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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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import { createHash, randomUUID, X509Certificate } from "node:crypto"; import { chmodSync, lstatSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, rmSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { withClientLifecycleSync } from "../../client/lifecycle-lock"; import { ALL_IP_ADDRESS_BASES, createCertificateAuthority, issueServerLeaf, type LocalInterceptCa, type PemKeyPair, } from "./local-ca"; /** Separate root for Desktop traffic: its critical DNS constraint is checked on every reload. */ export const PICKER_HOST = "claude.ai"; export const PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME = "opencodex Claude Desktop Picker CA"; export const PICKER_STATE_DIR = "claude-picker"; export interface PickerCa extends LocalInterceptCa { fingerprint: string } export interface PendingPickerCaUntrust { certPem: string; sha1: string; sha256: string } const processAuthorities = new Map<string, PickerCa>(); const MAX_PENDING_CA_BYTES = 64 * 1024; const LEGACY_OWNER_MTIME_TOLERANCE_MS = 2_000; export function pickerStateDir(configDir: string): string { return join(configDir, PICKER_STATE_DIR); } export function pickerCaCertPath(configDir: string): string { return join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "ca.pem"); } export function pickerLeafCertPath(configDir: string): string { return join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "leaf.pem"); } export function pickerCaOwnerPath(configDir: string): string { return join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "ca-owner.json"); } export function pickerCaPendingUntrustPath(configDir: string): string { return join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "pending-untrust.json"); } function pickerCaLockPath(configDir: string): string { return join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "ca.lock.sqlite"); } export function pickerCaFingerprints(certPem: string): { sha1: string; sha256: string } { const der = new X509Certificate(certPem).raw; return { sha1: createHash("sha1").update(der).digest("hex").toUpperCase(), sha256: createHash("sha256").update(der).digest("hex").toUpperCase(), }; } interface DerItem { tag: number; body: Buffer; next: number } function readDer(bytes: Buffer, at: number): DerItem | null { if (at + 2 > bytes.length) return null; const tag = bytes[at]!; let length = bytes[at + 1]!; let cursor = at + 2; if (length & 0x80) { const width = length & 0x7f; if (width === 0 || width > 4 || cursor + width > bytes.length) return null; length = 0; for (let i = 0; i < width; i++) length = length * 256 + bytes[cursor++]!; } if (cursor + length > bytes.length) return null; return { tag, body: bytes.subarray(cursor, cursor + length), next: cursor + length }; } function children(bytes: Buffer): DerItem[] | null { const out: DerItem[] = []; for (let cursor = 0; cursor < bytes.length;) { const item = readDer(bytes, cursor); if (!item) return null; out.push(item); cursor = item.next; } return out; } function constrainedToPickerHost(value: Buffer): boolean { const root = readDer(value, 0); if (!root || root.tag !== 0x30 || root.next !== value.length) return false; const fields = children(root.body); if (!fields || fields.length !== 2 || fields[0]!.tag !== 0xa0 || fields[1]!.tag !== 0xa1) return false; const excluded = children(fields[1]!.body); const excludesAllIps = excluded?.length === ALL_IP_ADDRESS_BASES.length && excluded.every((subtree, index) => { const base = subtree.tag === 0x30 ? children(subtree.body) : null; return base?.length === 1 && base[0]!.tag === 0x87 && base[0]!.body.equals(Buffer.from(ALL_IP_ADDRESS_BASES[index]!)); }); if (!excludesAllIps) return false; const subtrees = children(fields[0]!.body); const subtree = subtrees?.length === 1 && subtrees[0]!.tag === 0x30 ? children(subtrees[0]!.body) : null; return subtree?.length === 1 && subtree[0]!.tag === 0x82 && subtree[0]!.body.equals(Buffer.from(PICKER_HOST, "ascii")); } interface ParsedExtension { oid: Buffer; critical: boolean; value: Buffer } /** One Extension SEQUENCE → oid, criticality, and extnValue bytes; malformed shapes return null. */ function parseExtension(item: DerItem): ParsedExtension | null { if (item.tag !== 0x30) return null; const fields = children(item.body); if (!fields || fields.length < 2 || fields.length > 3 || fields[0]!.tag !== 0x06) return null; const value = fields[fields.length - 1]!; if (value.tag !== 0x04) return null; if (fields.length === 2) return { oid: fields[0]!.body, critical: false, value: value.body }; // DER encodes the critical flag only as BOOLEAN TRUE; anything else is not a real extension. if (fields[1]!.tag !