@bitkyc08/opencodex
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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code
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text/typescript
/**
* POSIX census targets are hints, not execution authority. Walk each path before its
* first version probe, including symlink destinations and directory replacement
* authority. Only root and the SSH account may control traversed components; the
* final regular file must belong to the SSH account and have no foreign write bit.
* Sticky shared directories are safe only with the same ownership checks on their
* children. Keep the verified original spelling so package-prefix discovery and
* interpreter entrypoint semantics remain unchanged.
* macOS recorded hints are skipped: mode bits miss ACL grants and system ls can
* conceal ACL read failures. Its existing known-install discovery still runs.
* These checks do not defend against root or unrestricted same-account mutation.
*/
export const REMOTE_SERVED_PATH_TRUST = `served_path_info() {
stat -c '%u %a' "$1" 2>/dev/null || stat -f '%u %Mp%03Lp' "$1" 2>/dev/null
}
trusted_served_path() (
case "$1" in /*) ;; *) return 1;; esac
# A portable shell cannot prove macOS ACL protection from stat/ls output.
[ "$(uname -s 2>/dev/null)" = Linux ] || return 1
served_uid=$(id -u 2>/dev/null) || return 1
case "$served_uid" in ''|*[!0-9]*) return 1;; esac
original=$1; pending=\${1#/}; resolved=/; steps=0; links=0
# The root is trusted only after the same ownership/mode validation as each directory.
component=/
while :; do
steps=$((steps + 1)); [ "$steps" -le 512 ] || return 1
info=$(served_path_info "$component") || return 1
case "$info" in ''|*[!0-9[:blank:]]*) return 1;; esac
set -- $info
[ "$#" -eq 2 ] || return 1
case "$2" in ''|*[!0-7]*) return 1;; esac
[ "\${#2}" -le 4 ] || return 1
[ "$1" = "$served_uid" ] || [ "$1" = 0 ] || return 1
if [ -L "$component" ]; then
links=$((links + 1)); [ "$links" -le 40 ] || return 1
# Preserve trailing newlines in a link target instead of validating a different path.
target=$(readlink "$component" 2>/dev/null && printf '.') || return 1
target=\${target%.}
case "$target" in *'
') target=\${target%?};; *) return 1;; esac
case "$target" in ''|*'
'*) return 1;; esac
[ -z "$pending" ] || target=$target/$pending
case "$target" in /*) resolved=/; pending=\${target#/};; *) pending=$target;; esac
elif [ -d "$component" ]; then
# Group/world write is allowed only on a trusted sticky directory. Its next
# entry must still be root/account-owned, so another account cannot replace it.
[ $((0$2 & 0022)) -eq 0 ] || [ $((0$2 & 01000)) -ne 0 ] || return 1
resolved=$component
else
[ -z "$pending" ] && [ -f "$component" ] || return 1
[ "$1" = "$served_uid" ] && [ $((0$2 & 0022)) -eq 0 ] || return 1
printf '%s\\n' "$original"
return 0
fi
while :; do
[ -n "$pending" ] || return 1
name=\${pending%%/*}
case "$pending" in */*) pending=\${pending#*/};; *) pending=;; esac
case "$name" in
''|.) continue;;
..) resolved=\${resolved%/*}; [ -n "$resolved" ] || resolved=/; continue;;
esac
component=\${resolved%/}/$name
break
done
done
)
`;