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@fntio/infra-client

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Self-hosted AWS access portal: credential vending, target-account trust, and grant-driven private networking as CDK stacks and constructs.

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"use strict"; var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k); if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) { desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } }; } Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc); }) : (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; o[k2] = m[k]; })); var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) { Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v }); }) : function(o, v) { o["default"] = v; }); var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () { var ownKeys = function(o) { ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) { var ar = []; for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k; return ar; }; return ownKeys(o); }; return function (mod) { if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod; var result = {}; if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]); __setModuleDefault(result, mod); return result; }; })(); Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true }); exports.CredsStack = void 0; exports.resolveAlertEmails = resolveAlertEmails; const cdk = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib")); const naming_1 = require("../lambdacode/network/naming"); const web_stack_1 = require("./web-stack"); const apigw = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-apigateway")); const wafv2 = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-wafv2")); const web_acl_1 = require("./constructs/web-acl"); const cognito = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-cognito")); const events = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-events")); const iam = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-iam")); const s3 = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-s3")); const targets = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-events-targets")); const logs = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs")); const cr = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/custom-resources")); const app_function_1 = require("./constructs/app-function"); const audit_log_1 = require("./audit-log"); const plugin_api_1 = require("./plugins/plugin-api"); const plugin_catalog_activation_1 = require("./plugins/plugin-catalog-activation"); const runtime_1 = require("./plugins/runtime"); const monitoring_1 = require("./constructs/monitoring"); const oidc_issuer_1 = require("./constructs/oidc-issuer"); const vending_api_1 = require("./constructs/vending-api"); const api_throttle_1 = require("./api-throttle"); const federation_1 = require("./federation"); /** Cognito + issuer + vending API. The user pool and REST API stay at stack * level so their CloudFormation identities survive internal refactors. */ const EMAIL_RE = /^[^\s@"]+@[^\s@"]+\.[^\s@"]+$/; /** `alertEmail` as the list it stands for: trimmed, de-duplicated, every entry a real address. * Throws at synth — a placeholder would leave every alarm pointed at nothing. */ function resolveAlertEmails(alertEmail) { const list = [...new Set((typeof alertEmail === "string" ? [alertEmail] : alertEmail).map((e) => e.trim()))]; if (!list.length) throw new Error("alertEmail is empty — alarms and the issuer canary need a recipient."); for (const e of list) { if (!EMAIL_RE.test(e) || /change-me/i.test(e)) { throw new Error(`alertEmail (${e}) is not a real email address — alarms and the issuer canary notify it.