@bitkyc08/opencodex
Version:
Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code
465 lines (434 loc) • 24.2 kB
text/typescript
/**
* Fail-closed protection for the user's REAL OpenCodex home while tests run.
*
* A management-route unit test once passed an in-memory fixture config to a handler
* that persisted it through the process-global writer, replacing a live 41KB,
* ten-provider `~/.opencodex/config.json` with an 874-byte fixture on a real machine.
* Credentials survived only because the store files are separate; the providers were
* recoverable only because an unrelated backup snapshot happened to exist.
* (devlog `_plan/260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070`.)
*
* Two properties matter more than breadth here:
*
* 1. It must be INERT in production. Guessing "am I a test?" from ecosystem variables
* like NODE_ENV would brick `NODE_ENV=test ocx ...` for a user who did nothing
* wrong — worse than the bug it prevents. Arming requires OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=1,
* which this repository's test preload sets, or a process whose entry module is a
* Bun test file (see {@link isBunTestFileProcess}); no production entrypoint is one.
* 2. It must fail CLOSED for code nobody has written yet. So it denies ONE path — the
* captured production home — instead of allow-listing known-good test directories.
* An allowlist would have to be opted into, and the test that forgets is exactly
* how this incident happened.
*/
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve, sep } from "node:path";
import { realpathSync } from "node:fs";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
const GUARD_ENV = "OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD";
/**
* Set by `scripts/test.ts` to the ORIGINAL home before it hands the child a rewritten
* HOME. On that path `homedir()` already points at the sandbox by the time this module
* loads, so the true home is only knowable from this hand-off.
*/
const REAL_HOME_ENV = "OCX_REAL_HOME";
/** Set by `scripts/test.ts` to the developer's own Claude config directory before it sandboxes one. */
const REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV = "OCX_REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR";
/**
* Resolve symlinks so two spellings of one location compare equal — macOS hands out
* `/var/folders/...` whose realpath is `/private/var/folders/...` — and so a path that
* merely *points* at the protected home cannot slip past a string comparison. A path
* that does not exist yet canonicalizes through its nearest existing ancestor, which is
* the common case for a config file about to be created.
*/
function canonicalize(path: string): string {
let current = resolve(path);
const unresolved: string[] = [];
for (;;) {
try {
return join(realpathSync.native(current), ...unresolved.reverse());
} catch {
const parent = dirname(current);
if (parent === current) return resolve(path);
unresolved.push(current.slice(parent.length + 1));
current = parent;
}
}
}
/**
* Captured ONCE at module load, before any harness replaces HOME/USERPROFILE. Reading
* `homedir()` later would return the sandbox and leave the real home unprotected — the
* guard would be perfectly inverted while its tests still looked green.
*/
const REAL_HOME = process.env[REAL_HOME_ENV]?.trim() || homedir();
const PROTECTED_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex"));
const PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex"));
/**
* The developer's Claude config directory: the default `<real home>/.claude`, plus their own
* `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` when they set one. `scripts/test.ts` hands the original over as
* `OCX_REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` because its child already starts with a sandboxed
* `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`; a bare run imports this module before the preload rewrites the
* environment, so `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` still holds the developer's value here.
*
* Claude agent sync prunes generated `agents/ocx-*.md`, and a bare `bun test` once did that
* to a live directory: Bun's `os.homedir()` ignores a HOME rewritten after startup (#6775).
*/
const REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS = [...new Set([
join(REAL_HOME, ".claude"),
process.env[REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV]?.trim() || process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim() || join(REAL_HOME, ".claude"),
])];
const PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES = REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS.map(path => ({
path: canonicalize(path),
lexical: resolve(path),
label: "the real Claude config directory",
}));
/**
* `~/Library/LaunchAgents` needs its own entry because HOME isolation does not reach it:
* `os.homedir()` reads the password database, not `$HOME`, so a macOS test that rewrites
* HOME still resolves `plistPath()` to the developer's real LaunchAgents directory. The
* launchd install tests were doing exactly that — replacing the live
* `com.opencodex.proxy.plist` with one whose token file, log path and Bun paths all point
* into a temp sandbox, for as long as the case ran. launchd holds its own parsed copy, so
* nothing broke until the job next restarted.