== 0x01 || !fields[1]!.body.equals(Buffer.from([0xff]))) return null; return { oid: fields[0]!.body, critical: true, value: value.body }; } // DER OID bodies for the only four extensions a picker authority carries. A SAN, an EKU, or any // other extension means the certificate is not a picker authority, whatever its subject claims. const EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS = "551d13"; const EXT_KEY_USAGE = "551d0f"; const EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER = "551d0e"; const EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS = "551d1e"; const PICKER_CA_EXTENSION_OIDS = new Set([ EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, EXT_KEY_USAGE, EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER, EXT_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ]); /** basicConstraints CA:TRUE with pathLenConstraint 0 — the anchor signs leaves, not other CAs. */ const PICKER_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS = Buffer.from([0x30, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]); /** keyUsage keyCertSign | cRLSign only — the anchor can never sign a TLS handshake itself. */ const PICKER_CA_KEY_USAGE = Buffer.from([0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x06]); /** * The trust decision accepts exactly the extension profile createCertificateAuthority emits, not * merely a certificate that happens to contain the right name constraint. A root that also carries * leaf privileges (SAN, serverAuth EKU, digitalSignature) could be presented directly as an * off-host server certificate, where name constraints on subordinates no longer apply. */ function acceptsExtensionProfile(extensions: DerItem[]): boolean { const seen = new Set<string>(); for (const item of extensions) { const extension = parseExtension(item); if (extension === null) return false; const key = extension.oid.toString("hex"); if (!PICKER_CA_EXTENSION_OIDS.has(key) || seen.has(key)) return false; seen.add(key); switch (key) { case EXT_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS: if (!extension.critical || !extension.value.equals(PICKER_CA_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS)) return false; break; case EXT_KEY_USAGE: if (!extension.critical || !extension.value.equals(PICKER_CA_KEY_USAGE)) return false; break; case EXT_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER: { const id = readDer(extension.value, 0); if (extension.critical || id === null || id.tag !== 0x04 || id.next !== extension.value.length) return false; break; } default: if (!extension.critical || !constrainedToPickerHost(extension.value)) return false; } } return seen.size === PICKER_CA_EXTENSION_OIDS.size; } /** Independently authorize a root before installing it as system trust. */ export function acceptsPickerAuthority(certPem: string): boolean { try { const cert = new X509Certificate(certPem); const names = cert.subject.split("\n"); if (!names.includes(`CN=${PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME}`)) return false; if (names.filter(line => line.startsWith("CN=")).length !== 1) return false; // A picker authority is self-issued and self-signed; a foreign issuer is not one of ours. if (cert.issuer !== cert.subject || !cert.verify(cert.publicKey)) return false; const root = readDer(cert.raw, 0); const certificate = root?.tag === 0x30 && root.next === cert.raw.length ? children(root.body) : null; const tbs = certificate?.[0]?.tag === 0x30 ? children(certificate[0].body) : null; const extensionField = tbs?.find(item => item.tag === 0xa3); const wrapped = extensionField && readDer(extensionField.body, 0); const extensions = wrapped?.tag === 0x30 && wrapped.next === extensionField!.body.length ? children(wrapped.body) : null; return extensions !== null && acceptsExtensionProfile(extensions); } catch { return false; } } /** Atomically publish a public certificate; these files carry no key material. */ function publishPem(path: string, pem: string): void { const tmp = `${path}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`; try { writeFileSync(tmp, pem, { flag: "wx", mode: 0o644 }); try { chmodSync(tmp, 0o644); } catch { /* best-effort on platforms without POSIX modes */ } renameSync(tmp, path); } finally { rmSync(tmp, { force: true }); } } /** * Publish this process's authority and record which pid owns it, so another process that shares * the config directory can distinguish "the file went missing or stale" from "a live peer rotated * the authority" — only the former may be overwritten. */ function publishAuthority(configDir: string, ca: PickerCa): void { publishPem(pickerCaCertPath(configDir), ca.certPem); publishOwner(configDir, ca); } function publishOwner(configDir: string, ca: PickerCa): void { publishPem(pickerCaOwnerPath(configDir), JSON.stringify({ pid: process.pid, startTime: processStartIdentity(process.pid), sha256: ca.fingerprint, }) + "\n"); } function currentProcessOwnsPublishedCa(configDir: string, ca: PickerCa): boolean { try { const owner = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pickerCaOwnerPath(configDir), "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>; return owner.pid === process.pid && owner.sha256 === ca.fingerprint && owner.startTime === processStartIdentity(process.pid); } catch { return false; } } /** The OS process start identity prevents a recycled PID from impersonating the recorded owner. */ function processStartIdentity(pid: number, utc = false): string | null { if (process.platform === "linux") { try { const stat = readFileSync(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf8"); const afterCommand = stat.lastIndexOf(") "); const ticks = afterCommand < 0 ? undefined : stat.slice(afterCommand + 2).trim().split(/\s+/)[19]; return ticks && /^\d+$/.test(ticks) ? ticks : null; } catch { return null; } } if (process.platform === "darwin") { try { const result = Bun.spawnSync(["/bin/ps", "-o", "lstart=", "-p", String(pid)], { stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "ignore", ...