UNPKG

@bitkyc08/opencodex

Version:

Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

81 lines (77 loc) • 3.6 kB
/** Hard cap for canonicalizing ANY item. Past it, the item is not comparable. */ const REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024; /** Depth ceiling so a pathologically nested item cannot blow the canonicalizer. */ const REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_DEPTH = 64; /** * Canonical, order-stable fingerprint for one input item, or null when the item cannot be * compared safely. * * Byte-counted DURING the walk rather than serialize-then-measure: a tool result can be * megabytes and this runs on the request path, so the point of the cap is to stop early, * not to discover afterwards that we should have. Object keys are sorted so two * semantically identical items cannot differ by key order alone. * * The cap applies to EVERY item. An `id`/`call_id` is additional occurrence evidence, never * a substitute for content equality, so an over-cap identified tool item is non-comparable * exactly like an over-cap message. */ function replayItemFingerprint(item: unknown): string | null { const out: string[] = []; let bytes = 0; const push = (text: string): boolean => { bytes += Buffer.byteLength(text, "utf8"); if (bytes > REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_BYTES) return false; out.push(text); return true; }; const walk = (value: unknown, depth: number): boolean => { if (depth > REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_DEPTH) return false; if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return push(JSON.stringify(value) ?? "null"); if (Array.isArray(value)) { if (!push("[")) return false; for (const element of value) { if (!walk(element, depth + 1)) return false; if (!push(",")) return false; } return push("]"); } if (!push("{")) return false; for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) { if (!push(JSON.stringify(key))) return false; if (!walk((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key], depth + 1)) return false; if (!push(",")) return false; } return push("}"); }; return walk(item, 0) ? out.join("") : null; } /** Non-empty provider-issued `id`/`call_id` on an item, else null. */ export function providerIssuedIdentity(item: unknown): string | null { if (!item || typeof item !== "object" || Array.isArray(item)) return null; const record = item as { id?: unknown; call_id?: unknown }; for (const candidate of [record.id, record.call_id]) { if (typeof candidate === "string" && candidate.trim().length > 0) return candidate; } return null; } /** * Number of leading stored items the client already carries verbatim, or 0. * * Requires an exact ordered run: every stored item must match the client input item at the * same index. Any not-comparable item aborts to 0 — skipping just that item could align two * different occurrences and manufacture a false positive, and a false positive here deletes * real conversation history. * * Known gap (FU-2): stored input can contain proxy-injected guidance the client never saw, * and ids repaired after recording. Those sessions do not match here and expand as before. */ export function clientCarriedPrefixLength(stored: readonly unknown[], clientInput: readonly unknown[]): number { if (stored.length === 0 || clientInput.length < stored.length) return 0; for (let index = 0; index < stored.length; index += 1) { const storedPrint = replayItemFingerprint(stored[index]); if (storedPrint === null) return 0; const clientPrint = replayItemFingerprint(clientInput[index]); if (clientPrint === null || storedPrint !== clientPrint) return 0; } return stored.length; }