*/
const PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents"));
/** The production home this process protects. Exported for the guard's own tests. */
export function protectedHomeForTests(): string {
return PROTECTED_HOME;
}
/** The production Codex home this process protects when tests write native credentials. */
export function protectedCodexHomeForTests(): string {
return PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME;
}
/** The Claude config directories this process protects. Exported for the guard's own tests. */
export function protectedClaudeConfigDirsForTests(): readonly string[] {
return PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES.map(tree => tree.path);
}
/**
* The file names Bun's test runner discovers: `.test`, `_test`, `.spec` or `_spec` before a
* JS/TS extension. Under `bun test`, `Bun.main` names the test file being evaluated, in the
* main runner and in `--parallel` workers alike. Every production entrypoint — the CLI, the
* service daemon, the compiled sidecar (`/$bunfs/...`), a release script — has a different name.
*/
const BUN_TEST_FILE = /[._](?:test|spec)\.[cm]?[jt]sx?$/i;
/**
* Whether this process runs a Bun test file as its entry module.
*
* This exists for the run that never loads `tests/preload.ts`. Bun resolves `bunfig.toml` from
* the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY, so `cd /tmp && bun test <repo>/tests/x.test.ts` skips the
* preload: HOME stays real, OPENCODEX_HOME stays unset, and before this check the guard stayed
* down, so an OAuth save landed in the developer's real `~/.opencodex/auth.json` (#7407).
* Bun exposes no runner flag, and NODE_ENV=test is both settable by users and overridable by the
* runner's caller, so the entry file's name is the one signal that production never carries.
*
* A file passed by explicit path under a non-test name (`bun test ./scratch.ts`) is not
* recognised; every repository suite is a `*.test.ts`, the only name `tests/test-layout.test.ts` admits.
*
* The converse also holds: `bun run ./something.test.ts` arms, because nothing distinguishes it
* from the runner. That is accepted. Requiring NODE_ENV=test as well would exempt every developer
* whose shell exports another NODE_ENV (`bun test` keeps an existing value), reopening #7407;
* the cost of the false positive is a refused real-home write from a script named like a test.
*/
export function isBunTestFileProcess(): boolean {
const main = (globalThis as { Bun?: { main?: unknown } }).Bun?.main;
const entry = typeof main === "string" ? main : process.argv[1];
return typeof entry === "string" && BUN_TEST_FILE.test(basename(entry));
}
/**
* Armed when the preload (or a harness) set OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=1, or when this process runs a
* Bun test file and nobody set the flag. An explicit OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=0 is how a test case
* exercises the production branch of a guarded call, so it disarms even inside a test file.
*/
export function isTestHomeGuardArmed(): boolean {
const flag = process.env[GUARD_ENV];
if (flag === "1") return true;
if (flag === "0") return false;
return isBunTestFileProcess();
}
/**
* A test process that armed through its entry file publishes the flag, so the CLI and helper
* processes it spawns — whose own entry is not a test file — inherit the arming instead of
* writing the real home they also inherited. Runs at import, which in such a run happens before
* any test body. A production process never matches, so it never reaches the assignment. Any value
* but the explicit "0" opt-out is normalised, because an empty or stray value arms this process by
* name but would leave a non-test child, which cannot match by name, disarmed.
*/
if (process.env[GUARD_ENV] !== "0" && process.env[GUARD_ENV] !== "1" && isBunTestFileProcess()) {
process.env[GUARD_ENV] = "1";
}
/**
* Appended to a refusal when no preload ran, because the fix there is different: the test did
* not forget OPENCODEX_HOME, the whole run started from a directory without bunfig.toml.
*/
function missingPreloadHint(): string {
if (process.env.OCX_TEST_PRELOAD_PID !== undefined) return "";
return " This test process did not load tests/preload.ts — Bun reads bunfig.toml from the "
+ "current working directory — so nothing was sandboxed. Run bun test from the repository "
+ "root, or pass --preload <repo>/tests/preload.ts.";
}
/**
* Whether `dir` IS the protected production home, decided with the SAME canonicalization as
* {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}.