`); } } return list; } class CredsStack extends cdk.Stack { /** Fronted by WebStack's CloudFront /api/* behavior (same-origin, no CORS). */ api; /** Plugin routes + the shared authorizer; present only when plugins are on. */ pluginApi; /** Other stacks hook their alarms here. */ alertTopic; /** WebStack attaches the SPA client + domain here — their callback URLs * need the CloudFront domain (avoids a circular stack ref). */ userPool; constructor(scope, id, props) { super(scope, id, props); const { loginMethods } = props; if (!props.projectName.trim()) { throw new Error("projectName must be a non-empty display name — " + "it is what users see in invite emails and the desktop app."); } const alertEmails = resolveAlertEmails(props.alertEmail); if (loginMethods.password === false) { throw new Error("loginMethods.password: false is not supported — Cognito requires " + "password as a first-auth factor. Omit it or set true."); } // A prefix-domain RP id can never match the app origin — every passkey // registration would throw SecurityError. if (loginMethods.passkey && !props.passkeyDomain) { throw new Error("loginMethods.passkey requires the `web` block — passkeys bind to " + "the custom web domain as the relying-party id. Set `web`, or " + "disable passkey until it exists."); } // Adaptive step-ups only exist with MFA at least optional on the pool. if (loginMethods.threatProtection && !loginMethods.mfa) { throw new Error('loginMethods.threatProtection needs mfa: "optional" or "required" — ' + "its risky-sign-in step-ups are TOTP challenges."); } // Security Hub Cognito.5 evaluates PASSWORD-only pools — a silent default // would change the pool and the web UI behind the config's back. if (!loginMethods.passkey && !loginMethods.emailOtp && !loginMethods.mfa) { throw new Error('loginMethods: a password-only pool must set mfa: "optional" or ' + '"required" (Security Hub Cognito.5), or enable a passwordless ' + "factor (passkey / emailOtp)."); } // An address outside the domain deploys fine, then fails on every send. if (props.email && !props.email.fromAddress.endsWith(`@${props.email.zoneName}`)) { throw new Error(`email.fromAddress (${props.email.fromAddress}) must be an address ` + `under email.zoneName (${props.email.zoneName}).`); } // Lowercased — the pool's sign-in alias is case-sensitive. const firstAdminEmail = props.firstAdmin?.email.trim().toLowerCase(); if (firstAdminEmail !== undefined && (!EMAIL_RE.test(firstAdminEmail) || /change-me/i.test(firstAdminEmail))) { throw new Error(`firstAdmin.email (${props.firstAdmin.email}) is not a real email ` + `address — it receives the first admin invite.`); } const { accountsTable, rolesTable, requestsTable, auditTable, groupsTable, resourcesTable, accessTable, revocationsTable, serviceUsersTable, } = props; const auditLog = { table: auditTable, retentionDays: props.auditRetentionDays ?? audit_log_1.DEFAULT_AUDIT_RETENTION_DAYS }; const ssoLabels = props.federation?.providers.map((p) => p.label).join(" or "); const ssoLead = (how) => ssoLabels ? `<p>If your organization signs in with ${ssoLabels}, ${how} — you don't need a password.</p>` : ""; const userPool = new cognito.UserPool(this, "UserPool", { selfSignUpEnabled: false, // admins create users signInAliases: { email: true }, // Cognito's own defaults, pinned so they can't drift. passwordPolicy: { minLength: 8, requireLowercase: true, requireUppercase: true, requireDigits: true, requireSymbols: true, }, removalPolicy: props.prod ? cdk.RemovalPolicy.RETAIN : cdk.RemovalPolicy.DESTROY, // RETAIN only covers stack deletion, not a direct DeleteUserPool. deletionProtection: !!props.prod, email: props.email ? cognito.UserPoolEmail.withSES({ fromEmail: props.email.fromAddress, fromName: props.email.fromName, sesVerifiedDomain: props.email.zoneName, }) : undefined, // Cognito requires {username} + {####}, but {username} is the internal // UUID — it rides in the link (#inv=…) or hides in an HTML comment. ONE // template per pool, so with SSO configured it addresses both kinds of // user: the provider button first, the password path as the fallback. userInvitation: props.appUrl ? { emailSubject: `Your ${props.projectName} invitation`, emailBody: `<p>You've been invited to ${props.projectName}.</p>` + ssoLead(`open <a href="${props.appUrl}/login">${props.appUrl}/login</a> and click <b>Sign in with ${ssoLabels}</b>`) + `<p>${ssoLabels ? "Otherwise, " : ""}<a href="${props.appUrl}/login#inv={username}:{####}">${ssoLabels ? "set" : "Set"} your password</a> to get started.</p>` + `<p>The set-password link expires in 7 days. If it has expired, ask your administrator to resend the invite.</p>`, } : { emailSubject: `Your ${props.projectName} invitation`, emailBody: `<p>You've been invited to ${props.projectName}.</p>` + ssoLead(`click <b>Sign in with ${ssoLabels}</b> on the sign-in page`) + `<p>${ssoLabels ? "Otherwise, sign" : "Sign"} in with your email address and this temporary password: {####}</p>` + `<p>The password expires in 7 days. If it has expired, ask your administrator to resend the invite.