@gguf/claw/dist/audit-CWGOX7Eh.js

WhatsApp gateway CLI (Baileys web) with Pi RPC agent

import { g as resolveStateDir, m as resolveOAuthDir, o as resolveConfigPath } from "./paths-BDd7_JUB.js";
import { N as normalizeAgentId, c as resolveDefaultAgentId } from "./agent-scope-CrgUOY3f.js";
import { n as runExec } from "./exec-CTo4hK94.js";
import { t as formatCliCommand } from "./command-format-BQK1OIvH.js";
import { D as INCLUDE_KEY, O as MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH, n as createConfigIO } from "./config-qgIz1lbh.js";
import { n as listChannelPlugins } from "./plugins-D1CxUobm.js";
import { $ as resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent, Z as resolveSandboxConfigForAgent, at as resolveToolProfilePolicy } from "./sandbox-BXUfp_qv.js";
import { a as resolveProfile, i as resolveBrowserConfig } from "./server-context-D2cv-pIA.js";
import { m as GATEWAY_CLIENT_NAMES, p as GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES } from "./message-channel-CQGWXVL4.js";
import { t as GatewayClient } from "./client-zqMhLTAX.js";
import { t as buildGatewayConnectionDetails } from "./call-CPBhMXxo.js";
import { i as readChannelAllowFromStore } from "./pairing-store-BnMngoWQ.js";
import { c as resolveNativeSkillsEnabled, n as isToolAllowedByPolicies, s as resolveNativeCommandsEnabled } from "./pi-tools.policy-DleRi9eC.js";
import { t as resolveChannelDefaultAccountId } from "./helpers-Cw9kFCkw.js";
import { i as resolveGatewayAuth } from "./auth-DK3l201_.js";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import JSON5 from "json5";
import fs from "node:fs/promises";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";

//#region src/gateway/probe.ts
function formatError(err) {
	if (err instanceof Error) return err.message;
	return String(err);
}
async function probeGateway(opts) {
	const startedAt = Date.now();
	const instanceId = randomUUID();
	let connectLatencyMs = null;
	let connectError = null;
	let close = null;
	return await new Promise((resolve) => {
		let settled = false;
		const settle = (result) => {
			if (settled) return;
			settled = true;
			clearTimeout(timer);
			client.stop();
			resolve({
				url: opts.url,
				...result
			});
		};
		const client = new GatewayClient({
			url: opts.url,
			token: opts.auth?.token,
			password: opts.auth?.password,
			clientName: GATEWAY_CLIENT_NAMES.CLI,
			clientVersion: "dev",
			mode: GATEWAY_CLIENT_MODES.PROBE,
			instanceId,
			onConnectError: (err) => {
				connectError = formatError(err);
			},
			onClose: (code, reason) => {
				close = {
					code,
					reason
				};
			},
			onHelloOk: async () => {
				connectLatencyMs = Date.now() - startedAt;
				try {
					const [health, status, presence, configSnapshot] = await Promise.all([
						client.request("health"),
						client.request("status"),
						client.request("system-presence"),
						client.request("config.get", {})
					]);
					settle({
						ok: true,
						connectLatencyMs,
						error: null,
						close,
						health,
						status,
						presence: Array.isArray(presence) ? presence : null,
						configSnapshot
					});
				} catch (err) {
					settle({
						ok: false,
						connectLatencyMs,
						error: formatError(err),
						close,
						health: null,
						status: null,
						presence: null,
						configSnapshot: null
					});
				}
			}
		});
		const timer = setTimeout(() => {
			settle({
				ok: false,
				connectLatencyMs,
				error: connectError ? `connect failed: ${connectError}` : "timeout",
				close,
				health: null,
				status: null,
				presence: null,
				configSnapshot: null
			});
		}, Math.max(250, opts.timeoutMs));
		client.start();
	});
}

//#endregion
//#region src/security/windows-acl.ts
const INHERIT_FLAGS = new Set([
	"I",
	"OI",
	"CI",
	"IO",
	"NP"
]);
const WORLD_PRINCIPALS = new Set([
	"everyone",
	"users",
	"builtin\\users",
	"authenticated users",
	"nt authority\\authenticated users"
]);
const TRUSTED_BASE = new Set([
	"nt authority\\system",
	"system",
	"builtin\\administrators",
	"creator owner"
]);
const WORLD_SUFFIXES = ["\\users", "\\authenticated users"];
const TRUSTED_SUFFIXES = ["\\administrators", "\\system"];
const normalize = (value) => value.trim().toLowerCase();
function resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env) {
	const username = env?.USERNAME?.trim() || os.userInfo().username?.trim();
	if (!username) return null;
	const domain = env?.USERDOMAIN?.trim();
	return domain ? `${domain}\\${username}` : username;
}
function buildTrustedPrincipals(env) {
	const trusted = new Set(TRUSTED_BASE);
	const principal = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(env);
	if (principal) {
		trusted.add(normalize(principal));
		const userOnly = principal.split("\\").at(-1);
		if (userOnly) trusted.add(normalize(userOnly));
	}
	return trusted;
}
function classifyPrincipal(principal, env) {
	const normalized = normalize(principal);
	if (buildTrustedPrincipals(env).has(normalized) || TRUSTED_SUFFIXES.some((s) => normalized.endsWith(s))) return "trusted";
	if (WORLD_PRINCIPALS.has(normalized) || WORLD_SUFFIXES.some((s) => normalized.endsWith(s))) return "world";
	return "group";
}
function rightsFromTokens(tokens) {
	const upper = tokens.join("").toUpperCase();
	const canWrite = upper.includes("F") || upper.includes("M") || upper.includes("W") || upper.includes("D");
	return {
		canRead: upper.includes("F") || upper.includes("M") || upper.includes("R"),
		canWrite
	};
}
function parseIcaclsOutput(output, targetPath) {
	const entries = [];
	const normalizedTarget = targetPath.trim();
	const lowerTarget = normalizedTarget.toLowerCase();
	const quotedTarget = `"${normalizedTarget}"`;
