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@pdfme/common

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TypeScript base PDF generator and React base UI. Open source, developed by the community, and completely free to use under the MIT license!

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"use strict"; Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true }); const expression_js_1 = require("../src/expression.js"); describe('replacePlaceholders', () => { it('should return content as is if there are no placeholders', () => { const content = 'Hello, world!'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should replace placeholders with variables', () => { const content = 'Hello, {name}!'; const variables = { name: 'Alice' }; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Hello, Alice!'); }); it('should evaluate expressions within placeholders', () => { const content = 'The sum is {1 + 2}.'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('The sum is 3.'); }); it('should handle date and dateTime placeholders', () => { const content = 'Today is {date} and now is {dateTime}.'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); const date = new Date(); const padZero = (num) => String(num).padStart(2, '0'); const formattedDate = `${date.getFullYear()}/${padZero(date.getMonth() + 1)}/${padZero(date.getDate())}`; const formattedDateTime = `${formattedDate} ${padZero(date.getHours())}:${padZero(date.getMinutes())}`; expect(result).toBe(`Today is ${formattedDate} and now is ${formattedDateTime}.`); }); it('should handle data from schemas', () => { const content = 'Schema content: {name}'; const variables = {}; const schemas = [ [ { name: 'name', type: 'text', content: 'SchemaName', readOnly: true, }, ], ]; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas }); expect(result).toBe('Schema content: SchemaName'); }); it('should prioritize variables over schemas', () => { const content = 'Name: {name}'; const variables = { name: 'VariableName' }; const schemas = [ [ { name: 'name', type: 'text', content: 'SchemaName', readOnly: true, }, ], ]; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas }); expect(result).toBe('Name: VariableName'); }); it('should handle nested placeholders in variables', () => { const content = 'Nested variable: {greeting}'; const variables = { greeting: 'Hello, {name}!' }; const schemas = [ [ { name: 'name', type: 'text', content: 'Bob', readOnly: true, }, ], ]; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas }); expect(result).toBe('Nested variable: Hello, Bob!'); }); it('should return content unchanged when placeholders are invalid', () => { const content = 'Invalid placeholder: {name'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Invalid placeholder: {name'); }); it('should evaluate expressions even if they result in Infinity', () => { const content = 'Divide by zero: {1 / 0}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Divide by zero: Infinity'); }); it('should handle complex expressions', () => { const content = 'Result: {Math.max(1, 2, 3)}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Result: 3'); }); it('should parse JSON strings in variables', () => { const content = 'Data: {data.value}'; const variables = { data: '{"value": "42"}' }; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Data: 42'); }); it('should handle variables of different types', () => { const content = 'Number: {num}, Boolean: {bool}, Array: {arr[0]}, Object: {obj.key}'; const variables = { num: 42, bool: true, arr: ['first', 'second'], obj: { key: 'value' }, }; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Number: 42, Boolean: true, Array: first, Object: value'); }); it('should use content from readOnly schemas', () => { const content = 'Content: {readOnlyField}'; const variables = {}; const schemas = [ [ { name: 'readOnlyField', type: 'text', content: 'ReadOnlyContent', readOnly: true, }, ], ]; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas }); expect(result).toBe('Content: ReadOnlyContent'); }); it('should use empty string for non-readOnly schema content', () => { const content = 'Content: {editableField}'; const variables = {}; const schemas = [ [ { name: 'editableField', type: 'text', content: 'Should not be used', readOnly: false, }, ], ]; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas }); expect(result).toBe('Content: '); }); it('should allow method chaining on permitted global objects', () => { const content = 'Chained: {Math.random().toString()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Math.random() generates a random number, which is then converted to a string using toString() const regex = /^Chained: \d+\.\d+$/; expect(regex.test(result)).toBe(true); }); }); describe('replacePlaceholders - Security Tests', () => { it('should prevent access to __proto__ property', () => { const content = 'Proto: {__proto__}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Since __proto__ access is prohibited, the placeholder should remain unchanged expect(result).toBe('Proto: {__proto__}'); }); it('should prevent access to constructor property', () => { const content = 'Constructor: {constructor}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'constructor' is allowed if defined in context or globals; assuming it's not, placeholder remains expect(result).toBe('Constructor: {constructor}'); }); it('should prevent access to prototype property', () => { const content = 'Prototype: {prototype}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'prototype' access is prohibited expect(result).toBe('Prototype: {prototype}'); }); it('should prevent access to nested prohibited properties', () => { const content = 'Nested: {user.__proto__.polluted}'; const variables = { user: {} }; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas: [] }); // Access to '__proto__' is prohibited; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Nested: {user.