@noble/curves
Version:
Audited & minimal JS implementation of elliptic curve cryptography
293 lines • 13.1 kB
TypeScript
import { randomBytes, type TArg, type TRet } from '../utils.ts';
import { type CurvePoint, type CurvePointCons } from './curve.ts';
import { type H2CDSTOpts } from './hash-to-curve.ts';
import { type IField } from './modular.ts';
export type RNG = typeof randomBytes;
export type Identifier = string;
export type Commitment = Uint8Array;
export type Coefficient = Uint8Array;
export type Signature = Uint8Array;
export type Signers = {
min: number;
max: number;
};
export type SecretKey = Uint8Array;
export type Bytes = Uint8Array;
type Point = Uint8Array;
export type DKG_Round1 = {
identifier: Identifier;
commitment: TRet<Commitment[]>;
proofOfKnowledge: TRet<Signature>;
};
export type DKG_Round2 = {
identifier: Identifier;
signingShare: TRet<Bytes>;
};
export type DKG_Secret = {
identifier: bigint;
coefficients?: bigint[];
commitment: TRet<Point[]>;
signers: Signers;
step?: 1 | 2 | 3;
};
export type FrostPublic = {
signers: Signers;
commitments: TRet<Bytes[]>;
verifyingShares: TRet<Record<Identifier, Bytes>>;
};
export type FrostSecret = {
identifier: Identifier;
signingShare: TRet<Bytes>;
};
export type Key = {
public: FrostPublic;
secret: FrostSecret;
};
export type DealerShares = {
public: FrostPublic;
secretShares: Record<Identifier, FrostSecret>;
};
export type Nonces = {
hiding: TRet<Bytes>;
binding: TRet<Bytes>;
};
export type NonceCommitments = {
identifier: Identifier;
hiding: TRet<Bytes>;
binding: TRet<Bytes>;
};
export type GenNonce = {
nonces: Nonces;
commitments: NonceCommitments;
};
export interface FROSTPoint<T extends CurvePoint<any, T>> extends CurvePoint<any, T> {
add(rhs: T): T;
multiply(rhs: bigint): T;
equals(rhs: T): boolean;
toBytes(compressed?: boolean): Bytes;
clearCofactor(): T;
}
export interface FROSTPointConstructor<T extends FROSTPoint<T>> extends CurvePointCons<T> {
fromBytes(a: Bytes): T;
Fn: IField<bigint>;
}
export type FrostOpts<P extends FROSTPoint<P>> = {
readonly name: string;
readonly Point: FROSTPointConstructor<P>;
readonly Fn?: IField<bigint>;
/** Optional suite hook that tightens canonical decoding with subgroup / identity checks. */
readonly validatePoint?: (p: P) => void;
/** Optional public-key parser. Implementations MUST preserve the same subgroup / identity policy
* as `validatePoint`, because this bypasses generic canonical decoding in `parsePoint()`. */
readonly parsePublicKey?: (bytes: TArg<Uint8Array>) => P;
readonly hash: (msg: TArg<Uint8Array>) => TRet<Uint8Array>;
/** Custom scalar hash hook. Implementations MUST treat `msg` and `options` as read-only. */
readonly hashToScalar?: (msg: TArg<Uint8Array>, options?: TArg<H2CDSTOpts>) => bigint;
readonly adjustScalar?: (n: bigint) => bigint;
readonly adjustPoint?: (n: P) => P;
readonly challenge?: (R: P, PK: P, msg: TArg<Uint8Array>) => bigint;
readonly adjustNonces?: (PK: P, nonces: TArg<Nonces>) => TRet<Nonces>;
readonly adjustSecret?: (secret: TArg<FrostSecret>, pub: TArg<FrostPublic>) => TRet<FrostSecret>;
readonly adjustPublic?: (pub: TArg<FrostPublic>) => TRet<FrostPublic>;
readonly adjustGroupCommitmentShare?: (GC: P, GCShare: P) => P;
readonly adjustTx?: {
readonly encode: (tx: TArg<Uint8Array>) => TRet<Uint8Array>;
readonly decode: (tx: TArg<Uint8Array>) => TRet<Uint8Array>;
};
readonly adjustDKG?: (k: TArg<Key>) => TRet<Key>;
readonly H1?: string;
readonly H2?: string;
readonly H3?: string;
readonly H4?: string;
readonly H5?: string;
readonly HDKG?: string;
readonly HID?: string;
};
/**
* FROST: Threshold Protocol for Two‑Round Schnorr Signatures
* from [RFC 9591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc9591/).