	const quotedLower = quotedTarget.toLowerCase();
	for (const rawLine of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
		const line = rawLine.trimEnd();
		if (!line.trim()) continue;
		const trimmed = line.trim();
		const lower = trimmed.toLowerCase();
		if (lower.startsWith("successfully processed") || lower.startsWith("processed") || lower.startsWith("failed processing") || lower.startsWith("no mapping between account names")) continue;
		let entry = trimmed;
		if (lower.startsWith(lowerTarget)) entry = trimmed.slice(normalizedTarget.length).trim();
		else if (lower.startsWith(quotedLower)) entry = trimmed.slice(quotedTarget.length).trim();
		if (!entry) continue;
		const idx = entry.indexOf(":");
		if (idx === -1) continue;
		const principal = entry.slice(0, idx).trim();
		const rawRights = entry.slice(idx + 1).trim();
		const tokens = rawRights.match(/\(([^)]+)\)/g)?.map((token) => token.slice(1, -1).trim()).filter(Boolean) ?? [];
		if (tokens.some((token) => token.toUpperCase() === "DENY")) continue;
		const rights = tokens.filter((token) => !INHERIT_FLAGS.has(token.toUpperCase()));
		if (rights.length === 0) continue;
		const { canRead, canWrite } = rightsFromTokens(rights);
		entries.push({
			principal,
			rights,
			rawRights,
			canRead,
			canWrite
		});
	}
	return entries;
}
function summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, env) {
	const trusted = [];
	const untrustedWorld = [];
	const untrustedGroup = [];
	for (const entry of entries) {
		const classification = classifyPrincipal(entry.principal, env);
		if (classification === "trusted") trusted.push(entry);
		else if (classification === "world") untrustedWorld.push(entry);
		else untrustedGroup.push(entry);
	}
	return {
		trusted,
		untrustedWorld,
		untrustedGroup
	};
}
async function inspectWindowsAcl(targetPath, opts) {
	const exec = opts?.exec ?? runExec;
	try {
		const { stdout, stderr } = await exec("icacls", [targetPath]);
		const entries = parseIcaclsOutput(`${stdout}\n${stderr}`.trim(), targetPath);
		const { trusted, untrustedWorld, untrustedGroup } = summarizeWindowsAcl(entries, opts?.env);
		return {
			ok: true,
			entries,
			trusted,
			untrustedWorld,
			untrustedGroup
		};
	} catch (err) {
		return {
			ok: false,
			entries: [],
			trusted: [],
			untrustedWorld: [],
			untrustedGroup: [],
			error: String(err)
		};
	}
}
function formatWindowsAclSummary(summary) {
	if (!summary.ok) return "unknown";
	const untrusted = [...summary.untrustedWorld, ...summary.untrustedGroup];
	if (untrusted.length === 0) return "trusted-only";
	return untrusted.map((entry) => `${entry.principal}:${entry.rawRights}`).join(", ");
}
function formatIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts) {
	const user = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(opts.env) ?? "%USERNAME%";
	const grant = opts.isDir ? "(OI)(CI)F" : "F";
	return `icacls "${targetPath}" /inheritance:r /grant:r "${user}:${grant}" /grant:r "SYSTEM:${grant}"`;
}
function createIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts) {
	const user = resolveWindowsUserPrincipal(opts.env);
	if (!user) return null;
	const grant = opts.isDir ? "(OI)(CI)F" : "F";
	return {
		command: "icacls",
		args: [
			targetPath,
			"/inheritance:r",
			"/grant:r",
			`${user}:${grant}`,
			"/grant:r",
			`SYSTEM:${grant}`
		],
		display: formatIcaclsResetCommand(targetPath, opts)
	};
}

//#endregion
//#region src/security/audit-fs.ts
async function safeStat(targetPath) {
	try {
		const lst = await fs.lstat(targetPath);
		return {
			ok: true,
			isSymlink: lst.isSymbolicLink(),
			isDir: lst.isDirectory(),
			mode: typeof lst.mode === "number" ? lst.mode : null,
			uid: typeof lst.uid === "number" ? lst.uid : null,
			gid: typeof lst.gid === "number" ? lst.gid : null
		};
	} catch (err) {
		return {
			ok: false,
			isSymlink: false,
			isDir: false,
			mode: null,
			uid: null,
			gid: null,
			error: String(err)
		};
	}
}
async function inspectPathPermissions(targetPath, opts) {
	const st = await safeStat(targetPath);
	if (!st.ok) return {
		ok: false,
		isSymlink: false,
		isDir: false,
		mode: null,
		bits: null,
		source: "unknown",
		worldWritable: false,
		groupWritable: false,
		worldReadable: false,
		groupReadable: false,
		error: st.error
	};
	const bits = modeBits(st.mode);
	if ((opts?.platform ?? process.platform) === "win32") {
		const acl = await inspectWindowsAcl(targetPath, {
			env: opts?.env,
			exec: opts?.exec
		});
		if (!acl.ok) return {
			ok: true,
			isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
			isDir: st.isDir,
			mode: st.mode,
			bits,
			source: "unknown",
			worldWritable: false,
			groupWritable: false,
			worldReadable: false,
			groupReadable: false,
			error: acl.error
		};
		return {
			ok: true,
			isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
			isDir: st.isDir,
			mode: st.mode,
			bits,
			source: "windows-acl",
			worldWritable: acl.untrustedWorld.some((entry) => entry.canWrite),
			groupWritable: acl.untrustedGroup.some((entry) => entry.canWrite),
			worldReadable: acl.untrustedWorld.some((entry) => entry.canRead),
			groupReadable: acl.untrustedGroup.some((entry) => entry.canRead),
			aclSummary: formatWindowsAclSummary(acl)
		};
	}
	return {
		ok: true,
		isSymlink: st.isSymlink,
		isDir: st.isDir,
		mode: st.mode,
		bits,
		source: "posix",
		worldWritable: isWorldWritable(bits),
		groupWritable: isGroupWritable(bits),
		worldReadable: isWorldReadable(bits),
		groupReadable: isGroupReadable(bits)
	};
}
function formatPermissionDetail(targetPath, perms) {
	if (perms.source === "windows-acl") return `${targetPath} acl=${perms.aclSummary ?? "unknown"}`;
