@hyperlane-xyz/core/dependencies/@eth-optimism-contracts-0.6.0/specs/withdrawals.md

Core solidity contracts for Hyperlane

# Withdrawals

<!-- All glossary references in this file. -->

[g-deposits]: glossary.md#deposits
[g-deposited]: glossary.md#deposited-transaction
[deposit-tx-type]: glossary.md#deposited-transaction-type
[g-withdrawal]: glossary.md#withdrawal
[g-mpt]: glossary.md#merkle-patricia-trie
[g-relayer]: glossary.md#withdrawals
[g-execution-engine]: glossary.md#execution-engine

[Withdrawals][g-withdrawal] are cross domain transactions which are initiated on L2, and finalized by a transaction
executed on L1. Notably, withdrawals may be used by an L2 account to call an L1 contract, or to transfer ETH from
an L2 account to an L1 account.

**Vocabulary note**: _withdrawal_ can refer to the transaction at various stages of the process, but we introduce
more specific terms to differentiate:

- A _withdrawal initiating transaction_ refers specifically to a transaction on L2 sent to the Withdrawals predeploy.
- A _withdrawal proving transaction_ refers specifically to an L1 transaction
  which proves the withdrawal is correct (that it has been included in a merkle
  tree whose root is available on L1).
- A _withdrawal finalizing transaction_ refers specifically to an L1 transaction which finalizes and relays the
  withdrawal.

Withdrawals are initiated on L2 via a call to the Message Passer predeploy contract, which records the important
properties of the message in its storage.
Withdrawals are proven on L1 via a call to the `OptimismPortal`, which proves the inclusion of this withdrawal message.
Withdrawals are finalized on L1 via a call to the `OptimismPortal` contract,
which verifies that the fault challenge period has passed since the withdrawal message has been proved.

In this way, withdrawals are different from [deposits][g-deposits] which make use of a special transaction type in the
[execution engine][g-execution-engine] client. Rather, withdrawals transaction must use smart contracts on L1 for
finalization.

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**Table of Contents**

- [Withdrawal Flow](#withdrawal-flow)
  - [On L2](#on-l2)
  - [On L1](#on-l1)
- [The L2ToL1MessagePasser Contract](#the-l2tol1messagepasser-contract)
  - [Addresses are not Aliased on Withdrawals](#addresses-are-not-aliased-on-withdrawals)
- [The Optimism Portal Contract](#the-optimism-portal-contract)
- [Withdrawal Verification and Finalization](#withdrawal-verification-and-finalization)
- [Security Considerations](#security-considerations)
  - [Key Properties of Withdrawal Verification](#key-properties-of-withdrawal-verification)
  - [Handling Successfully Verified Messages That Fail When Relayed](#handling-successfully-verified-messages-that-fail-when-relayed)
- [Summary of Definitions](#summary-of-definitions)
  - [Constants](#constants)

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## Withdrawal Flow

We first describe the end to end flow of initiating and finalizing a withdrawal:

### On L2

An L2 account sends a withdrawal message (and possibly also ETH) to the `L2ToL1MessagePasser` predeploy contract.
This is a very simple contract that stores the hash of the withdrawal data.

### On L1

1. A [relayer][g-relayer] submits a withdrawal proving transaction with the required inputs
   to the `OptimismPortal` contract.
   The relayer is not necessarily the same entity which initiated the withdrawal on L2.
   These inputs include the withdrawal transaction data, inclusion proofs, and a block number. The block number
   must be one for which an L2 output root exists, which commits to the withdrawal as registered on L2.
1. The `OptimismPortal` contract retrieves the output root for the given block number from the `L2OutputOracle`'s
   `getL2Output()` function, and performs the remainder of the verification process internally.
1. If proof verification fails, the call reverts. Otherwise the hash is recorded to prevent it from being re-proven.
   Note that the withdrawal can be proven more than once if the corresponding output root changes.
1. After the withdrawal is proven, it enters a 7 day challenge period, allowing time for other network participants
   to challenge the integrity of the corresponding output root.
1. Once the challenge period has passed, a relayer submits a withdrawal finalizing transaction to the
   `OptimismPortal` contract.
   The relayer doesn't need to be the same entity that initiated the withdrawal on L2.
1. The `OptimismPortal` contract receives the withdrawal transaction data and verifies that the withdrawal has
   both been proven and passed the challenge period.
1. If the requirements are not met, the call reverts. Otherwise the call is forwarded, and the hash is recorded to
   prevent it from being replayed.

## The L2ToL1MessagePasser Contract

[message-passer-contract]: #the-l2tol1messagepasser-contract

A withdrawal is initiated by calling the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract's `initiateWithdrawal` function.
The L2ToL1MessagePasser is a simple predeploy contract at `0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000016`
which stores messages to be withdrawn.

```js
interface L2ToL1MessagePasser {
    event MessagePassed(
        uint256 indexed nonce, // this is a global nonce value for all withdrawal messages
        address indexed sender,
        address indexed target,
        uint256 value,
        uint256 gasLimit,
        bytes data,
        bytes32 withdrawalHash
    );

    event WithdrawerBalanceBurnt(uint256 indexed amount);

    function burn() external;

    function initiateWithdrawal(address _target, uint256 _gasLimit, bytes memory _data) payable external;

    function messageNonce() public view returns (uint256);

    function sentMessages(bytes32) view external returns (bool);
}

```

The `MessagePassed` event includes all of the data that is hashed and
stored in the `sentMessages` mapping, as well as the hash itself.