*/
export type FROST = {
/**
* Methods to construct participant identifiers.
*/
Identifier: {
/**
* Constructs an identifier from a numeric index.
* @param n - A positive integer.
* @returns A canonical serialized Identifier.
*/
fromNumber(n: number): Identifier;
/**
* Derives an identifier deterministically from a string (e.g. an email).
* @param s - Arbitrary string.
* @returns A canonical serialized Identifier.
*/
derive(s: string): Identifier;
};
/**
* Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol interface.
* RFC 9591 leaves DKG out of scope; Appendix C only specifies dealer/VSS key generation.
* These helpers follow the split-round API used by frost-rs for interoperable testing.
*/
DKG: {
/**
* Generates the first round of DKG.
* @param id - Participant's identifier.
* @param signers - Set of all participants (min/max threshold).
* @param secret - Optional initial secret scalar.
* @param rng - Optional RNG for nonce generation.
* @returns Public broadcast and private DKG state. The returned `secret` package is mutable
* round state that will be consumed by `round2()` and `round3()`.
*/
round1: (id: Identifier, signers: Signers, secret?: TArg<SecretKey>, rng?: RNG) => {
public: DKG_Round1;
secret: DKG_Secret;
};
/**
* Executes DKG round 2 given public round1 data from others.
* @param secret - Private DKG state from round1. This mutates `secret.step` in place.
* @param others - Public round1 broadcasts from other participants.
* @returns A map of round2 messages to be sent to others.
*/
round2: (secret: TArg<DKG_Secret>, others: TArg<DKG_Round1[]>) => TRet<Record<string, DKG_Round2>>;
/**
* Finalizes key generation in round3 using received round1 + round2 messages.
* @param secret - Private DKG state. This consumes the remaining local polynomial coefficients
* and transitions the package to its final post-round3 state.
* @param round1 - Public round1 broadcasts from all participants.
* @param round2 - Round2 messages received from others.
* @returns Final secret/public key information for the participant.
* Callers MUST pass the same verified remote `round1` package set that was already
* accepted in `round2()`, rather than re-fetching or rebuilding it from the network.
*/
round3: (secret: TArg<DKG_Secret>, round1: TArg<DKG_Round1[]>, round2: TArg<DKG_Round2[]>) => TRet<Key>;
/**
* Best-effort erasure of internal secret state. Bigint/JIT copies may still survive outside the
* local object even after cleanup.
* @param secret - Private DKG state from round1.
*/
clean(secret: TArg<DKG_Secret>): void;
};
/**
* Trusted dealer mode: generates key shares from a central trusted authority.
* Mirrors RFC 9591 Appendix C and returns one shared VSS commitment package
* plus per-participant shares.
* @param signers - Threshold parameters (min/max).
* @param identifiers - Optional explicit participant list.
* @param secret - Optional secret scalar.
* @param rng - Optional RNG.
* @returns One shared public package plus the participant secret-share packages.
*/
trustedDealer(signers: Signers, identifiers?: Identifier[], secret?: TArg<SecretKey>, rng?: RNG): TRet<DealerShares>;
/**
* Validates the consistency of a secret share against the shared public commitments.
* This is the RFC 9591 Appendix C.2 `vss_verify` check against the shared dealer/DKG commitment.
* It does not relax RFC 9591 Section 3.1: public identity elements are still invalid even when
* the scalar/share algebra would otherwise be self-consistent.
* Throws if invalid.
* @param secret - A FrostSecret containing identifier and signing share.
* @param pub - Shared public package containing commitments.
*/
validateSecret(secret: TArg<FrostSecret>, pub: TArg<FrostPublic>): void;
/**
* Produces nonces and public commitments used in signing.
* RFC 9591 Section 5.1 `commit()`.
* @param secret - Participant's secret share.
* @param rng - Optional RNG.
* @returns Nonce values and their public commitments.
* Returned nonces are one-time-use and MUST NOT be reused across signing sessions.