	return `${targetPath} mode=${formatOctal(perms.bits)}`;
}
function formatPermissionRemediation(params) {
	if (params.perms.source === "windows-acl") return formatIcaclsResetCommand(params.targetPath, {
		isDir: params.isDir,
		env: params.env
	});
	return `chmod ${params.posixMode.toString(8).padStart(3, "0")} ${params.targetPath}`;
}
function modeBits(mode) {
	if (mode == null) return null;
	return mode & 511;
}
function formatOctal(bits) {
	if (bits == null) return "unknown";
	return bits.toString(8).padStart(3, "0");
}
function isWorldWritable(bits) {
	if (bits == null) return false;
	return (bits & 2) !== 0;
}
function isGroupWritable(bits) {
	if (bits == null) return false;
	return (bits & 16) !== 0;
}
function isWorldReadable(bits) {
	if (bits == null) return false;
	return (bits & 4) !== 0;
}
function isGroupReadable(bits) {
	if (bits == null) return false;
	return (bits & 32) !== 0;
}

//#endregion
//#region src/security/audit-extra.ts
const SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX = 300;
function expandTilde(p, env) {
	if (!p.startsWith("~")) return p;
	const home = typeof env.HOME === "string" && env.HOME.trim() ? env.HOME.trim() : null;
	if (!home) return null;
	if (p === "~") return home;
	if (p.startsWith("~/") || p.startsWith("~\\")) return path.join(home, p.slice(2));
	return null;
}
function summarizeGroupPolicy(cfg) {
	const channels = cfg.channels;
	if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") return {
		open: 0,
		allowlist: 0,
		other: 0
	};
	let open = 0;
	let allowlist = 0;
	let other = 0;
	for (const value of Object.values(channels)) {
		if (!value || typeof value !== "object") continue;
		const policy = value.groupPolicy;
		if (policy === "open") open += 1;
		else if (policy === "allowlist") allowlist += 1;
		else other += 1;
	}
	return {
		open,
		allowlist,
		other
	};
}
function collectAttackSurfaceSummaryFindings(cfg) {
	const group = summarizeGroupPolicy(cfg);
	const elevated = cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled !== false;
	const hooksEnabled = cfg.hooks?.enabled === true;
	const browserEnabled = cfg.browser?.enabled ?? true;
	return [{
		checkId: "summary.attack_surface",
		severity: "info",
		title: "Attack surface summary",
		detail: `groups: open=${group.open}, allowlist=${group.allowlist}\ntools.elevated: ${elevated ? "enabled" : "disabled"}\nhooks: ${hooksEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"}\nbrowser control: ${browserEnabled ? "enabled" : "disabled"}`
	}];
}
function isProbablySyncedPath(p) {
	const s = p.toLowerCase();
	return s.includes("icloud") || s.includes("dropbox") || s.includes("google drive") || s.includes("googledrive") || s.includes("onedrive");
}
function collectSyncedFolderFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	if (isProbablySyncedPath(params.stateDir) || isProbablySyncedPath(params.configPath)) findings.push({
		checkId: "fs.synced_dir",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "State/config path looks like a synced folder",
		detail: `stateDir=${params.stateDir}, configPath=${params.configPath}. Synced folders (iCloud/Dropbox/OneDrive/Google Drive) can leak tokens and transcripts onto other devices.`,
		remediation: `Keep OPENCLAW_STATE_DIR on a local-only volume and re-run "${formatCliCommand("openclaw security audit --fix")}".`
	});
	return findings;
}
function looksLikeEnvRef(value) {
	const v = value.trim();
	return v.startsWith("${") && v.endsWith("}");
}
function collectSecretsInConfigFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	const password = typeof cfg.gateway?.auth?.password === "string" ? cfg.gateway.auth.password.trim() : "";
	if (password && !looksLikeEnvRef(password)) findings.push({
		checkId: "config.secrets.gateway_password_in_config",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Gateway password is stored in config",
		detail: "gateway.auth.password is set in the config file; prefer environment variables for secrets when possible.",
		remediation: "Prefer OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD (env) and remove gateway.auth.password from disk."
	});
	const hooksToken = typeof cfg.hooks?.token === "string" ? cfg.hooks.token.trim() : "";
	if (cfg.hooks?.enabled === true && hooksToken && !looksLikeEnvRef(hooksToken)) findings.push({
		checkId: "config.secrets.hooks_token_in_config",
		severity: "info",
		title: "Hooks token is stored in config",
		detail: "hooks.token is set in the config file; keep config perms tight and treat it like an API secret."
	});
	return findings;
}
function collectHooksHardeningFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	if (cfg.hooks?.enabled !== true) return findings;
	const token = typeof cfg.hooks?.token === "string" ? cfg.hooks.token.trim() : "";
	if (token && token.length < 24) findings.push({
		checkId: "hooks.token_too_short",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Hooks token looks short",
		detail: `hooks.token is ${token.length} chars; prefer a long random token.`
	});
	const gatewayAuth = resolveGatewayAuth({
		authConfig: cfg.gateway?.auth,
		tailscaleMode: cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off"
	});
	const gatewayToken = gatewayAuth.mode === "token" && typeof gatewayAuth.token === "string" && gatewayAuth.token.trim() ? gatewayAuth.token.trim() : null;
	if (token && gatewayToken && token === gatewayToken) findings.push({
		checkId: "hooks.token_reuse_gateway_token",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Hooks token reuses the Gateway token",
		detail: "hooks.token matches gateway.auth token; compromise of hooks expands blast radius to the Gateway API.",
		remediation: "Use a separate hooks.token dedicated to hook ingress."