</p>` + `<!-- {username} -->`, }, // One template for EVERY emailed code, password resets included — the // copy must stay flow-neutral. userVerification: { emailSubject: `Your ${props.projectName} verification code`, emailBody: `<p>Your ${props.projectName} verification code is {####}.</p>` + `<p>If you didn't request a code, you can ignore this email.</p>`, }, // ESSENTIALS covers email OTP, passkeys, and the branding designer; // threat protection is PLUS-only. featurePlan: loginMethods.threatProtection ? cognito.FeaturePlan.PLUS : cognito.FeaturePlan.ESSENTIALS, standardThreatProtectionMode: loginMethods.threatProtection ? cognito.StandardThreatProtectionMode.FULL_FUNCTION : undefined, customThreatProtectionMode: loginMethods.threatProtection ? cognito.CustomThreatProtectionMode.FULL_FUNCTION : undefined, signInPolicy: { allowedFirstAuthFactors: { password: true, emailOtp: loginMethods.emailOtp ?? false, passkey: loginMethods.passkey ?? false, }, }, // Spread: EnabledMfas may not appear at all when MFA is off. ...(loginMethods.mfa ? { mfa: loginMethods.mfa === "required" ? cognito.Mfa.REQUIRED : cognito.Mfa.OPTIONAL, // No SMS: it would need SNS, an origination number and sandbox exit. mfaSecondFactor: { sms: false, otp: true }, } : {}), // The apex domain survives auth-host changes. Changing the RP id // orphans every registered passkey. passkeyRelyingPartyId: props.passkeyDomain ?? `creds-${this.account}.auth.${this.region}.amazoncognito.com`, passkeyUserVerification: cognito.PasskeyUserVerification.PREFERRED, // Mapped claims. MUTABLE is load-bearing: Cognito rewrites a mapped attribute on every // sign-in whose value changed, and an immutable one lets the user in exactly once. // Permanent for the pool's life — attributes can't be renamed or removed. ...(props.federation?.claimKeys.length ? { customAttributes: Object.fromEntries(props.federation.claimKeys.map((c) => [ c.key, new cognito.StringAttribute({ mutable: true, minLen: 0, maxLen: c.maxLen }), ])), } : {}), }); this.userPool = userPool; if (props.federation) { // First federated sign-in of an identity: link it to the invited user with that email, or // refuse (admins decide who gets in). No USER_POOL_ID env and a policy outside the role's // default one — both would close a pool → trigger → pool dependency cycle. const preSignUp = new app_function_1.AppFunction(this, "FederationPreSignUpFn", { description: "Sign-in trigger: links a first single-sign-on login to the invited user with that email, or refuses it.", asset: "federation-presignup", // Cognito waits 5 s for a trigger, then retries — longer only does invisible work. timeout: cdk.Duration.seconds(5), }); new iam.Policy(this, "FederationPreSignUpPolicy", { roles: [preSignUp.role], statements: [ new iam.PolicyStatement({ // ListUsers: the last-resort case-insensitive scan for a mixed-case invite. actions: ["cognito-idp:AdminGetUser", "cognito-idp:ListUsers", "cognito-idp:AdminLinkProviderForUser"], resources: [userPool.userPoolArn], }), ], }); userPool.addTrigger(cognito.UserPoolOperation.PRE_SIGN_UP, preSignUp); } if (loginMethods.threatProtection) { // Any MFA action on an attempt limits choice-based sign-in to the password // (Cognito drops passkey and email code for that attempt), so a user without // TOTP is downgraded, not stepped up. Medium risk — a new network — allows; // only High keeps the step-up, and tells the user by email when the pool // has a sender. Compromised-credential checks cover password sign-ins, not SRP. const notify = !!props.email; new cognito.CfnUserPoolRiskConfigurationAttachment(this, "RiskConfiguration", { userPoolId: userPool.userPoolId, clientId: "ALL", compromisedCredentialsRiskConfiguration: { actions: { eventAction: "BLOCK" }, eventFilter: ["SIGN_IN", "PASSWORD_CHANGE", "SIGN_UP"], }, accountTakeoverRiskConfiguration: { ...(props.email ? { notifyConfiguration: { sourceArn: `arn:aws:ses:${this.region}:${this.account}:identity/${props.email.zoneName}`, from: props.email.fromAddress, }, } : {}), actions: { lowAction: { eventAction: "NO_ACTION", notify: false }, mediumAction: { eventAction: "NO_ACTION", notify: false }, highAction: { eventAction: "MFA_IF_CONFIGURED", notify }, }, }, }); } const userPoolClient = userPool.addClient("WebClient", { // `user` = choice-based flow; userPassword/userSrp stay for scripts. authFlows: { userPassword: true, userSrp: true, user: true }, // Explicit: federated providers register on the pool from WebStack and // must never widen this scripts-only client. supportedIdentityProviders: [cognito.UserPoolClientIdentityProvider.COGNITO], // Its tokens carry the mapped claims like the SPA client's (read only, never write). ...