@gguf/claw
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WhatsApp gateway CLI (Baileys web) with Pi RPC agent
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text/typescript
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { verifyPlivoWebhook, verifyTwilioWebhook } from "./webhook-security.js";
function canonicalizeBase64(input: string): string {
return Buffer.from(input, "base64").toString("base64");
}
function plivoV2Signature(params: {
authToken: string;
urlNoQuery: string;
nonce: string;
}): string {
const digest = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", params.authToken)
.update(params.urlNoQuery + params.nonce)
.digest("base64");
return canonicalizeBase64(digest);
}
function plivoV3Signature(params: {
authToken: string;
urlWithQuery: string;
postBody: string;
nonce: string;
}): string {
const u = new URL(params.urlWithQuery);
const baseNoQuery = `${u.protocol}//${u.host}${u.pathname}`;
const queryPairs: Array<[string, string]> = [];
for (const [k, v] of u.searchParams.entries()) {
queryPairs.push([k, v]);
}
const queryMap = new Map<string, string[]>();
for (const [k, v] of queryPairs) {
queryMap.set(k, (queryMap.get(k) ?? []).concat(v));
}
const sortedQuery = Array.from(queryMap.keys())
.toSorted()
.flatMap((k) => [...(queryMap.get(k) ?? [])].toSorted().map((v) => `${k}=${v}`))
.join("&");
const postParams = new URLSearchParams(params.postBody);
const postMap = new Map<string, string[]>();
for (const [k, v] of postParams.entries()) {
postMap.set(k, (postMap.get(k) ?? []).concat(v));
}
const sortedPost = Array.from(postMap.keys())
.toSorted()
.flatMap((k) => [...(postMap.get(k) ?? [])].toSorted().map((v) => `${k}${v}`))
.join("");
const hasPost = sortedPost.length > 0;
let baseUrl = baseNoQuery;
if (sortedQuery.length > 0 || hasPost) {
baseUrl = `${baseNoQuery}?${sortedQuery}`;
}
if (sortedQuery.length > 0 && hasPost) {
baseUrl = `${baseUrl}.`;
}
baseUrl = `${baseUrl}${sortedPost}`;
const digest = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", params.authToken)
.update(`${baseUrl}.${params.nonce}`)
.digest("base64");
return canonicalizeBase64(digest);
}
function twilioSignature(params: { authToken: string; url: string; postBody: string }): string {
let dataToSign = params.url;
const sortedParams = Array.from(new URLSearchParams(params.postBody).entries()).toSorted((a, b) =>
a[0].localeCompare(b[0]),
);
for (const [key, value] of sortedParams) {
dataToSign += key + value;
}
return crypto.createHmac("sha1", params.authToken).update(dataToSign).digest("base64");
}
describe("verifyPlivoWebhook", () => {
it("accepts valid V2 signature", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const nonce = "nonce-123";
const ctxUrl = "http://local/voice/webhook?flow=answer&callId=abc";
const verificationUrl = "https://example.com/voice/webhook";
const signature = plivoV2Signature({
authToken,
urlNoQuery: verificationUrl,
nonce,
});
const result = verifyPlivoWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "example.com",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-plivo-signature-v2": signature,
"x-plivo-signature-v2-nonce": nonce,
},
rawBody: "CallUUID=uuid&CallStatus=in-progress",
url: ctxUrl,
method: "POST",
query: { flow: "answer", callId: "abc" },
},
authToken,
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.version).toBe("v2");
});
it("accepts valid V3 signature (including multi-signature header)", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const nonce = "nonce-456";
const urlWithQuery = "https://example.com/voice/webhook?flow=answer&callId=abc";
const postBody = "CallUUID=uuid&CallStatus=in-progress&From=%2B15550000000";
const good = plivoV3Signature({
authToken,
urlWithQuery,
postBody,
nonce,
});
const result = verifyPlivoWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "example.com",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-plivo-signature-v3": `bad, ${good}`,
"x-plivo-signature-v3-nonce": nonce,
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: urlWithQuery,
method: "POST",
query: { flow: "answer", callId: "abc" },
},
authToken,
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.version).toBe("v3");
});
it("rejects missing signatures", () => {
const result = verifyPlivoWebhook(
{
headers: { host: "example.com", "x-forwarded-proto": "https" },
rawBody: "",
url: "https://example.com/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
"token",
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/Missing Plivo signature headers/);
});
});
describe("verifyTwilioWebhook", () => {
it("uses request query when publicUrl omits it", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const publicUrl = "https://example.com/voice/webhook";
const urlWithQuery = `${publicUrl}?callId=abc`;
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const signature = twilioSignature({
authToken,
url: urlWithQuery,
postBody,
});
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "example.com",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-twilio-signature": signature,