	});
	if ((typeof cfg.hooks?.path === "string" ? cfg.hooks.path.trim() : "") === "/") findings.push({
		checkId: "hooks.path_root",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Hooks base path is '/'",
		detail: "hooks.path='/' would shadow other HTTP endpoints and is unsafe.",
		remediation: "Use a dedicated path like '/hooks'."
	});
	return findings;
}
function addModel(models, raw, source) {
	if (typeof raw !== "string") return;
	const id = raw.trim();
	if (!id) return;
	models.push({
		id,
		source
	});
}
function collectModels(cfg) {
	const out = [];
	addModel(out, cfg.agents?.defaults?.model?.primary, "agents.defaults.model.primary");
	for (const f of cfg.agents?.defaults?.model?.fallbacks ?? []) addModel(out, f, "agents.defaults.model.fallbacks");
	addModel(out, cfg.agents?.defaults?.imageModel?.primary, "agents.defaults.imageModel.primary");
	for (const f of cfg.agents?.defaults?.imageModel?.fallbacks ?? []) addModel(out, f, "agents.defaults.imageModel.fallbacks");
	const list = Array.isArray(cfg.agents?.list) ? cfg.agents?.list : [];
	for (const agent of list ?? []) {
		if (!agent || typeof agent !== "object") continue;
		const id = typeof agent.id === "string" ? agent.id : "";
		const model = agent.model;
		if (typeof model === "string") addModel(out, model, `agents.list.${id}.model`);
		else if (model && typeof model === "object") {
			addModel(out, model.primary, `agents.list.${id}.model.primary`);
			const fallbacks = model.fallbacks;
			if (Array.isArray(fallbacks)) for (const f of fallbacks) addModel(out, f, `agents.list.${id}.model.fallbacks`);
		}
	}
	return out;
}
const LEGACY_MODEL_PATTERNS = [
	{
		id: "openai.gpt35",
		re: /\bgpt-3\.5\b/i,
		label: "GPT-3.5 family"
	},
	{
		id: "anthropic.claude2",
		re: /\bclaude-(instant|2)\b/i,
		label: "Claude 2/Instant family"
	},
	{
		id: "openai.gpt4_legacy",
		re: /\bgpt-4-(0314|0613)\b/i,
		label: "Legacy GPT-4 snapshots"
	}
];
const WEAK_TIER_MODEL_PATTERNS = [{
	id: "anthropic.haiku",
	re: /\bhaiku\b/i,
	label: "Haiku tier (smaller model)"
}];
function inferParamBFromIdOrName(text) {
	const matches = text.toLowerCase().matchAll(/(?:^|[^a-z0-9])[a-z]?(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)b(?:[^a-z0-9]|$)/g);
	let best = null;
	for (const match of matches) {
		const numRaw = match[1];
		if (!numRaw) continue;
		const value = Number(numRaw);
		if (!Number.isFinite(value) || value <= 0) continue;
		if (best === null || value > best) best = value;
	}
	return best;
}
function isGptModel(id) {
	return /\bgpt-/i.test(id);
}
function isGpt5OrHigher(id) {
	return /\bgpt-5(?:\b|[.-])/i.test(id);
}
function isClaudeModel(id) {
	return /\bclaude-/i.test(id);
}
function isClaude45OrHigher(id) {
	return /\bclaude-[^\s/]*?(?:-4-?5\b|4\.5\b)/i.test(id);
}
function collectModelHygieneFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	const models = collectModels(cfg);
	if (models.length === 0) return findings;
	const weakMatches = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
	const addWeakMatch = (model, source, reason) => {
		const key = `${model}@@${source}`;
		const existing = weakMatches.get(key);
		if (!existing) {
			weakMatches.set(key, {
				model,
				source,
				reasons: [reason]
			});
			return;
		}
		if (!existing.reasons.includes(reason)) existing.reasons.push(reason);
	};
	for (const entry of models) {
		for (const pat of WEAK_TIER_MODEL_PATTERNS) if (pat.re.test(entry.id)) {
			addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, pat.label);
			break;
		}
		if (isGptModel(entry.id) && !isGpt5OrHigher(entry.id)) addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, "Below GPT-5 family");
		if (isClaudeModel(entry.id) && !isClaude45OrHigher(entry.id)) addWeakMatch(entry.id, entry.source, "Below Claude 4.5");
	}
	const matches = [];
	for (const entry of models) for (const pat of LEGACY_MODEL_PATTERNS) if (pat.re.test(entry.id)) {
		matches.push({
			model: entry.id,
			source: entry.source,
			reason: pat.label
		});
		break;
	}
	if (matches.length > 0) {
		const lines = matches.slice(0, 12).map((m) => `- ${m.model} (${m.reason}) @ ${m.source}`).join("\n");
		const more = matches.length > 12 ? `\n…${matches.length - 12} more` : "";
		findings.push({
			checkId: "models.legacy",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Some configured models look legacy",
			detail: "Older/legacy models can be less robust against prompt injection and tool misuse.\n" + lines + more,
			remediation: "Prefer modern, instruction-hardened models for any bot that can run tools."
		});
	}
	if (weakMatches.size > 0) {
		const lines = Array.from(weakMatches.values()).slice(0, 12).map((m) => `- ${m.model} (${m.reasons.join("; ")}) @ ${m.source}`).join("\n");
		const more = weakMatches.size > 12 ? `\n…${weakMatches.size - 12} more` : "";
		findings.push({
			checkId: "models.weak_tier",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Some configured models are below recommended tiers",
			detail: "Smaller/older models are generally more susceptible to prompt injection and tool misuse.\n" + lines + more,
			remediation: "Use the latest, top-tier model for any bot with tools or untrusted inboxes. Avoid Haiku tiers; prefer GPT-5+ and Claude 4.5+."
