UNPKG

@bitkyc08/opencodex

Version:

Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

283 lines (263 loc) • 14.1 kB
/** * Fail-closed protection for the user's REAL OpenCodex home while tests run. * * A management-route unit test once passed an in-memory fixture config to a handler * that persisted it through the process-global writer, replacing a live 41KB, * ten-provider `~/.opencodex/config.json` with an 874-byte fixture on a real machine. * Credentials survived only because the store files are separate; the providers were * recoverable only because an unrelated backup snapshot happened to exist. * (devlog `_plan/260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070`.) * * Two properties matter more than breadth here: * * 1. It must be INERT in production. Guessing "am I a test?" from ecosystem variables * like NODE_ENV would brick `NODE_ENV=test ocx ...` for a user who did nothing * wrong — worse than the bug it prevents. Arming requires OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=1, * which only this repository's test preload sets. * 2. It must fail CLOSED for code nobody has written yet. So it denies ONE path — the * captured production home — instead of allow-listing known-good test directories. * An allowlist would have to be opted into, and the test that forgets is exactly * how this incident happened. */ import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve } from "node:path"; import { realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const GUARD_ENV = "OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD"; /** * Set by `scripts/test.ts` to the ORIGINAL home before it hands the child a rewritten * HOME. On that path `homedir()` already points at the sandbox by the time this module * loads, so the true home is only knowable from this hand-off. */ const REAL_HOME_ENV = "OCX_REAL_HOME"; /** * Resolve symlinks so two spellings of one location compare equal — macOS hands out * `/var/folders/...` whose realpath is `/private/var/folders/...` — and so a path that * merely *points* at the protected home cannot slip past a string comparison. A path * that does not exist yet canonicalizes through its nearest existing ancestor, which is * the common case for a config file about to be created. */ function canonicalize(path: string): string { let current = resolve(path); const unresolved: string[] = []; for (;;) { try { return join(realpathSync.native(current), ...unresolved.reverse()); } catch { const parent = dirname(current); if (parent === current) return resolve(path); unresolved.push(current.slice(parent.length + 1)); current = parent; } } } /** * Captured ONCE at module load, before any harness replaces HOME/USERPROFILE. Reading * `homedir()` later would return the sandbox and leave the real home unprotected — the * guard would be perfectly inverted while its tests still looked green. */ const REAL_HOME = process.env[REAL_HOME_ENV]?.trim() || homedir(); const PROTECTED_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")); const PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")); /** * `~/Library/LaunchAgents` needs its own entry because HOME isolation does not reach it: * `os.homedir()` reads the password database, not `$HOME`, so a macOS test that rewrites * HOME still resolves `plistPath()` to the developer's real LaunchAgents directory. The * launchd install tests were doing exactly that — replacing the live * `com.opencodex.proxy.plist` with one whose token file, log path and Bun paths all point * into a temp sandbox, for as long as the case ran. launchd holds its own parsed copy, so * nothing broke until the job next restarted. */ const PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")); /** The production home this process protects. Exported for the guard's own tests. */ export function protectedHomeForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_HOME; } /** The production Codex home this process protects when tests write native credentials. */ export function protectedCodexHomeForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME; } export function isTestHomeGuardArmed(): boolean { return process.env[GUARD_ENV] === "1"; } /** * Whether `dir` IS the protected production home, decided with the SAME canonicalization as * {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}. * * For the caller that must FILTER the real home out of a candidate list instead of refusing * one write: `serviceStatePaths()` in `src/service.ts` keeps a legacy * `~/.opencodex/service-state.json` entry so an install made before OPENCODEX_HOME existed * can still be found, and under an armed test process that entry is the developer's live * record. Exported so that filter cannot drift onto a weaker comparison — `resolve()` alone * calls `/var/folders/...` and `/private/var/folders/...` different paths, which is exactly * how a macOS sandbox path slips past a string compare. */ export function isProtectedHomeUnderTest(dir: string): boolean { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return false; return canonicalize(dir) === PROTECTED_HOME; } /** * Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real OpenCodex home. * * Call FIRST inside a writer, before any mkdir/chmod/write, so a rejected write leaves * nothing behind. Silent no-op when disarmed (production) or when `dir` is any other * location, including a suite's own `mkdtemp` fixture — no registration required, which * is what keeps the 54 existing suites that write config working untouched. */ export function assertNotRealHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (canonicalize(dir) !== PROTECTED_HOME) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real OpenCodex home (${PROTECTED_HOME}) from a test process. ` + "Point OPENCODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test, or inject persistence " + "instead of calling the global writer (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070).", ); } /** The production LaunchAgents directory this process protects. Exported for its tests. */ export function protectedLaunchAgentsDirForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS; } /** * Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real `~/Library/LaunchAgents`. * * Same contract as {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}: call before any mkdir/write, and * pass a DIRECTORY. A launchd test gives `installLaunchd` an explicit plist path inside its * own fixture directory instead. */ export function assertNotRealLaunchAgentsUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (canonicalize(dir) !== PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real LaunchAgents directory (${PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS}) from a test ` + "process: os.homedir() ignores HOME, so rewriting HOME does not move this path. Pass an " + "explicit plist path inside the test's own fixture directory instead.", ); } /** Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real native Codex home. */ export function assertNotRealCodexHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (canonicalize(dir) !== PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real Codex home (${PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME}) from a test process. ` + "Point CODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test before writing native auth.json.", ); } /** * The trees a removal must never reach, and the reason each one is named. * * The writer guard above cannot help here. `rmSync` is plain `node:fs`: it calls no writer of * ours, so no assertion of ours runs, and by the time anything could observe the damage the * directory is already gone. On 2026-09-15 that is exactly what happened — a test resolved the * process-global config directory and removed it, taking every OAuth login, the Codex account * store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger with it. */ const PROTECTED_TREES: ReadonlyArray<{ path: string; lexical: string; label: string }> = [ { path: PROTECTED_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")), label: "the real OpenCodex home" }, { path: PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")), label: "the real Codex home" }, { path: PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")), label: "the real LaunchAgents directory", }, ]; const PROTECTED_REAL_HOME = canonicalize(REAL_HOME); const LEXICAL_REAL_HOME = resolve(REAL_HOME); /** Canonical paths whose removal is refused. Exported so the guard's tests cannot drift off them. */ export function protectedRemovalTreesForTests(): readonly string[] { return [PROTECTED_REAL_HOME, ...PROTECTED_TREES.map(tree => tree.path)]; } /** Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent`, both already canonicalized. */ function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean { const rel = relative(parent, child); return rel !== "" && !rel.startsWith("..") && !isAbsolute(rel); } let checkoutRootSpellings: readonly string[] | undefined; /** * Both spellings of the checkout that loaded this module (`src/lib` -> repository root). * * Lazy so a production process, which never removes anything through this guard, does no work * for it at module load. In a compiled binary the module URL sits under a virtual root, so the * result names no real checkout and the exemption below can never apply. */ function checkoutRoots(): readonly string[] { if (checkoutRootSpellings === undefined) { let lexical: string | null = null; try { lexical = resolve(fileURLToPath(new URL("../..", import.meta.url))); } catch { // A non-file module URL names no checkout: no exemption. } checkoutRootSpellings = lexical === null ? [] : [...new Set([canonicalize(lexical), lexical])]; } return checkoutRootSpellings; } /** * Whether `candidate` is repository content of a checkout that itself lives inside `protectedPath`. * * A Codex-app worktree is a checkout under `~/.codex/worktrees/`, and forty suites keep their * fixture directory beside the test file. Refusing every path inside `~/.codex` refused those * suites' own cleanup, 863 failures in one run, although nothing there is Codex state. The lift * is deliberately narrow: it applies to one tree, only when a checkout spelling is strictly * inside that tree and the candidate is strictly inside that checkout. The checkout root itself, * its ancestors and every sibling stay refused, and a checkout that merely CONTAINS a protected * tree (one at `$HOME`, or the virtual root of a compiled build) never qualifies. */ function isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath: string, candidate: string): boolean { return checkoutRoots().some(root => isInside(protectedPath, root) && isInside(root, candidate)); } /** * Why removing `target` is refused, or `null` when it is not a protected location. * * Three relations are refused, not one. Equality alone would still permit * `rmSync(getConfigPath())` against a live `config.json`, and it would permit * `rmSync(homedir())`, which takes the protected tree with it. So a target is refused when it * IS a protected tree, when it sits INSIDE one, or when it is an ANCESTOR of one. The one lift is * content of the running checkout when that checkout lives inside the tree * ({@link isOwnCheckoutContent}); it never applies to equality or ancestry. * * Canonicalization is what makes a symlink useless as a bypass: a temp path that merely points * at the real home resolves to the real home before any comparison happens. Each spelling is * judged on its own and any refusal wins, so a link inside the checkout that resolves into the * protected tree is refused through its canonical form. */ export function protectedRemovalReason(target: string): string | null { // Both spellings are judged, not just the canonical one. Canonicalization is what defeats a // symlink alias, but it also resolves the target away: if `~/.opencodex` is itself a link, // the literal path a caller passed is the thing that gets unlinked, and only the lexical // form still names it. Upstream Codex makes the same distinction in its writable-root // handling, keeping logical and resolved forms side by side rather than collapsing to one. for (const candidate of [canonicalize(target), resolve(target)]) { if (candidate === PROTECTED_REAL_HOME || candidate === LEXICAL_REAL_HOME) { return `the real home directory (${PROTECTED_REAL_HOME})`; } for (const tree of PROTECTED_TREES) { for (const protectedPath of [tree.path, tree.lexical]) { if (candidate === protectedPath) return `${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; if (isInside(protectedPath, candidate) && !isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath, candidate)) { return `a path inside ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; } if (isInside(candidate, protectedPath)) return `an ancestor of ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; } } } return null; } /** * Throw before a removal that would reach a protected tree. * * Deliberately NOT gated on {@link isTestHomeGuardArmed}. Arming happens in `tests/preload.ts`, * which Bun loads from the `bunfig.toml` it finds in the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY — so a run * started outside the repository arms nothing, leaves OPENCODEX_HOME unset, and resolves the * developer's real home. That unarmed run is precisely the one that caused the incident, so the * refusal has to hold without it. Nothing in production calls this; the callers are test * helpers, where the only cost of an unconditional check is a path comparison. */ export function assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(target: string): void { const reason = protectedRemovalReason(target); if (reason === null) return; throw new Error( `refusing to remove ${reason} from a test process: "${target}" resolves there. ` + "Create the directory this test owns with createTempHome() from tests/helpers/temp-home " + "and remove that handle instead (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070).", ); }