(utc ? { env: { ...process.env, TZ: "UTC" } } : {}), }); const value = result.stdout.toString().trim(); return result.exitCode === 0 && value.length > 0 && value.length <= 128 ? value : null; } catch { return null; } } return null; } /** Darwin's lstart is local wall-clock time; Linux's /proc start ticks are not comparable to mtime. */ function processStartEpochMs(pid: number): number | null { if (process.platform !== "darwin") return null; const identity = processStartIdentity(pid, true); if (identity === null) return null; const epoch = Date.parse(`${identity} UTC`); return Number.isFinite(epoch) ? epoch : null; } function processAlive(pid: number): boolean { if (!Number.isInteger(pid) || pid <= 0) return false; if (pid === process.pid) return true; try { process.kill(pid, 0); return true; } catch (error) { // EPERM means the process exists but is not signallable by us; ESRCH means it is gone. return error !== null && typeof error === "object" && (error as { code?: unknown }).code === "EPERM"; } } /** * True when the published certificate belongs to a live process's authority. The owner * record is only trusted while it describes the certificate actually on disk: a stale or * third-party `ca-owner.json` cannot shield a file that was tampered with after the owner wrote it. */ function livePublishedOwner(configDir: string, published: string): boolean { try { const owner = JSON.parse(readFileSync(pickerCaOwnerPath(configDir), "utf8")) as unknown; if (owner === null || typeof owner !== "object") return false; const { pid, sha256, startTime } = owner as { pid?: unknown; sha256?: unknown; startTime?: unknown }; if (typeof pid !== "number" || typeof sha256 !== "string") return false; if (sha256 !== pickerCaFingerprints(published).sha256) return false; if (!processAlive(pid)) return false; // Older records have no start identity. On Darwin, wall-clock start after the owner // file proves PID reuse; otherwise preserve the conservative live-owner decision. if (startTime === undefined || startTime === null) { const startedAt = processStartEpochMs(pid); if (startedAt === null) return true; let mtime: number; try { mtime = statSync(pickerCaOwnerPath(configDir)).mtimeMs; } catch { return true; } return !Number.isFinite(mtime) || startedAt <= mtime + LEGACY_OWNER_MTIME_TOLERANCE_MS; } if (typeof startTime !== "string" || startTime.length === 0 || startTime.length > 128) return false; const actual = processStartIdentity(pid); return actual === null || actual === startTime; } catch { return false; } } function publicCertificate(pem: string): PendingPickerCaUntrust | null { try { const certPem = new X509Certificate(pem).toString(); return { certPem, ...pickerCaFingerprints(certPem) }; } catch { return null; } } /** The pending record is public-only, but malformed or unsafe state must never be discarded. */ export function readPendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir: string): PendingPickerCaUntrust | null { const path = pickerCaPendingUntrustPath(configDir); let stat; try { stat = lstatSync(path); } catch (error) { if (error !== null && typeof error === "object" && (error as { code?: unknown }).code === "ENOENT") return null; throw error; } if (!stat.isFile() || stat.nlink !== 1 || stat.size > MAX_PENDING_CA_BYTES) { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_unsafe"); } const raw = readFileSync(path, "utf8"); if (Buffer.byteLength(raw) > MAX_PENDING_CA_BYTES) throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_unsafe"); let value: unknown; try { value = JSON.parse(raw); } catch { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_invalid"); } if (value === null || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value)) { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_invalid"); } const pending = value as Partial<PendingPickerCaUntrust>; if (Object.keys(pending).sort().join(",") !== "certPem,sha1,sha256" || typeof pending.certPem !== "string" || typeof pending.sha1 !== "string" || typeof pending.sha256 !== "string") { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_invalid"); } const publicOnly = publicCertificate(pending.certPem); if (!publicOnly || pending.certPem !== publicOnly.certPem || pending.sha1 !== publicOnly.sha1 || pending.sha256 !