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
function extractAgentIdFromSource(source) {
	return source.match(/^agents\.list\.([^.]*)\./)?.[1] ?? null;
}
function pickToolPolicy(config) {
	if (!config) return null;
	const allow = Array.isArray(config.allow) ? config.allow : void 0;
	const deny = Array.isArray(config.deny) ? config.deny : void 0;
	if (!allow && !deny) return null;
	return {
		allow,
		deny
	};
}
function resolveToolPolicies(params) {
	const policies = [];
	const profilePolicy = resolveToolProfilePolicy(params.agentTools?.profile ?? params.cfg.tools?.profile);
	if (profilePolicy) policies.push(profilePolicy);
	const globalPolicy = pickToolPolicy(params.cfg.tools ?? void 0);
	if (globalPolicy) policies.push(globalPolicy);
	const agentPolicy = pickToolPolicy(params.agentTools);
	if (agentPolicy) policies.push(agentPolicy);
	if (params.sandboxMode === "all") {
		const sandboxPolicy = resolveSandboxToolPolicyForAgent(params.cfg, params.agentId ?? void 0);
		policies.push(sandboxPolicy);
	}
	return policies;
}
function hasWebSearchKey(cfg, env) {
	const search = cfg.tools?.web?.search;
	return Boolean(search?.apiKey || search?.perplexity?.apiKey || env.BRAVE_API_KEY || env.PERPLEXITY_API_KEY || env.OPENROUTER_API_KEY);
}
function isWebSearchEnabled(cfg, env) {
	const enabled = cfg.tools?.web?.search?.enabled;
	if (enabled === false) return false;
	if (enabled === true) return true;
	return hasWebSearchKey(cfg, env);
}
function isWebFetchEnabled(cfg) {
	if (cfg.tools?.web?.fetch?.enabled === false) return false;
	return true;
}
function isBrowserEnabled(cfg) {
	try {
		return resolveBrowserConfig(cfg.browser, cfg).enabled;
	} catch {
		return true;
	}
}
function collectSmallModelRiskFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	const models = collectModels(params.cfg).filter((entry) => !entry.source.includes("imageModel"));
	if (models.length === 0) return findings;
	const smallModels = models.map((entry) => {
		const paramB = inferParamBFromIdOrName(entry.id);
		if (!paramB || paramB > SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX) return null;
		return {
			...entry,
			paramB
		};
	}).filter((entry) => Boolean(entry));
	if (smallModels.length === 0) return findings;
	let hasUnsafe = false;
	const modelLines = [];
	const exposureSet = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
	for (const entry of smallModels) {
		const agentId = extractAgentIdFromSource(entry.source);
		const sandboxMode = resolveSandboxConfigForAgent(params.cfg, agentId ?? void 0).mode;
		const agentTools = agentId && params.cfg.agents?.list ? params.cfg.agents.list.find((agent) => agent?.id === agentId)?.tools : void 0;
		const policies = resolveToolPolicies({
			cfg: params.cfg,
			agentTools,
			sandboxMode,
			agentId
		});
		const exposed = [];
		if (isWebSearchEnabled(params.cfg, params.env)) {
			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("web_search", policies)) exposed.push("web_search");
		}
		if (isWebFetchEnabled(params.cfg)) {
			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("web_fetch", policies)) exposed.push("web_fetch");
		}
		if (isBrowserEnabled(params.cfg)) {
			if (isToolAllowedByPolicies("browser", policies)) exposed.push("browser");
		}
		for (const tool of exposed) exposureSet.add(tool);
		const sandboxLabel = sandboxMode === "all" ? "sandbox=all" : `sandbox=${sandboxMode}`;
		const exposureLabel = exposed.length > 0 ? ` web=[${exposed.join(", ")}]` : " web=[off]";
		const safe = sandboxMode === "all" && exposed.length === 0;
		if (!safe) hasUnsafe = true;
		const statusLabel = safe ? "ok" : "unsafe";
		modelLines.push(`- ${entry.id} (${entry.paramB}B) @ ${entry.source} (${statusLabel}; ${sandboxLabel};${exposureLabel})`);
	}
	const exposureList = Array.from(exposureSet);
	const exposureDetail = exposureList.length > 0 ? `Uncontrolled input tools allowed: ${exposureList.join(", ")}.` : "No web/browser tools detected for these models.";
	findings.push({
		checkId: "models.small_params",
		severity: hasUnsafe ? "critical" : "info",
		title: "Small models require sandboxing and web tools disabled",
		detail: `Small models (<=${SMALL_MODEL_PARAM_B_MAX}B params) detected:\n` + modelLines.join("\n") + `\n` + exposureDetail + "\nSmall models are not recommended for untrusted inputs.",
		remediation: "If you must use small models, enable sandboxing for all sessions (agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=\"all\") and disable web_search/web_fetch/browser (tools.deny=[\"group:web\",\"browser\"])."
	});
	return findings;
}
async function collectPluginsTrustFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	const extensionsDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "extensions");
	const st = await safeStat(extensionsDir);
	if (!st.ok || !st.isDir) return findings;
	const pluginDirs = (await fs.readdir(extensionsDir, { withFileTypes: true }).catch(() => [])).filter((e) => e.isDirectory()).map((e) => e.name).filter(Boolean);
	if (pluginDirs.length === 0) return findings;
	const allow = params.cfg.plugins?.allow;
	if (!(Array.isArray(allow) && allow.length > 0)) {
		const hasString = (value) => typeof value === "string" && value.trim().length > 0;
		const hasAccountStringKey = (account, key) => Boolean(account && typeof account === "object" && hasString(account[key]));
		const discordConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.token) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.discord?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.discord.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "token"))) || hasString(process.env.DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN);
		const telegramConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.botToken) || hasString(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.tokenFile) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.telegram.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "tokenFile"))) || hasString(process.env.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN);
		const slackConfigured = hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.botToken) || hasString(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.appToken) || Boolean(params.cfg.channels?.slack?.accounts && Object.values(params.cfg.channels.slack.accounts).some((a) => hasAccountStringKey(a, "botToken") || hasAccountStringKey(a, "appToken"))) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_BOT_TOKEN) || hasString(process.env.SLACK_APP_TOKEN);
		const skillCommandsLikelyExposed = discordConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
			providerId: "discord",
			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.discord?.commands?.nativeSkills,
			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
		}) || telegramConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
			providerId: "telegram",
			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.telegram?.commands?.nativeSkills,
			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
		}) || slackConfigured && resolveNativeSkillsEnabled({
			providerId: "slack",
			providerSetting: params.cfg.channels?.slack?.commands?.nativeSkills,
			globalSetting: params.cfg.commands?.nativeSkills
		});
		findings.push({
			checkId: "plugins.extensions_no_allowlist",
			severity: skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "critical" : "warn",
			title: "Extensions exist but plugins.allow is not set",
			detail: `Found ${pluginDirs.length} extension(s) under ${extensionsDir}. Without plugins.allow, any discovered plugin id may load (depending on config and plugin behavior).` + (skillCommandsLikelyExposed ? "\nNative skill commands are enabled on at least one configured chat surface; treat unpinned/unallowlisted extensions as high risk." : ""),
			remediation: "Set plugins.allow to an explicit list of plugin ids you trust."