* This API does not mutate or zeroize caller-owned nonce objects.
*/
commit(secret: TArg<FrostSecret>, rng?: RNG): TRet<GenNonce>;
/**
* Signs a message using the participant's secret and nonce.
* @param secret - Participant's secret share.
* @param pub - Shared public package containing commitments.
* @param nonces - Participant's nonce pair.
* @param commitmentList - Commitments from all signing participants.
* @param msg - Message to be signed.
* @returns Signature share as a byte array.
* RFC 9591 Sections 4.1/5.1 require round-one commitments to be one-time-use, and
* Section 5.2 signs with the nonce corresponding to that published commitment.
* The caller MUST pass fresh nonces from `commit()`. On successful signing, this helper
* consumes the caller-owned nonce object by zeroing both nonce byte arrays in place.
* Later calls reject an all-zero nonce package, so same-object reuse fails closed and an
* accidentally generated zero nonce package is not silently used for signing.
*/
signShare(secret: TArg<FrostSecret>, pub: TArg<FrostPublic>, nonces: TArg<Nonces>, commitmentList: TArg<NonceCommitments[]>, msg: TArg<Uint8Array>): TRet<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Verifies a signature share against public commitments.
* Matches the coordinator-side individual-share verification from RFC 9591 Section 5.4.
* @param pub - Group public key information.
* @param commitmentList - Commitments from all signing participants.
* @param msg - Message being signed.
* @param identifier - Identifier of the signer whose share is being verified.
* @param sigShare - Signature share to verify.
* @returns True if valid, false otherwise.
*/
verifyShare(pub: TArg<FrostPublic>, commitmentList: TArg<NonceCommitments[]>, msg: TArg<Uint8Array>, identifier: Identifier, sigShare: TArg<Uint8Array>): boolean;
/**
* Aggregates signature shares into a full signature.
* RFC 9591 Section 5.3 `aggregate()`.
* @param pub - Group public key.
* @param commitmentList - Nonce commitments from all signers.
* @param msg - Message to sign.
* @param sigShares - Map from identifier to their signature share.
* @returns Final aggregated signature.
*/
aggregate(pub: TArg<FrostPublic>, commitmentList: TArg<NonceCommitments[]>, msg: TArg<Uint8Array>, sigShares: TArg<Record<Identifier, Uint8Array>>): TRet<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Signs a message using a raw secret key (e.g. from combineSecret).
* @param msg - Message to sign.
* @param secretKey - Group secret key as bytes.
* @returns Signature bytes.
*/
sign(msg: TArg<Uint8Array>, secretKey: TArg<Uint8Array>): TRet<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Verifies a full signature against the group public key.
* @param sig - Signature bytes.
* @param msg - Message that was signed.
* @param publicKey - Group public key.
* @returns True if valid, false otherwise.
*/
verify(sig: TArg<Signature>, msg: TArg<Uint8Array>, publicKey: TArg<Uint8Array>): boolean;
/**
* Combines multiple secret shares into a single secret key (e.g. for recovery).
* @param shares - Set of FrostSecret shares.
* @param signers - Threshold parameters.
* @returns Group secret key as bytes.
*/
combineSecret(shares: TArg<FrostSecret[]>, signers: Signers): TRet<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Low-level helper utilities (field arithmetic and polynomial tools).
*/
utils: {
/**
* Finite field used for scalars.
*/
Fn: IField<bigint>;
/**
* Generates a random scalar (private key).
* @param rng - Optional RNG source.
* @returns Scalar as 32-byte Uint8Array.
*/
randomScalar: (rng?: RNG) => TRet<Uint8Array>;
/**
* Generates a secret-sharing polynomial and its public commitments.
* @param signers - Threshold parameters.
* @param secret - Optional initial secret scalar.
* @param coeffs - Optional manual coefficients.
* @param rng - Optional RNG.
* @returns Polynomial coefficients, commitments, and secret value.
*/
generateSecretPolynomial: (signers: Signers, secret?: TArg<Uint8Array>, coeffs?: bigint[], rng?: RNG) => {
coefficients: bigint[];
commitment: TRet<Point[]>;
secret: bigint;
};
};
};
export declare function createFROST<P extends FROSTPoint<P>>(opts: FrostOpts<P>): TRet<FROST>;
export {};
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