@fntio/infra-client
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Self-hosted AWS access portal: credential vending, target-account trust, and grant-driven private networking as CDK stacks and constructs.
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TypeScript
import { Construct } from "constructs";
/** AWS WAF in front of the web app (CloudFront) and the API (API Gateway
* stage). ON by default — Security Hub CSPM fails APIGateway.4 and
* CloudFront.6 without it. Rules, cost, opt-out: the Security
* Posture wiki page. */
export interface WafConfig {
/** false = no web ACLs at all. Default true. */
readonly enabled?: boolean;
/** `/api/*` requests per client IP per 5 minutes before CloudFront answers
* 429. One office NAT is one IP — size for the office. Default 5000. */
readonly rateLimit?: number;
/** API requests per bearer token per 5 minutes before the API's WAF answers
* 429. Per TOKEN, not per user: a browser session keeps one token for up to
* an hour (each refresh starts a new bucket) and a service user can mint a
* fresh token any time — a ceiling on a runaway or leaked token, sized
* above the product's own bursts (import CLI, bulk UI actions, the e2e
* suite). Default 2000. */
readonly perTokenRateLimit?: number;
}
/** The resolved limits — undefined when WAF is off. */
export interface WafLimits {
readonly rateLimit: number;
readonly perTokenRateLimit: number;
}
export declare function resolveWaf(config?: WafConfig): WafLimits | undefined;
export interface WebAclProps {
/** CLOUDFRONT-scope ACLs only exist in us-east-1 (WAF rule). */
readonly scope: "REGIONAL" | "CLOUDFRONT";
/** Web ACL, metric and log-group name — unique per account + region + scope. */
readonly name: string;
/** Per-source-IP limit on requests under `pathPrefix`, per 5 minutes. Only
* where WAF sees the viewer IP, i.e. on CloudFront — behind it the only
* key is the client-writable X-Forwarded-For. */
readonly rateLimit?: {
readonly limit: number;
readonly pathPrefix: string;
};
/** Per-bearer-token limit (the `authorization` header value is the key) on
* requests under `pathPrefix` (omit = every request), per 5 minutes. Sound
* behind CloudFront too: tokens are signed, so nobody lands in another
* caller's bucket; junk tokens get their own and die 401 at the API. */
readonly tokenRateLimit?: {
readonly limit: number;
readonly pathPrefix?: string;
};
/** Every managed rule runs in COUNT: the ACL logs what it would have
* blocked and never blocks. For the issuer distribution — STS is its
* only client, and a false positive there fails every vend silently. */
readonly observeOnly?: boolean;
}
/** CommonRuleSet rules that only COUNT here: the API is JSON with free
* text, URLs, bulk-import batches and SVG data-URI logos, all shape-checked
* server-side, and M2M clients may send no User-Agent. */
export declare const COMMON_RULES_COUNT_ONLY: string[];
/** One WAFv2 web ACL: optional per-IP and per-token rate limits + the AWS managed baseline
* (IP reputation, known bad inputs, common rule set), logging blocks and
* counts to CloudWatch with credentials redacted. */
export declare class WebAcl extends Construct {
readonly arn: string;
constructor(scope: Construct, id: string, props: WebAclProps);
}