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://local/voice/webhook?callId=abc",
method: "POST",
query: { callId: "abc" },
},
authToken,
{ publicUrl },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
});
it("rejects invalid signatures even when attacker injects forwarded host", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "127.0.0.1:3334",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-forwarded-host": "attacker.ngrok-free.app",
"x-twilio-signature": "invalid",
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://127.0.0.1:3334/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
authToken,
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
// X-Forwarded-Host is ignored by default, so URL uses Host header
expect(result.isNgrokFreeTier).toBe(false);
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/Invalid signature/);
});
it("allows invalid signatures for ngrok free tier only on loopback", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "127.0.0.1:3334",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-forwarded-host": "local.ngrok-free.app",
"x-twilio-signature": "invalid",
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://127.0.0.1:3334/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
remoteAddress: "127.0.0.1",
},
authToken,
{ allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass: true },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.isNgrokFreeTier).toBe(true);
expect(result.reason).toMatch(/compatibility mode/);
});
it("ignores attacker X-Forwarded-Host without allowedHosts or trustForwardingHeaders", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
// Attacker tries to inject their host - should be ignored
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "legitimate.example.com",
"x-forwarded-host": "attacker.evil.com",
"x-twilio-signature": "invalid",
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://localhost:3000/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
authToken,
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
// Attacker's host is ignored - uses Host header instead
expect(result.verificationUrl).toBe("https://legitimate.example.com/voice/webhook");
});
it("uses X-Forwarded-Host when allowedHosts whitelist is provided", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const webhookUrl = "https://myapp.ngrok.io/voice/webhook";
const signature = twilioSignature({ authToken, url: webhookUrl, postBody });
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "localhost:3000",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-forwarded-host": "myapp.ngrok.io",
"x-twilio-signature": signature,
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://localhost:3000/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
authToken,
{ allowedHosts: ["myapp.ngrok.io"] },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.verificationUrl).toBe(webhookUrl);
});
it("rejects X-Forwarded-Host not in allowedHosts whitelist", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "localhost:3000",
"x-forwarded-host": "attacker.evil.com",
"x-twilio-signature": "invalid",
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://localhost:3000/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
authToken,
{ allowedHosts: ["myapp.ngrok.io", "webhook.example.com"] },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
// Attacker's host not in whitelist, falls back to Host header
expect(result.verificationUrl).toBe("https://localhost/voice/webhook");
});
it("trusts forwarding headers only from trusted proxy IPs", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const webhookUrl = "https://proxy.example.com/voice/webhook";
const signature = twilioSignature({ authToken, url: webhookUrl, postBody });
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "localhost:3000",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-forwarded-host": "proxy.example.com",
"x-twilio-signature": signature,
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://localhost:3000/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
remoteAddress: "203.0.113.10",
},
authToken,
{ trustForwardingHeaders: true, trustedProxyIPs: ["203.0.113.10"] },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
expect(result.verificationUrl).toBe(webhookUrl);
});
it("ignores forwarding headers when trustedProxyIPs are set but remote IP is missing", () => {
const authToken = "test-auth-token";
const postBody = "CallSid=CS123&CallStatus=completed&From=%2B15550000000";
const result = verifyTwilioWebhook(
{
headers: {
host: "legitimate.example.com",
"x-forwarded-proto": "https",
"x-forwarded-host": "proxy.example.com",
"x-twilio-signature": "invalid",
},
rawBody: postBody,
url: "http://localhost:3000/voice/webhook",
method: "POST",
},
authToken,
{ trustForwardingHeaders: true, trustedProxyIPs: ["203.0.113.10"] },
);
expect(result.ok).toBe(false);
expect(result.verificationUrl).toBe("https://legitimate.example.com/voice/webhook");
});
});