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
function resolveIncludePath(baseConfigPath, includePath) {
	return path.normalize(path.isAbsolute(includePath) ? includePath : path.resolve(path.dirname(baseConfigPath), includePath));
}
function listDirectIncludes(parsed) {
	const out = [];
	const visit = (value) => {
		if (!value) return;
		if (Array.isArray(value)) {
			for (const item of value) visit(item);
			return;
		}
		if (typeof value !== "object") return;
		const rec = value;
		const includeVal = rec[INCLUDE_KEY];
		if (typeof includeVal === "string") out.push(includeVal);
		else if (Array.isArray(includeVal)) {
			for (const item of includeVal) if (typeof item === "string") out.push(item);
		}
		for (const v of Object.values(rec)) visit(v);
	};
	visit(parsed);
	return out;
}
async function collectIncludePathsRecursive(params) {
	const visited = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
	const result = [];
	const walk = async (basePath, parsed, depth) => {
		if (depth > MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH) return;
		for (const raw of listDirectIncludes(parsed)) {
			const resolved = resolveIncludePath(basePath, raw);
			if (visited.has(resolved)) continue;
			visited.add(resolved);
			result.push(resolved);
			const rawText = await fs.readFile(resolved, "utf-8").catch(() => null);
			if (!rawText) continue;
			const nestedParsed = (() => {
				try {
					return JSON5.parse(rawText);
				} catch {
					return null;
				}
			})();
			if (nestedParsed) await walk(resolved, nestedParsed, depth + 1);
		}
	};
	await walk(params.configPath, params.parsed, 0);
	return result;
}
async function collectIncludeFilePermFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	if (!params.configSnapshot.exists) return findings;
	const configPath = params.configSnapshot.path;
	const includePaths = await collectIncludePathsRecursive({
		configPath,
		parsed: params.configSnapshot.parsed
	});
	if (includePaths.length === 0) return findings;
	for (const p of includePaths) {
		const perms = await inspectPathPermissions(p, {
			env: params.env,
			platform: params.platform,
			exec: params.execIcacls
		});
		if (!perms.ok) continue;
		if (perms.worldWritable || perms.groupWritable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_writable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Config include file is writable by others",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; another user could influence your effective config.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: p,
				perms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (perms.worldReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_world_readable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Config include file is world-readable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: p,
				perms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (perms.groupReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config_include.perms_group_readable",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Config include file is group-readable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(p, perms)}; include files can contain tokens and private settings.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: p,
				perms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
async function collectStateDeepFilesystemFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	const oauthDir = resolveOAuthDir(params.env, params.stateDir);
	const oauthPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(oauthDir, {
		env: params.env,
		platform: params.platform,
		exec: params.execIcacls
	});
	if (oauthPerms.ok && oauthPerms.isDir) {
		if (oauthPerms.worldWritable || oauthPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Credentials dir is writable by others",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; another user could drop/modify credential files.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: oauthDir,
				perms: oauthPerms,
				isDir: true,
				posixMode: 448,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (oauthPerms.groupReadable || oauthPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.credentials_dir.perms_readable",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Credentials dir is readable by others",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(oauthDir, oauthPerms)}; credentials and allowlists can be sensitive.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: oauthDir,
				perms: oauthPerms,
				isDir: true,
				posixMode: 448,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
	}
	const agentIds = Array.isArray(params.cfg.agents?.list) ? params.cfg.agents?.list.map((a) => a && typeof a === "object" && typeof a.id === "string" ? a.id.trim() : "").filter(Boolean) : [];
	const defaultAgentId = resolveDefaultAgentId(params.cfg);
	const ids = Array.from(new Set([defaultAgentId, ...agentIds])).map((id) => normalizeAgentId(id));
	for (const agentId of ids) {
		const agentDir = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "agent");
		const authPath = path.join(agentDir, "auth-profiles.json");
		const authPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(authPath, {
			env: params.env,
			platform: params.platform,
			exec: params.execIcacls
		});
		if (authPerms.ok) {
			if (authPerms.worldWritable || authPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_writable",
				severity: "critical",
				title: "auth-profiles.json is writable by others",
				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; another user could inject credentials.`,
				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
					targetPath: authPath,
					perms: authPerms,
					isDir: false,
					posixMode: 384,
					env: params.env
				})
			});
			else if (authPerms.worldReadable || authPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
				checkId: "fs.auth_profiles.perms_readable",
				severity: "warn",
				title: "auth-profiles.json is readable by others",
				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(authPath, authPerms)}; auth-profiles.json contains API keys and OAuth tokens.`,
				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
					targetPath: authPath,
					perms: authPerms,
					isDir: false,
					posixMode: 384,
					env: params.env
				})
			});
		}
		const storePath = path.join(params.stateDir, "agents", agentId, "sessions", "sessions.json");
		const storePerms = await inspectPathPermissions(storePath, {
			env: params.env,
			platform: params.platform,
			exec: params.execIcacls
		});
		if (storePerms.ok) {
			if (storePerms.worldReadable || storePerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
				checkId: "fs.sessions_store.perms_readable",
				severity: "warn",
				title: "sessions.json is readable by others",
				detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(storePath, storePerms)}; routing and transcript metadata can be sensitive.`,
				remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
					targetPath: storePath,
					perms: storePerms,
					isDir: false,
					posixMode: 384,
					env: params.env
				})
			});
		}
	}
	const logFile = typeof params.cfg.logging?.file === "string" ? params.cfg.logging.file.trim() : "";
	if (logFile) {
		const expanded = logFile.startsWith("~") ? expandTilde(logFile, params.env) : logFile;
		if (expanded) {
			const logPath = path.resolve(expanded);
			const logPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(logPath, {
				env: params.env,
				platform: params.platform,
				exec: params.execIcacls
			});
			if (logPerms.ok) {
				if (logPerms.worldReadable || logPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
					checkId: "fs.log_file.perms_readable",
					severity: "warn",
					title: "Log file is readable by others",
					detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(logPath, logPerms)}; logs can contain private messages and tool output.`,
					remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
