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@fntio/infra-client

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Self-hosted AWS access portal: credential vending, target-account trust, and grant-driven private networking as CDK stacks and constructs.

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"use strict"; var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k); if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) { desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } }; } Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc); }) : (function(o, m, k, k2) { if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k; o[k2] = m[k]; })); var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) { Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v }); }) : function(o, v) { o["default"] = v; }); var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () { var ownKeys = function(o) { ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) { var ar = []; for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k; return ar; }; return ownKeys(o); }; return function (mod) { if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod; var result = {}; if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]); __setModuleDefault(result, mod); return result; }; })(); Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true }); exports.TailnetConnector = void 0; const cdk = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib")); const constructs_1 = require("constructs"); const ec2 = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-ec2")); const ecs = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-ecs")); const logs = __importStar(require("aws-cdk-lib/aws-logs")); const mirrored_image_1 = require("./mirrored-image"); const scratch_tmpfs_1 = require("./scratch-tmpfs"); /** In-VPC subnet router, one per VPC; dials OUT only. Grants decide who may * route here — the resource's SG still decides what the VPC accepts. */ class TailnetConnector extends constructs_1.Construct { securityGroup; constructor(scope, id, props) { super(scope, id); const cluster = new ecs.Cluster(this, "Cluster", { vpc: props.vpc, containerInsightsV2: props.containerInsights ? ecs.ContainerInsights.ENABLED : ecs.ContainerInsights.DISABLED, }); const taskDef = new ecs.FargateTaskDefinition(this, "TaskDef", { cpu: 256, memoryLimitMiB: 512, }); // Both containers non-root on a read-only root, each with its own tmpfs. // No shared task volume (a Fargate task volume is root-owned whatever the // image says): the minted key crosses the task's loopback, // which the two containers share. Userspace forwarding needs no privilege. const NONROOT = "65534"; const HANDOFF_PORT = 9909; const tailscale = taskDef.addContainer("tailscale", { // Pinned: we ship this update train (same policy as the control plane). image: (0, mirrored_image_1.taskImage)(this, "TailscaleImage", "ghcr.io/tailscale/tailscale:v1.98.9", props.mirrorImages, taskDef), // Self-auth waits for the minted key on loopback (busybox nc, one // connection), then hands off to the stock entrypoint — upstream image // stays unmodified. stdin MUST be at EOF: this nc (1.10-compatible) // exits only once both stdin and the peer have closed, so a held-open // stdin hangs it (2026-10-09 crash loop). No key within five minutes = // exit, so the task restarts. entryPoint: [ "/bin/sh", "-ec", [ 'echo "waiting for the auth key on 127.0.0.1:' + HANDOFF_PORT + '"', `timeout 300 nc -l -s 127.0.0.1 -p ${HANDOFF_PORT} </dev/null >/tmp/key`, 'TS_AUTHKEY="$(cat /tmp/key)"', "rm -f /tmp/key", '[ -n "$TS_AUTHKEY" ] || { echo "no auth key received"; exit 1; }', 'echo "auth key received, starting tailscale"', "export TS_AUTHKEY", "exec /usr/local/bin/containerboot", ].join("\n"), ], user: NONROOT, readonlyRootFilesystem: true, linuxParameters: (0, scratch_tmpfs_1.scratchTmpfs)(this, "TmpfsTailscale", 64), environment: { // Fargate