== publicOnly.sha256) { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_invalid"); } return publicOnly; } function writePendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir: string, pending: PendingPickerCaUntrust): void { const path = pickerCaPendingUntrustPath(configDir); const temporary = `${path}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`; try { writeFileSync(temporary, JSON.stringify(pending) + "\n", { flag: "wx", mode: 0o600 }); try { chmodSync(temporary, 0o600); } catch { /* best-effort on platforms without POSIX modes */ } renameSync(temporary, path); } finally { rmSync(temporary, { force: true }); } } /** * A lock failure is separate from a successful void callback. Once the callback entered, an * exception (including lock release failure) propagates: its effects may be partial. */ function underPickerCaLock<T>(configDir: string, check: () => T): | { kind: "acquired"; value: T } | { kind: "unavailable"; error: unknown } { let entered = false; try { const value = withClientLifecycleSync(() => { entered = true; return check(); }, { lockPath: pickerCaLockPath(configDir) }); return { kind: "acquired", value }; } catch (error) { if (entered) throw error; return { kind: "unavailable", error }; } } function lockedPickerCa<T>(configDir: string, check: () => T): T { const result = underPickerCaLock(configDir, check); if (result.kind === "unavailable") throw result.error; return result.value; } function publishedPickerCa(configDir: string): string | null { try { return readFileSync(pickerCaCertPath(configDir), "utf8"); } catch (error) { if (error !== null && typeof error === "object" && (error as { code?: unknown }).code === "ENOENT") return null; throw error; } } /** A pending CA may still be serving when journal publication preceded a failed PEM replacement. */ export function pendingPickerCaHasLivePublishedOwner(configDir: string, pending: PendingPickerCaUntrust): boolean { return lockedPickerCa(configDir, () => { const current = readPendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir); if (!current || current.sha1 !== pending.sha1 || current.sha256 !== pending.sha256 || current.certPem !== pending.certPem) { throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust_changed"); } const published = publishedPickerCa(configDir); return published !== null && publicCertificate(published)?.sha256 === pending.sha256 && livePublishedOwner(configDir, published); }); } /** Acknowledgement never clears an entry another process created or replaced. */ export function acknowledgePendingPickerCaUntrust( configDir: string, pending: PendingPickerCaUntrust, confirmedUntrust: { ok: boolean }, ): boolean { if (confirmedUntrust?.ok !== true) return false; return lockedPickerCa(configDir, () => { const current = readPendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir); if (!current || current.certPem !== pending.certPem || current.sha1 !== pending.sha1 || current.sha256 !== pending.sha256) return false; rmSync(pickerCaPendingUntrustPath(configDir)); return true; }); } /** * Drop the legacy exportable signing key, if one exists in the picker state dir. Releases before * the process-scoped authority persisted `ca.key` next to `ca.pem`; the removal is deliberately * unconditional so a later failed rotation can never leave that key behind. */ export function discardPickerCaKey(configDir: string): void { rmSync(join(pickerStateDir(configDir), "ca.key"), { force: true }); } export function ensurePickerCa(configDir: string, options: { rotation?: "startup" } = {}): PickerCa { const dir = pickerStateDir(configDir); // The signing key must never survive this process: another process under the same user could // otherwise steal it and later take over the predictable loopback proxy. Drop a key left (or // restored) by an older release on every call, including cache hits. discardPickerCaKey(configDir); const cached = processAuthorities.get(dir); const pickerCa = cached ?? (() => { const ca = createCertificateAuthority({ commonName: PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME, permittedDnsNames: [PICKER_HOST] }); return { ...ca, fingerprint: pickerCaFingerprints(ca.certPem).sha256 }; })(); mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); lockedPickerCa(configDir, () => { if (readPendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir)) throw new Error("picker_ca_pending_untrust"); const published = publishedPickerCa(configDir); if (published === pickerCa.certPem) { // The signing key is still in this process. A missing/stale owner file must not let a // second process rotate this live authority after an otherwise harmless cached ensure. if (!currentProcessOwnsPublishedCa(configDir, pickerCa)) publishOwner(configDir, pickerCa); return; } if (published !== null && livePublishedOwner(configDir, published)) { throw new Error("picker_ca_live_owner"); } const outgoing = published === null ? null : publicCertificate(published); if (outgoing && outgoing.sha256 !== pickerCa.fingerprint) { if (options.rotation !== "startup") throw new Error("picker_ca_rotation_requires_startup"); writePendingPickerCaUntrust(configDir, outgoing); } publishAuthority(configDir, pickerCa); }); if (!cached) processAuthorities.set(dir, pickerCa); return pickerCa; } /** Fingerprint of this process's authority only — null until ensurePickerCa has run. */ export function publishedPickerCaSha256(configDir: string): string | null { const cached = processAuthorities.get(pickerStateDir(configDir)); return cached ? pickerCaFingerprints(cached.certPem).sha256 : null; } /** Persist only the public leaf, so trust inspection verifies this exact local issuer. */ export function issuePickerLeaf(ca: PickerCa, configDir: string): PemKeyPair { const leaf = issueServerLeaf(ca, PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME, [PICKER_HOST]); mkdirSync(pickerStateDir(configDir), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 }); publishPem(pickerLeafCertPath(configDir), leaf.certPem); return leaf; }