@phren/cli/dist/bridge/peer-handoff.js

Knowledge layer for AI agents - CLI, MCP server, and data layer

/** Only human/agent prose is redacted. Opaque protocol fields (tokens, paths,
 * capabilities, identities and grants) must retain their exact values. */
export function redactPeerHandoff(input) {
    const value = String.raw `(?:\[redacted\]|"(?:\\.|[^"\\])*"|'(?:\\.|[^'\\])*'|[^\s]+)`;
    let text = input.replace(/[\x00-\x08\x0b-\x1f\x7f]/g, "")
        .replace(/(?<![\w.+-])([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^/\s?#]+@/gi, "$1[redacted]@")
        .replace(/(\b(?:Authorization|Cookie|Set-Cookie|X-API-Key)[\t ]*:[\t ]*)[^\r\n]*/gi, "$1[redacted]")
        .replace(new RegExp(String.raw `(\bBearer[\t ]+)${value}`, "gi"), "$1[redacted]")
        .replace(/\b(?:mysql|curl)\b[^\r\n]*/gi, line => {
        if (/\bmysql\b/i.test(line))
            line = line.replace(/([\t ]-p)(?![\t ]|$)[^\s]+/g, "$1[redacted]");
        if (/\bcurl\b/i.test(line))
            line = line.replace(new RegExp(String.raw `([\t ](?:-u|--user)[\t ]+)${value}`, "g"), "$1[redacted]");
        return line;
    });
    // Consume each identifier once, then inspect its name. Requiring a genuine
    // token boundary prevents restarting a greedy search at each dot in a path.
    const keys = /(?<![\w.-])(?:"([\w.-]+)"|'([\w.-]+)'|([\w.-]+))([\t ]*(?:[:=][\t ]*|[\t ]+))/g;
    const secretName = /pass|pwd|token|secret|api[-_]?key|auth|bearer|credential/i;
    const values = new RegExp(value, "y");
    const parts = [];
    let copied = 0;
    for (let match; (match = keys.exec(text));) {
        const name = match[1] ?? match[2] ?? match[3];
        const cleanName = name.replace(/^--/, "");
        if (!secretName.test(cleanName) || /^(?:author|authority)$/i.test(cleanName) || !name.startsWith("--") && !/[:=]/.test(match[4]) && cleanName.toLowerCase() !== "bearer")
            continue;
        const start = keys.lastIndex;
        values.lastIndex = start;
        let found = values.exec(text);
        if (found?.[0] === "-p") {
            values.lastIndex = start + 2 + (/^[\t ]*/.exec(text.slice(start + 2))?.[0].length ?? 0);
            found = values.exec(text);
        }
        if (!found && text[start] !== "\n" && text[start] !== "\r" && start !== text.length)
            continue;
        const end = found ? values.lastIndex : start;
        parts.push(text.slice(copied, start), "[redacted]");
        copied = end;
        keys.lastIndex = end;
    }
    parts.push(text.slice(copied));
    text = parts.join("");
    // Recognizable credential formats are excised, never inferred from the
    // length/base64 shape of ordinary paths or used to refuse a continuation.
    return text.replace(/-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END (?:[A-Z0-9 ]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----|$)|\b(?:AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{22,}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}|sk-ant-api\d{2}-[\w-]{10,}|sk-proj-[\w-]{30,}|[sp]k_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{24,}|npm_[A-Za-z0-9]{36}|xox[bp]-[0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9-]+)|(?<![\w-])eyJ[\w-]+\.[\w-]+\.[\w-]+|https:\/\/hooks\.slack\.com\/services\/T\w+\/B\w+\/\w+/g, "[redacted]");
}
const proseFields = new Set(["text", "prompt", "reply", "error", "message", "notice", "reason", "description", "title", "label", "question", "request"]);
/** Conductor operation envelopes contain prose beside opaque routing data. */
export function redactPeerPayload(data) {
    return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(data, (key, value) => typeof value === "string" && proseFields.has(key) ? redactPeerHandoff(value) : value));
}