*
* For the caller that must FILTER the real home out of a candidate list instead of refusing
* one write: `serviceStatePaths()` in `src/service.ts` keeps a legacy
* `~/.opencodex/service-state.json` entry so an install made before OPENCODEX_HOME existed
* can still be found, and under an armed test process that entry is the developer's live
* record. Exported so that filter cannot drift onto a weaker comparison — `resolve()` alone
* calls `/var/folders/...` and `/private/var/folders/...` different paths, which is exactly
* how a macOS sandbox path slips past a string compare.
*/
export function isProtectedHomeUnderTest(dir: string): boolean {
if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return false;
return samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_HOME);
}
/**
* Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real OpenCodex home.
*
* Call FIRST inside a writer, before any mkdir/chmod/write, so a rejected write leaves
* nothing behind. Silent no-op when disarmed (production) or when `dir` is any other
* location, including a suite's own `mkdtemp` fixture — no registration required, which
* is what keeps the 54 existing suites that write config working untouched.
*/
export function assertNotRealHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void {
if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return;
if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_HOME)) return;
throw new Error(
`refusing to write the real OpenCodex home (${PROTECTED_HOME}) from a test process. `
+ "Point OPENCODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test, or inject persistence "
+ "instead of calling the global writer (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070)."
+ missingPreloadHint(),
);
}
/** The production LaunchAgents directory this process protects. Exported for its tests. */
export function protectedLaunchAgentsDirForTests(): string {
return PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS;
}
/**
* Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real `~/Library/LaunchAgents`.
*
* Same contract as {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}: call before any mkdir/write, and
* pass a DIRECTORY. A launchd test gives `installLaunchd` an explicit plist path inside its
* own fixture directory instead.
*/
export function assertNotRealLaunchAgentsUnderTest(dir: string): void {
if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return;
if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS)) return;
throw new Error(
`refusing to write the real LaunchAgents directory (${PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS}) from a test `
+ "process: os.homedir() ignores HOME, so rewriting HOME does not move this path. Pass an "
+ "explicit plist path inside the test's own fixture directory instead.",
);
}
/** Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real native Codex home. */
export function assertNotRealCodexHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void {
if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return;
if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME)) return;
throw new Error(
`refusing to write the real Codex home (${PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME}) from a test process. `
+ "Point CODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test before writing Codex files "
+ "(auth.json, the catalog, models_cache.json, the journal or config.toml)."
+ missingPreloadHint(),
);
}
/**
* Throw when an armed test process is about to write or prune inside the real Claude config
* directory. Unlike the OpenCodex and Codex homes this refuses descendants too, and callers pass
* every directory they are about to touch (the config root AND its `agents`/`cache` child), so a
* sandbox child that is a link into the real directory is judged by where it resolves.
*
* The protected roots are resolved at check time rather than at import, so a custom directory
* created after this module loaded still compares by its current identity. On macOS and Windows,
* whose default filesystems ignore case, paths compare case-insensitively: `.CLAUDE` is the same
* directory there. Comparing too broadly only refuses more, which is the safe direction here.
*
* Call FIRST, outside any best-effort catch, so a refusal is visible and nothing is touched.
*/
export function assertNotRealClaudeConfigUnderTest(...paths: string[]): void {
if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return;
const roots = currentClaudeConfigRoots();
for (const path of paths) {
for (const candidate of [canonicalize(path), resolve(path)]) {
for (const root of roots) {
if (!isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root, candidate)) continue;
throw new Error(
`refusing to write the real Claude config directory (${root}) from a test process. `
+ "Set CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR to a temp directory, or pass an explicit config directory "
+ "(for a server, startServer's managementApi.claudeAgentConfigDir).",
);
}
}
}
}
function currentClaudeConfigRoots(): string[] {
return REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS.flatMap(path => [canonicalize(path), resolve(path)]);
}
function foldPlatformCase(path: string): string {
return process.platform === "darwin" || process.platform === "win32" ? path.toLowerCase() : path;
}
/**
* Path equality as the default filesystem on this platform sees it. A not-yet-existing
* `.OPENCODEX` canonicalizes through its parent and keeps its spelling, so a plain `===`
* against the canonical home calls it a different directory on Windows and macOS (#7853).