__proto__.polluted}'); }); it('should prevent use of Function constructor', () => { const content = 'Function: {Function("return 42")()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Use of Function constructor is not allowed; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Function: {Function("return 42")()}'); }); it('should prevent access to disallowed global variables', () => { const content = 'Process: {process.env}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'process' is not in allowedGlobals; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Process: {process.env}'); }); it('should prevent prototype pollution via JSON.parse', () => { const content = 'Polluted: {JSON.parse(\'{"__proto__":{"polluted":true}}\').polluted}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Even if 'polluted' is accessed, the prototype is not polluted, so undefined is returned. expect(result).toBe('Polluted: undefined'); }); it('should prevent accessing nested prohibited properties in functions', () => { const content = 'Access: {( () => { return this.constructor } )()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Attempting to access 'constructor' via 'this' should be prohibited; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Access: {( () => { return this.constructor } )()}'); }); it('should prevent accessing global objects not in allowedGlobals', () => { const content = 'Global: {global}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'global' is not in allowedGlobals; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Global: {global}'); }); it('should prevent accessing Object constructor via allowed globals', () => { const content = 'ObjectConstructor: {Object.constructor}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Accessing 'constructor' of 'Object' is prohibited expect(result).toBe('ObjectConstructor: {Object.constructor}'); }); it('should prevent accessing Function from allowed globals', () => { const content = 'FunctionAccess: {Function("return 42")()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'Function' is not in allowedGlobals, so this should fail expect(result).toBe('FunctionAccess: {Function("return 42")()}'); }); it('should prevent accessing nested properties via allowed globals', () => { const content = 'NestedAccess: {Math.__proto__.polluted}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Accessing '__proto__' of allowed global 'Math' is prohibited expect(result).toBe('NestedAccess: {Math.__proto__.polluted}'); }); it('should prevent execution of arbitrary code via ternary operator', () => { const content = 'ArbitraryCode: {true ? (() => { return "Hacked" })() : "Safe"}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Execution of arbitrary functions is not allowed; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('ArbitraryCode: {true ? (() => { return "Hacked" })() : "Safe"}'); }); it('should handle attempts to override context variables', () => { const content = 'Override: {date = "Hacked"} {date}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Assignment operations are not supported; placeholders remain unchanged const date = new Date(); const padZero = (num) => String(num).padStart(2, '0'); const dateFmt = `${date.getFullYear()}/${padZero(date.getMonth() + 1)}/${padZero(date.getDate())}`; expect(result).toBe(`Override: {date = "Hacked"} ${dateFmt}`); }); it('should prevent using eval-like expressions', () => { const content = 'Eval: {eval("2 + 2")'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'eval' is not in allowedGlobals; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Eval: {eval("2 + 2")'); }); it('should prevent accessing undefined variables', () => { const content = 'Undefined: {undefinedVar}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'undefinedVar' is not defined; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('Undefined: {undefinedVar}'); }); it('should prevent accessing nested properties of undefined variables', () => { const content = 'NestedUndefined: {user.name}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // 'user' is undefined; accessing 'name' should fail and placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('NestedUndefined: {user.name}'); }); it('should prevent accessing nested prohibited properties in objects', () => { const content = 'Nested: {user.__proto__.polluted}'; const variables = { user: {} }; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables, schemas: [] }); // Since access to '__proto__' is prohibited, the placeholder remains unchanged. expect(result).toBe('Nested: {user.__proto__.polluted}'); }); it('should prevent using Function constructor', () => { const content = 'Function: {Function("return 42")()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Since 'Function' is not included in allowedGlobals, the placeholder remains unchanged. expect(result).toBe('Function: {Function("return 42")()}'); }); }); describe('replacePlaceholders - Comparison Operators Tests', () => { it('should evaluate expressions with == operator', () => { const content = 'Equals: {1 == 1}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Equals: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with != operator', () => { const content = 'NotEquals: {1 != 2}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('NotEquals: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with === operator', () => { const content = 'StrictEquals: {1 === 1}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('StrictEquals: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with !== operator', () => { const content = 'StrictNotEquals: {1 !== "1"}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('StrictNotEquals: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with < operator', () => { const content = 'LessThan: {1 < 2}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('LessThan: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with > operator', () => { const content = 'GreaterThan: {2 > 1}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('GreaterThan: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with <= operator', () => { const content = 'LessThanOrEquals: {1 <= 1}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('LessThanOrEquals: true'); }); it('should evaluate expressions with >= operator', () => { const content = 'GreaterThanOrEquals: {2 >= 1}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('GreaterThanOrEquals: true'); }); it('should handle complex expressions with comparison operators', () => { const content = 'Complex: {1 + 2 > 2 && 4 - 1 < 5}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe('Complex: true'); }); it('should prevent execution of arbitrary code via comparison operators', () => { const content = 'ArbitraryCode: {1 < (() => { return "Hacked" })()}'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Execution of arbitrary functions is not allowed; placeholder remains unchanged expect(result).toBe('ArbitraryCode: {1 < (() => { return "Hacked" })()}'); }); }); describe('replacePlaceholders - XSS Vulnerability Prevention Tests', () => { it('should prevent XSS via Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor and Object.getPrototypeOf (CVE payload 1)', () => { const content = '{ ((f, g) => f(g(Object), "constructor").value)(Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor, Object.getPrototypeOf)("alert(location)")() }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // The dangerous expression should not be evaluated and should return as-is expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent XSS via object property assignment (CVE payload 2)', () => { const content = '{ { f: Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor }.f({ g: Object.getPrototypeOf }.g(Object), "constructor").value("alert(location)")() }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // The dangerous expression should not be evaluated and should return as-is expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent direct access to Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor', () => { const content = '{ Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(Object, "constructor") }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent direct access to Object.getPrototypeOf', () => { const content = '{ Object.getPrototypeOf(Object) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to Object.setPrototypeOf', () => { const content = '{ Object.setPrototypeOf({}, null) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to Object.defineProperty', () => { const content = '{ Object.defineProperty({}, "prop", { value: 42 }) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to Object.defineProperties', () => { const content = '{ Object.defineProperties({}, { prop: { value: 42 } }) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to Object.getOwnPropertyNames', () => { const content = '{ Object.getOwnPropertyNames(Object) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to Object.getOwnPropertySymbols', () => { const content = '{ Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(Object) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Direct access to dangerous method should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should allow safe Object methods', () => { // Test Object.keys const keysContent = '{ Object.keys({ a: 1, b: 2 }) }'; const keysResult = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: keysContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(keysResult).toBe('a,b'); // Test Object.values const valuesContent = '{ Object.values({ a: 1, b: 2 }) }'; const valuesResult = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: valuesContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(valuesResult).toBe('1,2'); // Test Object.entries const entriesContent = '{ Object.entries({ a: 1 })[0] }'; const entriesResult = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: entriesContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(entriesResult).toBe('a,1'); // Test safe Object.assign const assignContent = '{ Object.assign({}, { a: 1 }, { b: 2 }).a }'; const assignResult = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: assignContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(assignResult).toBe('1'); // Safe assign should work }); it('should prevent complex XSS attempts via nested function calls', () => { const content = '{ [].map.call("abc", Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Complex attempts to access dangerous functions should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent Function constructor access via constructor property', () => { const content = '{ "".constructor.constructor("alert(1)")() }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Attempts to access Function constructor should be blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent prototype pollution via Object.assign and __lookupGetter__', () => { const content = '{ { assign: Object.assign }.assign({ f: {}.__lookupGetter__("__proto__") }.f(), { polluted: "yes" }) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // The dangerous expression should not be evaluated due to __lookupGetter__ being blocked expect(result).toBe(content); // Verify that prototype is not polluted expect({}.polluted).toBeUndefined(); }); it('should prevent access to __lookupGetter__', () => { const content = '{ {}.__lookupGetter__("__proto__") }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to __lookupSetter__', () => { const content = '{ {}.__lookupSetter__("__proto__") }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to __defineGetter__', () => { const content = '{ {}.__defineGetter__("test", () => "hacked") }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should prevent access to __defineSetter__', () => { const content = '{ {}.__defineSetter__("test", () => {}) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should allow safe Object.assign but prevent prototype pollution', () => { const content = '{ Object.assign({}, { a: 1 }) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Safe assign should work expect(result).toBe('[object Object]'); }); it('should prevent prototype pollution via Object.assign', () => { const pollutionContent = '{ Object.assign({}, { "__proto__": { polluted: "yes" } }) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: pollutionContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Should execute but not pollute prototype expect(result).toBe('[object Object]'); expect({}.polluted).toBeUndefined(); // Test with constructor const constructorContent = '{ Object.assign({}, { "constructor": { polluted: "yes" } }) }'; const result2 = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content: constructorContent, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); expect(result2).toBe('[object Object]'); expect({}.constructor.polluted).toBeUndefined(); }); it('should no longer allow Object.create due to security concerns', () => { const content = '{ Object.create(null) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Object.create is now blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should no longer allow Object.freeze due to security concerns', () => { const content = '{ Object.freeze({}) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Object.freeze is now blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); it('should no longer allow Object.seal due to security concerns', () => { const content = '{ Object.seal({}) }'; const result = (0, expression_js_1.replacePlaceholders)({ content, variables: {}, schemas: [] }); // Object.seal is now blocked expect(result).toBe(content); }); }); //# sourceMappingURL=expression.test.js.map