@bitkyc08/opencodex
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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code
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text/typescript
/** Hard cap for canonicalizing ANY item. Past it, the item is not comparable. */
const REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024;
/** Depth ceiling so a pathologically nested item cannot blow the canonicalizer. */
const REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_DEPTH = 64;
/**
* Canonical, order-stable fingerprint for one input item, or null when the item cannot be
* compared safely.
*
* Byte-counted DURING the walk rather than serialize-then-measure: a tool result can be
* megabytes and this runs on the request path, so the point of the cap is to stop early,
* not to discover afterwards that we should have. Object keys are sorted so two
* semantically identical items cannot differ by key order alone.
*
* The cap applies to EVERY item. An `id`/`call_id` is additional occurrence evidence, never
* a substitute for content equality, so an over-cap identified tool item is non-comparable
* exactly like an over-cap message.
*/
function replayItemFingerprint(item: unknown): string | null {
const out: string[] = [];
let bytes = 0;
const push = (text: string): boolean => {
bytes += Buffer.byteLength(text, "utf8");
if (bytes > REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_BYTES) return false;
out.push(text);
return true;
};
const walk = (value: unknown, depth: number): boolean => {
if (depth > REPLAY_FINGERPRINT_MAX_DEPTH) return false;
if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") return push(JSON.stringify(value) ?? "null");
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (!push("[")) return false;
for (const element of value) {
if (!walk(element, depth + 1)) return false;
if (!push(",")) return false;
}
return push("]");
}
if (!push("{")) return false;
for (const key of Object.keys(value as Record<string, unknown>).sort()) {
if (!push(JSON.stringify(key))) return false;
if (!walk((value as Record<string, unknown>)[key], depth + 1)) return false;
if (!push(",")) return false;
}
return push("}");
};
return walk(item, 0) ? out.join("") : null;
}
/** Non-empty provider-issued `id`/`call_id` on an item, else null. */
export function providerIssuedIdentity(item: unknown): string | null {
if (!item || typeof item !== "object" || Array.isArray(item)) return null;
const record = item as { id?: unknown; call_id?: unknown };
for (const candidate of [record.id, record.call_id]) {
if (typeof candidate === "string" && candidate.trim().length > 0) return candidate;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Number of leading stored items the client already carries verbatim, or 0.
*
* Requires an exact ordered run: every stored item must match the client input item at the
* same index. Any not-comparable item aborts to 0 — skipping just that item could align two
* different occurrences and manufacture a false positive, and a false positive here deletes
* real conversation history.
*
* Known gap (FU-2): stored input can contain proxy-injected guidance the client never saw,
* and ids repaired after recording. Those sessions do not match here and expand as before.
*/
export function clientCarriedPrefixLength(stored: readonly unknown[], clientInput: readonly unknown[]): number {
if (stored.length === 0 || clientInput.length < stored.length) return 0;
for (let index = 0; index < stored.length; index += 1) {
const storedPrint = replayItemFingerprint(stored[index]);
if (storedPrint === null) return 0;
const clientPrint = replayItemFingerprint(clientInput[index]);
if (clientPrint === null || storedPrint !== clientPrint) return 0;
}
return stored.length;
}