(props.federation?.claimKeys.length ? { readAttributes: (0, federation_1.readAttributes)(props.federation.claimKeys), writeAttributes: (0, federation_1.writeAttributes)(props.federation.claimKeys, { claims: false }), } : {}), // Without this CDK fills in OAuth defaults (implicit grant + an // example.com callback) that nobody chose. disableOAuth: true, // This client id is published unauthenticated (/.well-known/infra-client), so like the SPA client it // must answer "wrong credentials" for unknown and known addresses alike — the Cognito default (LEGACY) // tells anyone which emails have an account. preventUserExistenceErrors: true, // Same session cap as the SPA client — Cognito's 30-day refresh default // would outlive it. idTokenValidity: cdk.Duration.hours(1), accessTokenValidity: cdk.Duration.hours(1), refreshTokenValidity: cdk.Duration.hours(web_stack_1.SESSION_HOURS), }); // auth.ts requires exactly `api/invoke` on service-user tokens; the M2M // clients themselves are created at runtime (serviceUsersService). userPool.addResourceServer("ApiResourceServer", { identifier: "api", scopes: [ new cognito.ResourceServerScope({ scopeName: "invoke", scopeDescription: "Call the vending API as a service user", }), ], }); // Admin = membership here, via the token's cognito:groups claim — no DB // flag; requireAdmin checks this exact name. const adminsGroup = new cognito.CfnUserPoolGroup(this, "AdminsGroup", { userPoolId: userPool.userPoolId, groupName: "admins", description: "Users allowed to call admin-only API routes.", }); // Mints the one account nothing else can; the handler is idempotent // against the live pool (lambdacode/firstadmin/handler.ts). if (props.firstAdmin) { const firstAdminFn = new app_function_1.AppFunction(this, "FirstAdminFn", { description: "Deploy-time helper: creates the first admin account and sends its invite.", asset: "firstadmin", timeout: cdk.Duration.seconds(30), environment: { USER_POOL_ID: userPool.userPoolId, ...(0, audit_log_1.auditLogEnv)(auditLog) }, }); (0, audit_log_1.grantAuditLogWrite)(firstAdminFn, auditLog); firstAdminFn.addToRolePolicy(new iam.PolicyStatement({ actions: [ "cognito-idp:AdminGetUser", "cognito-idp:AdminCreateUser", "cognito-idp:AdminAddUserToGroup", // Tells a promotion of an existing user (an admin-grant row) from a no-op re-add. "cognito-idp:AdminListGroupsForUser", ], resources: [userPool.userPoolArn], })); const provider = new cr.Provider(this, "FirstAdminProvider", { onEventHandler: firstAdminFn, }); const firstAdmin = new cdk.CustomResource(this, "FirstAdmin", { serviceToken: provider.serviceToken, resourceType: "Custom::FirstAdmin", properties: { Email: firstAdminEmail, Resend: props.firstAdmin.resend ?? 0, // Bump when the handler's RESPONSE shape changes — a stale response // has no new Data attribute for outputs to GetAtt. SchemaVersion: "2", }, }); // The group-add must find the group already created. firstAdmin.node.addDependency(adminsGroup); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "FirstAdminEmail", { value: firstAdminEmail, }); // "suppressed" = created but the invite email failed (SES sandbox) — // resend from the Users page; "blocked" = left untouched. new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "FirstAdminInviteSent", { value: firstAdmin.getAttString("InviteSent"), }); } // Created before the issuer: the signing key's policy names this role as // the ONLY principal allowed kms:Sign. const vendingRole = new iam.Role(this, "VendingApiRole", { assumedBy: new iam.ServicePrincipal("lambda.amazonaws.com"), managedPolicies: [ iam.ManagedPolicy.fromAwsManagedPolicyName("service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole"), ], }); const issuer = new oidc_issuer_1.OidcIssuer(this, "Issuer", { ...props.issuer, resourcePrefix: props.resourcePrefix, signerRole: vendingRole, prod: props.prod, accessLogsBucket: props.accessLogsBucket, }); // The branding route writes /branding.json into the site bucket, by name // — WebStack