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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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import { assertServerAuthConfig, corsHeaders, managementCorsHeaders, isAllowedRequestOrigin, isAllowedManagementOrigin, isApiAuthRequired, isLoopbackHostname, jsonResponse, admissionFields, resolveApiAuth, resolveResponsesApiAuth, requestPolicyView, type DataPlaneAdmission, type RequestPolicyView, safeConfigDTO, setCorsOrigin, withCors, withManagementCors, } from "../auth-cors"; // Header-safe by construction: a key id reaches a response header, so anything outside this // class could inject a header break or a control character into a response we control. const REMOTE_CATALOG_KEY_ID_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,64}$/; export const GUI_PAIRING_EXCHANGE_BODY_LIMIT = 4 * 1024; export const REMOTE_WORKSPACE_PAIRING_BODY_LIMIT = 32 * 1024; /** * Read at most `limit` bytes of a request body, or refuse. * * Returns null the moment the body is known to exceed `limit`, without retaining the excess. * `req.text()` cannot express that: it buffers to completion first, so a caller who omits * Content-Length or uses chunked framing decides how much memory the process spends. That * matters here because the one caller is an unauthenticated endpoint. * * limit+1 is the stopping point rather than limit, so a body exactly at the limit is still * accepted and only a genuinely over-limit body is rejected. */ export async function readBoundedRequestText(req: Request, limit: number): Promise<string | null> { const body = req.body; if (!body) return ""; const reader = body.getReader(); const chunks: Uint8Array[] = []; let total = 0; try { for (;;) { const { done, value } = await reader.read(); if (done) break; if (!value || value.byteLength === 0) continue; total += value.byteLength; if (total > limit) return null; chunks.push(value); } } finally { // Cancel rather than only releasing the lock: on the reject path the peer may still be // sending, and an uncancelled body keeps that transfer alive. await reader.cancel().catch(() => {}); } const joined = new Uint8Array(total); let offset = 0; for (const chunk of chunks) { joined.set(chunk, offset); offset += chunk.byteLength; } return new TextDecoder().decode(joined); } /** * Name WHICH configured credential was admitted, so a multi-key operator can attribute a * catalog read. * * Scoped to configured keys on purpose: an environment token or a loopback bind has no key * to name, and emitting one anyway would invent an attribution that does not exist. 200 only * — this route emits no validator and therefore never answers 304. * * An id that fails the header-safe pattern is omitted rather than sanitized, with one warning * that does NOT repeat the id: logging the offending value is how a malformed id becomes a * log-injection vector instead of a dropped header. */ export function withRemoteCatalogKeyId(response: Response, admission: DataPlaneAdmission): Response { if (response.status !== 200 || admission.kind !== "configured") return response; if (!REMOTE_CATALOG_KEY_ID_PATTERN.test(admission.keyId)) { console.warn("[remote-catalog] configured API key id is not header-safe; omitting x-opencodex-key-id"); return response; } response.headers.set("x-opencodex-key-id", admission.keyId); return response; }