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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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import { createHash } from "node:crypto"; import { COMPACT_PROMPT, compactionItemToText, decodeCompactionSummary, isCompactionItemType } from "../../responses/compaction"; import { debugProviderDiagnostic } from "../../lib/debug"; import { modelInList } from "../../types"; import { isPlainObject } from "./internal"; import { activateDeferredTool } from "./tool-schema"; import { stripOpenAiOnlyWebSearchFields } from "./web-search"; export function stripInvalidItemIds(body: unknown): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body) || !Array.isArray(body.input)) return body; const validPrefixes: Record<string, string> = { message: "msg_", agent_message: "amsg_", reasoning: "rs_", function_call: "fc_", custom_tool_call: "ctc_", tool_search_call: "tsc_", web_search_call: "ws_", }; let changed = false; const input = body.input.map(item => { if (!isPlainObject(item) || typeof item.type !== "string") return item; const validPrefix = validPrefixes[item.type]; if (!validPrefix) return item; if (typeof item.id === "string" && item.id.startsWith(validPrefix)) return item; if (!("id" in item)) return item; changed = true; const next = { ...item }; delete next.id; return next; }); return changed ? { ...body, input } : body; } /** * Codex-private tool fields that only the ChatGPT backend understands. * * A third-party Responses gateway validates its schema and rejects the whole request before * inference — xAI answers `Argument not supported: external_web_access` — so these are removed at * the noncanonical boundary while the tool and every public option stay. * * Keep this a table. Each private bit Codex attaches has so far arrived as its own bespoke strip * with its own traversal, and the traversals disagreed about which containers they covered; a new * one should be a row here instead. `toolTypes` omitted means the field is private on any tool. */ const CANONICAL_ONLY_TOOL_FIELDS: readonly { field: string; toolTypes?: ReadonlySet<string>; capabilityGated?: boolean }[] = [ // ChatGPT's browsing policy bit. The public hosted tool is enabled by its presence alone. // OWNERSHIP: official OpenAI API-key traffic and unclassified gateways ACCEPT this field, so // it is only stripped when the provider capability denies it (supportsOpenAiWebSearchToolFields // === false), matching stripOpenAiOnlyWebSearchFields; see // tests/responses/responses-routed-web-search-fields.test.ts. { field: "external_web_access", toolTypes: new Set(["web_search", "web_search_preview"]), capabilityGated: true }, // Deferred-discovery marker. `activateDeferredTool` clears it only for tools a `tool_search_output` // already loaded, so a still-deferred declaration — including one promoted out of a namespace // group — otherwise reaches the wire carrying it. { field: "defer_loading" }, ]; export function stripCanonicalOnlyToolFields(body: unknown, includeCapabilityGated: boolean): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body)) return body; const rewriteTools = (tools: unknown[]): unknown[] => { let changed = false; const rewritten = tools.map(tool => { if (!isPlainObject(tool)) return tool; let next = tool; for (const { field, toolTypes, capabilityGated } of CANONICAL_ONLY_TOOL_FIELDS) { if (capabilityGated && !includeCapabilityGated) continue; if (!Object.hasOwn(next, field)) continue; if (toolTypes && (typeof next.type !== "string" || !toolTypes.has(next.type))) continue; const { [field]: _private, ...rest } = next; next = rest; } if (next === tool) return tool; changed = true; return next; }); return changed ? rewritten : tools; }; let rewrittenBody = body; if (Array.isArray(body.tools)) { const tools = rewriteTools(body.tools); if (tools !== body.tools) rewrittenBody = { ...rewrittenBody, tools }; } if (!Array.isArray(body.input)) return rewrittenBody; let input: unknown[] | undefined; for (let index = 0; index < body.input.length; index += 1) { const item = body.input[index]; if (!isPlainObject(item) || item.type !== "additional_tools" || !Array.isArray(item.tools)) continue; const tools = rewriteTools(item.tools); if (tools === item.tools) continue; input ??= [...body.input]; input[index] = { ...item, tools }; } return input ? { ...rewrittenBody, input } : rewrittenBody; } /** * Codex keeps this ChatGPT-internal item metadata when its configured provider name is `openai`. * Loopback OpenCodex injection intentionally retains that provider identity for history continuity, * even when the proxy ultimately routes the request to a public Responses destination. Those * destinations reject the private field as an unknown `input[*]` parameter, so remove it at the * noncanonical boundary without mutating the caller-owned raw body. */ export function stripInternalChatMessageMetadataPassthrough(body: unknown): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body) || !Array.isArray(body.input)) return body; let changed = false; const input = body.input.map(item => { if (!isPlainObject(item) || !Object.hasOwn(item, "internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough")) { return item; } changed = true; const next = { ...item }; delete next.internal_chat_message_metadata_passthrough; return next; }); return changed ? { ...body, input } : body; } /** * OpenAI-private TOP-LEVEL request keys, the sibling of `CANONICAL_ONLY_TOOL_FIELDS` one level up. * * Codex attaches these on the request body itself rather than on a tool or an input item, and gates * them on its own auth rather than on the destination URL. Loopback injection keeps Codex pointed at * its built-in `openai` provider, so the client still believes it is addressing the canonical * ChatGPT backend and keeps the key no matter where this proxy routes the turn. A Responses gateway * that validates its top-level schema then rejects the whole request before inference. * * Keep this a table, and keep it to keys a client is OBSERVED to send. It is not an unknown-field * sanitizer: a top-level key nobody has traced to a client is forwarded untouched, because deleting * it