deploys after us. const siteBucketName = (0, web_stack_1.webBucketName)(props.resourcePrefix, this.account); vendingRole.addToPrincipalPolicy(new iam.PolicyStatement({ actions: ["s3:PutObject", "s3:GetObject"], resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${siteBucketName}/branding.json`], })); // Without ListBucket a missing overlay reads AccessDenied (branding saves // 502); unconditioned — S3's 404-vs-403 check can't see s3:prefix reliably. vendingRole.addToPrincipalPolicy(new iam.PolicyStatement({ actions: ["s3:ListBucket"], resources: [`arn:aws:s3:::${siteBucketName}`], })); // Access reports built in the background land here, behind presigned links; nothing lives past a week. const reportsBucket = new s3.Bucket(this, "ReportsBucket", { blockPublicAccess: s3.BlockPublicAccess.BLOCK_ALL, encryption: s3.BucketEncryption.S3_MANAGED, enforceSSL: true, removalPolicy: cdk.RemovalPolicy.DESTROY, // derived output, rebuilt on request autoDeleteObjects: true, lifecycleRules: [{ expiration: cdk.Duration.days(7), abortIncompleteMultipartUploadAfter: cdk.Duration.days(1) }], // Same access-log bucket as every other hub bucket (Security Hub S3.9). serverAccessLogsBucket: props.accessLogsBucket, serverAccessLogsPrefix: props.accessLogsBucket && "s3/reports/", }); const vendingApi = new vending_api_1.VendingApi(this, "VendingApi", { handlerRole: vendingRole, appUrl: props.appUrl, webBucketName: siteBucketName, reportsBucket, reportJobFunctionName: `${props.resourcePrefix}-report-job`, emailConfigured: Boolean(props.email), emailFrom: props.email?.fromAddress, configAccounts: props.configAccounts, accountsTable, rolesTable, requestsTable, auditTable, auditRetentionDays: auditLog.retentionDays, groupsTable, resourcesTable, accessTable, revocationsTable, serviceUsersTable, tokensTable: props.tokensTable, personalAccessTokens: props.personalAccessTokens, roleSessionName: props.roleSessionName, plugins: props.plugins && { discoveryRefreshSeconds: props.plugins.discoveryRefreshSeconds, catalogTable: props.plugins.catalogTable }, signingKey: issuer.signingKey, issuerUrl: issuer.url, userPool, userPoolClientId: userPoolClient.userPoolClientId, projectName: props.projectName, network: props.networkSites?.length ? { sites: props.networkSites, keyMinterFnName: (0, naming_1.deviceKeyMinterFnName)(props.resourcePrefix), reconcilerFnName: (0, naming_1.aclReconcilerFnName)(props.resourcePrefix), devShares: props.devShares, } : undefined, accountDimensions: props.accountDimensions, dashboardLayout: props.dashboardLayout, }); // Daily: raises reapprovals past 12 months, auto-revokes past the grace // window. const reapprovalSweeper = new app_function_1.AppFunction(this, "ReapprovalSweeper", { description: "Daily access-review sweep: raises reapprovals that are due and revokes access past the grace period.", asset: "reapproval", handler: "handler", timeout: cdk.Duration.minutes(5), environment: { ROLES_TABLE_NAME: rolesTable.tableName, REQUESTS_TABLE_NAME: requestsTable.tableName, RESOURCES_TABLE_NAME: resourcesTable.tableName, ACCESS_TABLE_NAME: accessTable.tableName, REVOCATIONS_TABLE_NAME: revocationsTable.tableName, ...(0, audit_log_1.auditLogEnv)(auditLog), // Admin/service-user reviews are raise-only — the sweep never // deletes or demotes on its own. GROUPS_TABLE_NAME: groupsTable.tableName, SERVICE_USERS_TABLE_NAME: serviceUsersTable.tableName, USER_POOL_ID: userPool.userPoolId, // Plugin reviews need the catalog AND the accounts catalog (binding availability). ...(props.plugins ? (0, runtime_1.pluginRuntimeEnv)({ catalogTable: props.plugins.catalogTable, accountsTable }) : {}), NODE_ENV: "production", }, }); if (props.plugins) (0, runtime_1.grantPluginRuntimeRead)(reapprovalSweeper, { catalogTable: props.plugins.catalogTable, accountsTable }); requestsTable.grantReadWriteData(reapprovalSweeper); rolesTable.grantReadData(reapprovalSweeper); accessTable.grantReadWriteData(reapprovalSweeper); resourcesTable.grantReadData(reapprovalSweeper); revocationsTable.grantReadWriteData(reapprovalSweeper); (0, audit_log_1.grantAuditLogWrite)(reapprovalSweeper, auditLog); // Read-write: a lapsed group reapproval can delete a bundle-less group. groupsTable.grantReadWriteData(reapprovalSweeper); serviceUsersTable.grantReadData(reapprovalSweeper); reapprovalSweeper.addToRolePolicy(new iam.PolicyStatement({ // The