### Addresses are not Aliased on Withdrawals

[address-aliasing]: #no-address-aliasing

When a contract makes a deposit, the sender's address is [aliased](./deposits.md#address-aliasing). The same is not true
of withdrawals, which do not modify the sender's address. The difference is that:

- on L2, the deposit sender's address is returned by the `CALLER` opcode, meaning a contract cannot easily tell if the
  call originated on L1 or L2, whereas
- on L1, the withdrawal sender's address is accessed by calling the `l2Sender()` function on the `OptimismPortal`
  contract.

Calling `l2Sender()` removes any ambiguity about which domain the call originated from. Still, developers will need to
recognize that having the same address does not imply that a contract on L2 will behave the same as a contract on L1.

## The Optimism Portal Contract

The Optimism Portal serves as both the entry and exit point to the Optimism L2. It is a contract which inherits from
the [OptimismPortal](./deposits.md#deposit-contract) contract, and in addition provides the following interface for
withdrawals:

- [`WithdrawalTransaction` type]
- [`OutputRootProof` type]

```js
interface OptimismPortal {

    event WithdrawalFinalized(bytes32 indexed withdrawalHash, bool success);


    function l2Sender() returns(address) external;

    function proveWithdrawalTransaction(
        Types.WithdrawalTransaction memory _tx,
        uint256 _l2OutputIndex,
        Types.OutputRootProof calldata _outputRootProof,
        bytes[] calldata _withdrawalProof
    ) external;

    function finalizeWithdrawalTransaction(
        Types.WithdrawalTransaction memory _tx
    ) external;
}
```

## Withdrawal Verification and Finalization

The following inputs are required to prove and finalize a withdrawal:

- Withdrawal transaction data:
  - `nonce`: Nonce for the provided message.
  - `sender`: Message sender address on L2.
  - `target`: Target address on L1.
  - `value`: ETH to send to the target.
  - `data`: Data to send to the target.
  - `gasLimit`: Gas to be forwarded to the target.
- Proof and verification data:
  - `l2OutputIndex`: The index in the L2 outputs where the applicable output root may be found.
  - `outputRootProof`: Four `bytes32` values which are used to derive the output root.
  - `withdrawalProof`: An inclusion proof for the given withdrawal in the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract.

These inputs must satisfy the following conditions:

1. The `l2OutputIndex` must be the index in the L2 outputs that contains the applicable output root.
1. `L2OutputOracle.getL2Output(l2OutputIndex)` returns a non-zero `OutputProposal`.
1. The keccak256 hash of the `outputRootProof` values is equal to the `outputRoot`.
1. The `withdrawalProof` is a valid inclusion proof demonstrating that a hash of the Withdrawal transaction data
   is contained in the storage of the L2ToL1MessagePasser contract on L2.

## Security Considerations

### Key Properties of Withdrawal Verification

1. It should not be possible to 'double spend' a withdrawal, ie. to relay a withdrawal on L1 which does not
   correspond to a message initiated on L2. For reference, see [this writeup][polygon-dbl-spend] of a vulnerability
   of this type found on Polygon.

   [polygon-dbl-spend]: https://gerhard-wagner.medium.com/double-spending-bug-in-polygons-plasma-bridge-2e0954ccadf1

1. For each withdrawal initiated on L2 (i.e. with a unique `messageNonce()`), the following properties must hold:
   1. It should only be possible to prove the withdrawal once, unless the outputRoot for the withdrawal
      has changed.
   1. It should only be possible to finalize the withdrawal once.
   1. It should not be possible to relay the message with any of its fields modified, ie.
      1. Modifying the `sender` field would enable a 'spoofing' attack.
      1. Modifying the `target`, `data`, or `value` fields would enable an attacker to dangerously change the
         intended outcome of the withdrawal.
      1. Modifying the `gasLimit` could make the cost of relaying too high, or allow the relayer to cause execution
         to fail (out of gas) in the `target`.

### Handling Successfully Verified Messages That Fail When Relayed

If the execution of the relayed call fails in the `target` contract, it is unfortunately not possible to determine
whether or not it was 'supposed' to fail, and whether or not it should be 'replayable'. For this reason, and to
minimize complexity, we have not provided any replay functionality, this may be implemented in external utility
contracts if desired.

## Summary of Definitions

### Constants

| Name                  | Value     | Unit    |
| --------------------- | --------- | ------- |
| `FINALIZATION_PERIOD` | `604_800` | seconds |

This `FINALIZATION_PERIOD` value is equivalent to 7 days.

[`WithdrawalTransaction` type]: https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/6c6d142d7bb95faa11066aab5d8aed7187abfe38/packages/contracts-bedrock/contracts/libraries/Types.sol#L76-L83
[`OutputRootProof` type]: https://github.com/ethereum-optimism/optimism/blob/6c6d142d7bb95faa11066aab5d8aed7187abfe38/packages/contracts-bedrock/contracts/libraries/Types.sol#L33-L38