grants no NET_ADMIN/tun device; userspace forwarding is fine // for developer access, not bulk transfer. TS_USERSPACE: "true", TS_AUTH_ONCE: "true", TS_HOSTNAME: props.hostname ?? "connector", TS_ROUTES: props.routes.join(","), TS_EXTRA_ARGS: `--login-server=${props.controlUrl}`, TS_STATE_DIR: "/tmp/tailscale", }, // A connector can stay on "could not connect to the ... relay server" after the relay map // comes back, until restarted (#83). Unhealthy after ~5 min of it, so ECS replaces the task. // A status read that fails (daemon not up yet) passes. An empty map replaces a running // connector at most once: the new task has no home relay, a different warning, and passes. healthCheck: { command: [ "CMD-SHELL", "! tailscale --socket=/tmp/tailscaled.sock status --json 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'could not connect to the'", ], interval: cdk.Duration.seconds(60), timeout: cdk.Duration.seconds(15), retries: 5, startPeriod: cdk.Duration.seconds(300), }, logging: ecs.LogDrivers.awsLogs({ streamPrefix: "connector", logRetention: logs.RetentionDays.ONE_MONTH, }), }); // Mint at boot with the task role; aws-cli image has grep/sed, no jq needed. // bash for /dev/tcp: the key goes to the tailscale container's listener, // retried for two minutes while it comes up (it is started first). const init = taskDef.addContainer("mint-authkey", { image: ecs.ContainerImage.fromRegistry("public.ecr.aws/aws-cli/aws-cli:2.15.17"), essential: false, user: NONROOT, readonlyRootFilesystem: true, linuxParameters: (0, scratch_tmpfs_1.scratchTmpfs)(this, "TmpfsMint", 16), entryPoint: ["/usr/bin/bash", "-c"], command: [ [ "set -e", 'aws lambda invoke --function-name "$MINTER_ARN"' + " --cli-binary-format raw-in-base64-out" + ' --payload \'{"keyType":"connector"}\' /tmp/out.json >/dev/null', // one-line JSON: {"key":"tskey-…","expiresAt":"…"} "KEY=$(grep -oE '\"key\":\"[^\"]+\"' /tmp/out.json | head -1 | sed 's/\"key\":\"//;s/\"//')", 'test -n "$KEY"', "rm -f /tmp/out.json", "n=0", `until (printf %s "$KEY" > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/${HANDOFF_PORT}) 2>/dev/null; do n=$((n+1)); [ $n -lt 120 ] || exit 1; sleep 1; done`, 'echo "auth key handed to tailscale after $n retries"', ].join("; "), ], environment: { // The uid has no passwd entry in this image; the CLI resolves ~ via HOME. HOME: "/tmp", MINTER_ARN: props.minter.functionArn, // The MINTER's region (from its ARN), not this VPC's — Lambda answers for its own // region's endpoint only, and the hub may sit elsewhere. AWS_REGION: props.minter.env.region, }, logging: ecs.LogDrivers.awsLogs({ streamPrefix: "connector-mint", logRetention: logs.RetentionDays.ONE_MONTH, }), }); init.addContainerDependencies({ container: tailscale, condition: ecs.ContainerDependencyCondition.START, }); // Identity-policy half of the invoke. Cross-account minters also need the // resource-policy half, granted hub-side (grantConnectorAccount). props.minter.grantInvoke(taskDef.taskRole); this.securityGroup = new ec2.SecurityGroup(this, "Sg", { vpc: props.vpc, // EC2 rejects non-ASCII in this field - plain hyphen only. description: "Tailnet connector - no inbound; resource SGs allow FROM this to be reachable.", allowAllOutbound: true, }); new ecs.FargateService(this, "Service", { cluster, taskDefinition: taskDef, desiredCount: 1, securityGroups: [this.securityGroup], // Public subnet + public IP: the connector needs outbound internet to // reach the control plane/DERP, and target-account VPCs often have no NAT. assignPublicIp: true, vpcSubnets: { subnetType: ec2.SubnetType.PUBLIC }, minHealthyPercent: 0, maxHealthyPercent: 100, circuitBreaker: { rollback: true }, }); new cdk.CfnOutput(this, "ConnectorSecurityGroupId", { value: this.securityGroup.securityGroupId, description: "Allow this SG in a resource's security group to make it reachable over the tailnet.", }); } } exports.TailnetConnector = TailnetConnector;