%d)-archived.txt # Rename new key mv ~/.config/chezmoi/key-new.txt ~/.config/chezmoi/key.txt # Commit changes cd ~/.dotfiles git add -A git commit -m "chore(secrets): rotate age encryption key" ``` ### Emergency Rotation (Compromised Key) ```bash # 1. Immediately generate new key age-keygen -o ~/.config/chezmoi/key-emergency.txt # 2. Re-encrypt ALL secrets (prioritize most sensitive) # 3. Revoke/rotate any API keys, tokens that were encrypted # 4. Update any shared secrets with team members # 5. Document the incident ``` --- ## SOPS Key Rotation ### Overview SOPS supports multiple key types. This covers Age keys (recommended) and GPG keys. ### SOPS with Age Keys #### Generate New Key ```bash age-keygen -o ~/.config/sops/age/keys-new.txt ``` #### Update .sops.yaml ```yaml creation_rules: - path_regex: \.env$ age: >- age1new_key_here, age1old_key_here # Keep old key temporarily for decryption ``` #### Re-encrypt Files ```bash # Rotate key for a single file sops updatekeys secrets.env # Or re-encrypt entirely sops -d secrets.env | sops -e /dev/stdin > secrets.env.new mv secrets.env.new secrets.env ``` #### Remove Old Key After confirming all files are re-encrypted: 1. Remove old key from `.sops.yaml` 2. Archive old key securely 3. Commit changes ### SOPS with GPG Keys ```bash # Generate new GPG key gpg --full-generate-key # Export fingerprint gpg --list-keys --keyid-format LONG # Update .sops.yaml with new fingerprint # Re-encrypt files sops updatekeys <file> ``` --- ## Automation Scripts ### Check Key Age ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash # check-key-age.sh - Alert if keys are older than 365 days KEY_FILE="${HOME}/.config/chezmoi/key.txt" MAX_AGE_DAYS=365 if [[ -f "$KEY_FILE" ]]; then key_age=$(( ($(date +%s) - $(stat -c %Y "$KEY_FILE")) / 86400 )) if [[ $key_age -gt $MAX_AGE_DAYS ]]; then echo "⚠️ Age key is ${key_age} days old. Consider rotation." exit 1 else echo "✓ Age key is ${key_age} days old (limit: ${MAX_AGE_DAYS})" fi fi ``` ### Automated Backup Before Rotation ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash # backup-before-rotation.sh BACKUP_DIR="${HOME}/.local/share/dotfiles/key-backups" mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR" # Backup current key cp ~/.config/chezmoi/key.txt "$BACKUP_DIR/key-$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).txt" # Encrypt backup with passphrase gpg --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 "$BACKUP_DIR/key-$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).txt" # Remove unencrypted backup rm "$BACKUP_DIR/key-$(date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S).txt" echo "Key backed up to $BACKUP_DIR (encrypted)" ``` --- ## Best Practices 1. **Never commit unencrypted keys** - Use `.gitignore` properly 2. **Store backups offline** - USB drive in secure location 3. **Use hardware keys when possible** - YubiKey with age-plugin-yubikey 4. **Document rotation dates** - Keep a log of when keys were rotated 5. **Test decryption** - Always verify after rotation 6. **Notify team members** - If using shared secrets ## Recovery Procedures If you lose access to your key: 1. **Check backups** - Offline storage, password manager 2. **Check other machines** - Key may exist on another device 3. **Re-create secrets** - As last resort, regenerate API keys, tokens, etc. ## Related Documentation - [SECRETS.md](SECRETS.md) - Secrets management overview - [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) - Security hardening guide - [Age documentation](https://github.com/FiloSottile/age) - [SOPS documentation](https://github.com/getsops/sops)