						targetPath: logPath,
						perms: logPerms,
						isDir: false,
						posixMode: 384,
						env: params.env
					})
				});
			}
		}
	}
	return findings;
}
function listGroupPolicyOpen(cfg) {
	const out = [];
	const channels = cfg.channels;
	if (!channels || typeof channels !== "object") return out;
	for (const [channelId, value] of Object.entries(channels)) {
		if (!value || typeof value !== "object") continue;
		const section = value;
		if (section.groupPolicy === "open") out.push(`channels.${channelId}.groupPolicy`);
		const accounts = section.accounts;
		if (accounts && typeof accounts === "object") for (const [accountId, accountVal] of Object.entries(accounts)) {
			if (!accountVal || typeof accountVal !== "object") continue;
			if (accountVal.groupPolicy === "open") out.push(`channels.${channelId}.accounts.${accountId}.groupPolicy`);
		}
	}
	return out;
}
function collectExposureMatrixFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	const openGroups = listGroupPolicyOpen(cfg);
	if (openGroups.length === 0) return findings;
	if (cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled !== false) findings.push({
		checkId: "security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled",
		detail: `Found groupPolicy="open" at:\n${openGroups.map((p) => `- ${p}`).join("\n")}\nWith tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.`,
		remediation: `Set groupPolicy="allowlist" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.`
	});
	return findings;
}
async function readConfigSnapshotForAudit(params) {
	return await createConfigIO({
		env: params.env,
		configPath: params.configPath
	}).readConfigFileSnapshot();
}

//#endregion
//#region src/security/audit.ts
function countBySeverity(findings) {
	let critical = 0;
	let warn = 0;
	let info = 0;
	for (const f of findings) if (f.severity === "critical") critical += 1;
	else if (f.severity === "warn") warn += 1;
	else info += 1;
	return {
		critical,
		warn,
		info
	};
}
function normalizeAllowFromList(list) {
	if (!Array.isArray(list)) return [];
	return list.map((v) => String(v).trim()).filter(Boolean);
}
function classifyChannelWarningSeverity(message) {
	const s = message.toLowerCase();
	if (s.includes("dms: open") || s.includes("grouppolicy=\"open\"") || s.includes("dmpolicy=\"open\"")) return "critical";
	if (s.includes("allows any") || s.includes("anyone can dm") || s.includes("public")) return "critical";
	if (s.includes("locked") || s.includes("disabled")) return "info";
	return "warn";
}
async function collectFilesystemFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	const stateDirPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(params.stateDir, {
		env: params.env,
		platform: params.platform,
		exec: params.execIcacls
	});
	if (stateDirPerms.ok) {
		if (stateDirPerms.isSymlink) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.state_dir.symlink",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "State dir is a symlink",
			detail: `${params.stateDir} is a symlink; treat this as an extra trust boundary.`
		});
		if (stateDirPerms.worldWritable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "State dir is world-writable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; other users can write into your OpenClaw state.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.stateDir,
				perms: stateDirPerms,
				isDir: true,
				posixMode: 448,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (stateDirPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_group_writable",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "State dir is group-writable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; group users can write into your OpenClaw state.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.stateDir,
				perms: stateDirPerms,
				isDir: true,
				posixMode: 448,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (stateDirPerms.groupReadable || stateDirPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_readable",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "State dir is readable by others",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.stateDir, stateDirPerms)}; consider restricting to 700.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.stateDir,
				perms: stateDirPerms,
				isDir: true,
				posixMode: 448,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
	}
	const configPerms = await inspectPathPermissions(params.configPath, {
		env: params.env,
		platform: params.platform,
		exec: params.execIcacls
	});
	if (configPerms.ok) {
		if (configPerms.isSymlink) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config.symlink",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Config file is a symlink",
			detail: `${params.configPath} is a symlink; make sure you trust its target.`
		});
		if (configPerms.worldWritable || configPerms.groupWritable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config.perms_writable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Config file is writable by others",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; another user could change gateway/auth/tool policies.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.configPath,
				perms: configPerms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (configPerms.worldReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config.perms_world_readable",
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Config file is world-readable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.configPath,
				perms: configPerms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
		else if (configPerms.groupReadable) findings.push({
			checkId: "fs.config.perms_group_readable",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Config file is group-readable",
			detail: `${formatPermissionDetail(params.configPath, configPerms)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
			remediation: formatPermissionRemediation({
				targetPath: params.configPath,
				perms: configPerms,
				isDir: false,
				posixMode: 384,
				env: params.env
			})
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
function collectGatewayConfigFindings(cfg, env) {
	const findings = [];
	const bind = typeof cfg.gateway?.bind === "string" ? cfg.gateway.bind : "loopback";
	const tailscaleMode = cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off";
	const auth = resolveGatewayAuth({
		authConfig: cfg.gateway?.auth,
		tailscaleMode,
		env
	});
	const controlUiEnabled = cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.enabled !== false;
	const trustedProxies = Array.isArray(cfg.gateway?.trustedProxies) ? cfg.gateway.trustedProxies : [];
	const hasToken = typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0;
	const hasPassword = typeof auth.password === "string" && auth.password.trim().length > 0;
	const hasSharedSecret = auth.mode === "token" && hasToken || auth.mode === "password" && hasPassword;
	const hasTailscaleAuth = auth.allowTailscale && tailscaleMode === "serve";
	const hasGatewayAuth = hasSharedSecret || hasTailscaleAuth;
	if (bind !== "loopback" && !hasSharedSecret) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.bind_no_auth",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Gateway binds beyond loopback without auth",
		detail: `gateway.bind="${bind}" but no gateway.auth token/password is configured.`,
		remediation: `Set gateway.auth (token recommended) or bind to loopback.`
	});
	if (bind === "loopback" && controlUiEnabled && trustedProxies.length === 0) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.trusted_proxies_missing",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Reverse proxy headers are not trusted",
		detail: "gateway.bind is loopback and gateway.trustedProxies is empty. If you expose the Control UI through a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies so local-client checks cannot be spoofed.",
		remediation: "Set gateway.trustedProxies to your proxy IPs or keep the Control UI local-only."
