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@fntio/infra-client

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Self-hosted AWS access portal: credential vending, target-account trust, and grant-driven private networking as CDK stacks and constructs.

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import * as cdk from "aws-cdk-lib"; import { Construct } from "constructs"; import * as dynamodb from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-dynamodb"; import * as s3 from "aws-cdk-lib/aws-s3"; /** Cognito → SES email delivery. */ export interface EmailConfig { readonly hostedZoneId: string; readonly zoneName: string; /** Sender address — must be an address under zoneName (the SES identity * that authorizes sending is the domain itself). */ readonly fromAddress: string; /** Display name shown next to fromAddress in mail clients. */ readonly fromName?: string; /** DMARC aggregate-report recipient (`rua`); omitted = no reports requested. */ readonly dmarcReportEmail?: string; } export interface DataStackProps extends cdk.StackProps { /** Harden the tables (RETAIN + point-in-time recovery). Defaults to false * (sandbox behavior). See AppTable. */ readonly prod?: boolean; /** The SES identity lives HERE, not CredsStack: verification is async, so a * failed CredsStack deploy must not roll the identity back (never converges). */ readonly email?: EmailConfig; } /** The DynamoDB tables — separate from CredsStack so durable data outlives * compute redeploys. */ export declare class DataStack extends cdk.Stack { readonly accountsTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly rolesTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly requestsTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly auditTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly groupsTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly resourcesTable: dynamodb.Table; /** Access model v2: grants stored exactly as granted — principal → target, * plus member#/pref# rows; `byTarget` = who holds X. */ readonly accessTable: dynamodb.Table; readonly revocationsTable: dynamodb.Table; /** clientId → name + rotation state; grants live in Access under `user#<clientId>`. */ readonly serviceUsersTable: dynamodb.Table; /** Personal access tokens: tokenId → owner, scopes, expiry and the SHA-256 of the secret (never the secret). * Always present, like the plugin catalog, so switching the feature never adds or removes an export. */ readonly tokensTable: dynamodb.Table; /** Plugin catalog (Epic 5): deployment-written records, keyed by pluginId. Always present so enabling or * disabling the feature never adds or removes a cross-stack export; unused until `plugins.enabled`. */ readonly pluginCatalogTable: dynamodb.Table; /** Plugin UIs under immutable `<id>/<version>-<hash>/` prefixes: uploaded by CredsStack's registrations * (so a record can depend on its upload), served by WebStack's /plugin-assets/* behavior, never touched * by the site deploy's prune. */ readonly pluginAssetsBucket: s3.Bucket; /** Server-access logs of every hub bucket and the standard logs of both CloudFront distributions * (Security Hub S3.9, CloudFront.5). ACL-based ownership: that is what CloudFront's standard logging * and S3 log delivery write with, and it keeps the other stacks free of a cross-stack bucket-policy * reference back into this one. The one bucket that logs nowhere — AWS says to suppress S3.9 on it. */ readonly accessLogsBucket: s3.Bucket; constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props?: DataStackProps); }