would silently drop a parameter some other caller means. */ const CANONICAL_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS: readonly string[] = [ // Cyber access program selector, new in Codex 0.155. codex-rs mints it from // `cyber_access_program::for_auth`, which filters on ChatGPT auth alone and never on the // destination base URL, and serializes it on the Responses request, the compaction input and the // WebSocket `response.create` envelope. No public specification defines it, so a strict // third-party gateway answers with an unknown-parameter error naming it, and every turn of that // thread fails (#4853). // // `codex_output_schema` is deliberately NOT here. In codex-rs it is the `name` of the JSON-schema // `text.format` object, not a top-level key, so listing it would delete a field this client never // sends and discard it for any client that does send it meaningfully. "access_programs", ]; /** * Remove the OpenAI-private top-level keys. * * The caller decides the boundary; see the call site in `passthrough.ts`, which applies this only * to a destination OpenCodex does not operate. Returns the input unchanged when no listed key is * present, so the common path allocates nothing and the caller-owned raw body is never mutated. */ export function stripCanonicalOnlyTopLevelFields(body: unknown): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body)) return body; if (!CANONICAL_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS.some(field => Object.hasOwn(body, field))) return body; const next = { ...body }; for (const field of CANONICAL_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_FIELDS) delete next[field]; return next; } /** * Sampling fields a model on the provider's `noStopModels` / `noPenaltyModels` list rejects on * every wire. Claude inbound translates `stop_sequences` into a Responses `stop` * (`src/claude/inbound.ts`), and a direct Responses caller can send penalties. Some listed models * only have the Responses wire (xAI grok-4.20-multi-agent-0309 answers Chat Completions with 400), * so the Chat adapter's omission cannot cover them. Returns the input unchanged when nothing is * removed, so the caller-owned raw body is never mutated. */ export function stripRejectedSamplingParams( body: unknown, provider: { noStopModels?: string[]; noPenaltyModels?: string[] }, modelId: string, ): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body)) return body; const dropStop = Object.hasOwn(body, "stop") && modelInList(provider.noStopModels, modelId); const penalties = ["presence_penalty", "frequency_penalty"].filter(field => Object.hasOwn(body, field)); const dropPenalties = penalties.length > 0 && modelInList(provider.noPenaltyModels, modelId); if (!dropStop && !dropPenalties) return body; const next = { ...body }; if (dropStop) delete next.stop; if (dropPenalties) for (const field of penalties) delete next[field]; return next; } /** * When `store` is false, the upstream API does not persist response items. Any item ID * forwarded in `input` is then interpreted as a reference to a stored item that does not * exist, producing a 404. Strip all item IDs in this case — `call_id` pairing is unaffected. * Matches codex-rs behavior (core/src/client.rs:918-925). */ export function stripItemIdsWhenUnstored(body: unknown, requireCustomCallIds = false): unknown { const repairCustomCallIds = requireCustomCallIds === true; if (!isPlainObject(body) || (body.store !== false && !repairCustomCallIds)) return body; if (!Array.isArray(body.input)) return body; let changed = false; const input = body.input.map(item => { if (!isPlainObject(item)) return item; if (repairCustomCallIds && item.type === "custom_tool_call") { try { if (typeof item.id === "string" && item.id.startsWith("ctc_")) return item; if ( typeof item.call_id !== "string" || typeof item.name !== "string" || typeof item.input !== "string" ) return item; const digest = createHash("sha256") .update(JSON.stringify([item.call_id, item.name, item.input])) .digest("hex") .slice(0, 40); changed = true; debugProviderDiagnostic("openai-responses", "xai-custom-tool-call-id-repaired", { hadId: typeof item.id === "string", }); return { ...item, id: `ctc_${digest}` }; } catch { debugProviderDiagnostic("openai-responses", "xai-custom-tool-call-id-unrepaired", {}); return item; } } if (body.store !== false || !("id" in item)) return item; changed = true; const next = { ...item }; delete next.id; return next; }); return changed ? { ...body, input } : body; } /** * Normalize replayed compaction items for the destination backend. * * A compaction item carries an `encrypted_content` blob the client replays verbatim on every later * turn, and only the backend that minted it can decode it. Proxy-minted `ocx1:` envelopes are * transparent base64 rather than encryption, so no upstream can read them and they always become * plain user messages. Native blobs have multiple possible minters, so a destination's ability to * decode its own blobs does not make a blob from a previous serving identity portable. On a known * identity mismatch the blob degrades to the same note the bridged parser uses, even when the * destination normally accepts native blobs. Without a known mismatch, the destination capability * keeps the existing behavior. * * A bare `context_compaction` marker carries no blob and is forwarded untouched. */ export function scrubOcxCompactionItems( body: unknown, destinationDecodesNativeBlob: boolean, threadServingIdentityChanged: boolean, ): unknown { if (!isPlainObject(body) || !Array.isArray(body.input)) return body; let changed = false; const input = body.input.map(item => { if (!isPlainObject(item) || !isCompactionItemType(item.type)) return item; const encrypted = typeof item.encrypted_content === "string" ? item.encrypted_content : undefined; if (encrypted === undefined) return item; if ( decodeCompactionSummary(encrypted) === null && destinationDecodesNativeBlob && !threadServingIdentityChanged ) return item; changed = true; return { type: "message", role: "user", content: [{ type: "input_text", text: compactionItemToText(encrypted) }], }; }); return changed ? { ...body, input } : body; }