	});
	if (bind === "loopback" && controlUiEnabled && !hasGatewayAuth) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.loopback_no_auth",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Gateway auth missing on loopback",
		detail: "gateway.bind is loopback but no gateway auth secret is configured. If the Control UI is exposed through a reverse proxy, unauthenticated access is possible.",
		remediation: "Set gateway.auth (token recommended) or keep the Control UI local-only."
	});
	if (tailscaleMode === "funnel") findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.tailscale_funnel",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Tailscale Funnel exposure enabled",
		detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="funnel" exposes the Gateway publicly; keep auth strict and treat it as internet-facing.`,
		remediation: `Prefer tailscale.mode="serve" (tailnet-only) or set tailscale.mode="off".`
	});
	else if (tailscaleMode === "serve") findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.tailscale_serve",
		severity: "info",
		title: "Tailscale Serve exposure enabled",
		detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="serve" exposes the Gateway to your tailnet (loopback behind Tailscale).`
	});
	if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.allowInsecureAuth === true) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.control_ui.insecure_auth",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "Control UI allows insecure HTTP auth",
		detail: "gateway.controlUi.allowInsecureAuth=true allows token-only auth over HTTP and skips device identity.",
		remediation: "Disable it or switch to HTTPS (Tailscale Serve) or localhost."
	});
	if (cfg.gateway?.controlUi?.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth === true) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.control_ui.device_auth_disabled",
		severity: "critical",
		title: "DANGEROUS: Control UI device auth disabled",
		detail: "gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyDisableDeviceAuth=true disables device identity checks for the Control UI.",
		remediation: "Disable it unless you are in a short-lived break-glass scenario."
	});
	const token = typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0 ? auth.token.trim() : null;
	if (auth.mode === "token" && token && token.length < 24) findings.push({
		checkId: "gateway.token_too_short",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Gateway token looks short",
		detail: `gateway auth token is ${token.length} chars; prefer a long random token.`
	});
	return findings;
}
function collectBrowserControlFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	let resolved;
	try {
		resolved = resolveBrowserConfig(cfg.browser, cfg);
	} catch (err) {
		findings.push({
			checkId: "browser.control_invalid_config",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Browser control config looks invalid",
			detail: String(err),
			remediation: `Fix browser.cdpUrl in ${resolveConfigPath()} and re-run "${formatCliCommand("openclaw security audit --deep")}".`
		});
		return findings;
	}
	if (!resolved.enabled) return findings;
	for (const name of Object.keys(resolved.profiles)) {
		const profile = resolveProfile(resolved, name);
		if (!profile || profile.cdpIsLoopback) continue;
		let url;
		try {
			url = new URL(profile.cdpUrl);
		} catch {
			continue;
		}
		if (url.protocol === "http:") findings.push({
			checkId: "browser.remote_cdp_http",
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Remote CDP uses HTTP",
			detail: `browser profile "${name}" uses http CDP (${profile.cdpUrl}); this is OK only if it's tailnet-only or behind an encrypted tunnel.`,
			remediation: `Prefer HTTPS/TLS or a tailnet-only endpoint for remote CDP.`
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
function collectLoggingFindings(cfg) {
	if (cfg.logging?.redactSensitive !== "off") return [];
	return [{
		checkId: "logging.redact_off",
		severity: "warn",
		title: "Tool summary redaction is disabled",
		detail: `logging.redactSensitive="off" can leak secrets into logs and status output.`,
		remediation: `Set logging.redactSensitive="tools".`
	}];
}
function collectElevatedFindings(cfg) {
	const findings = [];
	const enabled = cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled;
	const allowFrom = cfg.tools?.elevated?.allowFrom ?? {};
	const anyAllowFromKeys = Object.keys(allowFrom).length > 0;
	if (enabled === false) return findings;
	if (!anyAllowFromKeys) return findings;
	for (const [provider, list] of Object.entries(allowFrom)) {
		const normalized = normalizeAllowFromList(list);
		if (normalized.includes("*")) findings.push({
			checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.wildcard`,
			severity: "critical",
			title: "Elevated exec allowlist contains wildcard",
			detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} includes "*" which effectively approves everyone on that channel for elevated mode.`
		});
		else if (normalized.length > 25) findings.push({
			checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.large`,
			severity: "warn",
			title: "Elevated exec allowlist is large",
			detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} has ${normalized.length} entries; consider tightening elevated access.`
		});
	}
	return findings;
}
async function collectChannelSecurityFindings(params) {
	const findings = [];
	const coerceNativeSetting = (value) => {
		if (value === true) return true;
		if (value === false) return false;
		if (value === "auto") return "auto";
	};
	const warnDmPolicy = async (input) => {
		const policyPath = input.policyPath