admin re-attestation reads the admins group membership. actions: ["cognito-idp:ListUsersInGroup"], resources: [userPool.userPoolArn], })); new events.Rule(this, "ReapprovalSchedule", { description: "Daily periodic-reapproval sweep of standing grants.", schedule: events.Schedule.rate(cdk.Duration.days(1)), targets: [new targets.LambdaFunction(reapprovalSweeper)], }); // No Cognito authorizer — the Express middleware validates the JWT itself. const apiAccessLogs = new logs.LogGroup(this, "CredsApiAccessLogs", { retention: logs.RetentionDays.THREE_MONTHS, }); const throttle = props.apiThrottle ?? (0, api_throttle_1.resolveApiThrottle)(); const api = new apigw.LambdaRestApi(this, "CredsApi", { restApiName: "creds-api", handler: vendingApi.handler, // The proxy is added by hand below: a proxying LambdaRestApi refuses explicit child resources, and the // plugin routes need /api/... resources. addProxy() creates the same {proxy+} + ANY constructs (same // logical ids) that proxy: true would. proxy: false, // Explicit: consumers with the disableCloudWatchRole feature flag would // otherwise synth without the account role and fail at deploy. cloudWatchRole: true, deployOptions: { stageName: "dev", // Security Hub APIGateway.1/.3. ERROR level only — the app's own // structured logs carry the detail — into the group API Gateway // manages (negligible volume); traces stop at the gateway, no Lambda // has active tracing. loggingLevel: apigw.MethodLoggingLevel.ERROR, tracingEnabled: true, accessLogDestination: new apigw.LogGroupLogDestination(apiAccessLogs), accessLogFormat: apigw.AccessLogFormat.jsonWithStandardFields({ caller: false, httpMethod: true, ip: true, protocol: true, requestTime: true, resourcePath: true, responseLength: true, status: true, user: false, }), // Deployment-wide ceiling; the per-token WAF rule is what bounds one leaked token. throttlingRateLimit: throttle.rateLimit, throttlingBurstLimit: throttle.burstLimit, }, }); api.root.addProxy(); this.api = api; if (props.plugins) { this.pluginApi = new plugin_api_1.PluginApi(this, "PluginApi", { api, coreHandler: vendingApi.handler, plugins: props.plugins.plugins, runtime: { userPoolId: userPool.userPoolId, accessTable, serviceUsersTable, catalogTable: props.plugins.catalogTable, accountsTable, }, auditLog, }); if (props.plugins.plugins.length) { new plugin_catalog_activation_1.PluginCatalogActivation(this, "Plugins", { plugins: props.plugins.plugins, assetsBucket: props.plugins.assetsBucket, pluginCatalogTable: props.plugins.catalogTable, accessTable, accountsTable, revocationsTable, auditLog, apiStage: api.deploymentStage, methodsByPlugin: this.pluginApi.methodsByPlugin, owner: cdk.Aws.STACK_ID, }); } } if (props.waf) { const webAcl = new web_acl_1.WebAcl(this, "ApiWebAcl", { scope: "REGIONAL", name: `${props.resourcePrefix}-api`, // Only here, not on CloudFront: every /api/* call lands on this stage // anyway and direct execute-api callers are seen only here; a second // counter would just disagree with this one. No path prefix — every // request on the stage is an API call (the path starts with the stage). tokenRateLimit: { limit: props.waf.perTokenRateLimit }, }); new wafv2.CfnWebACLAssociation(this, "ApiWebAclAssociation", { resourceArn: api.deploymentStage.stageArn, webAclArn: webAcl.arn, }); } const monitoring = new monitoring_1.Monitoring(this, "Monitoring", { alertEmails, vendingFn: vendingApi.handler, issuerUrl: issuer.url, signingKeyId: issuer.signingKey.keyId, }); this.alertTopic = monitoring.topic; new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "ApiUrl", { value: api.url }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "UserPoolId", { value: userPool.userPoolId }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "UserPoolClientId", { value: userPoolClient.userPoolClientId, }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "AccountsTableName", { value: accountsTable.tableName, }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "RolesTableName", { value: rolesTable.tableName }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "RequestsTableName", { value: requestsTable.tableName, }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "IssuerUrl", { value: issuer.url }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "KmsKeyId", { value: issuer.signingKey.keyId }); } } exports.CredsStack = CredsStack;