*/
function samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(a: string, b: string): boolean {
return foldPlatformCase(a) === foldPlatformCase(b);
}
function isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root: string, candidate: string): boolean {
const parent = foldPlatformCase(root);
const child = foldPlatformCase(candidate);
if (parent === child) return true;
const rel = relative(parent, child);
// Only a leading ".." COMPONENT leaves the root, split on this platform's separator: a child
// named "..fixture", or "..\\fixture" on POSIX where a backslash is a filename character, is inside.
return rel !== "" && !isAbsolute(rel) && rel !== ".." && !rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`);
}
/**
* The trees a removal must never reach, and the reason each one is named.
*
* The writer guard above cannot help here. `rmSync` is plain `node:fs`: it calls no writer of
* ours, so no assertion of ours runs, and by the time anything could observe the damage the
* directory is already gone. On 2026-09-15 that is exactly what happened — a test resolved the
* process-global config directory and removed it, taking every OAuth login, the Codex account
* store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger with it.
*/
const PROTECTED_TREES: ReadonlyArray<{ path: string; lexical: string; label: string }> = [
{ path: PROTECTED_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")), label: "the real OpenCodex home" },
{ path: PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")), label: "the real Codex home" },
{
path: PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS,
lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")),
label: "the real LaunchAgents directory",
},
...PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES,
];
const PROTECTED_REAL_HOME = canonicalize(REAL_HOME);
const LEXICAL_REAL_HOME = resolve(REAL_HOME);
/** Canonical paths whose removal is refused. Exported so the guard's tests cannot drift off them. */
export function protectedRemovalTreesForTests(): readonly string[] {
return [PROTECTED_REAL_HOME, ...PROTECTED_TREES.map(tree => tree.path)];
}
/**
* Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent`, both already canonicalized.
*
* Containment is decided per path component, with case folded where the filesystem folds it.
* A prefix test on the relative path called a direct child named `..backup` "outside", so the
* removal guard let it through (#7853).
*/
function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean {
return !samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(parent, child) && isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(parent, child);
}
/**
* Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent` with case PRESERVED, deciding per path component.
*
* Only for the checkout exemption below, which LIFTS a refusal. Folding case there would let a
* running checkout at `~/.codex/worktrees/repo` exempt a distinct `~/.codex/worktrees/REPO` on a
* case-sensitive macOS volume. Protection decisions fold, because comparing too broadly only refuses
* more; an exemption must not, because the same breadth removes more.
*/
function isInsidePreservingCase(parent: string, child: string): boolean {
if (parent === child) return false;
const rel = relative(parent, child);
return rel !== "" && !isAbsolute(rel) && rel !== ".." && !rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`);
}
let checkoutRootSpellings: readonly string[] | undefined;
/**
* Both spellings of the checkout that loaded this module (`src/lib` -> repository root).
*
* Lazy so a production process, which never removes anything through this guard, does no work
* for it at module load. In a compiled binary the module URL sits under a virtual root, so the
* result names no real checkout and the exemption below can never apply.
*/
function checkoutRoots(): readonly string[] {
if (checkoutRootSpellings === undefined) {
let lexical: string | null = null;
try {
lexical = resolve(fileURLToPath(new URL("../..", import.meta.url)));
} catch {
// A non-file module URL names no checkout: no exemption.
}
checkoutRootSpellings = lexical === null ? [] : [...new Set([canonicalize(lexical), lexical])];
}
return checkoutRootSpellings;
}
/**
* Whether `candidate` is repository content of a checkout that itself lives inside `protectedPath`.
*
* A Codex-app worktree is a checkout under `~/.codex/worktrees/`, and forty suites keep their
* fixture directory beside the test file. Refusing every path inside `~/.codex` refused those
* suites' own cleanup, 863 failures in one run, although nothing there is Codex state. The lift
* is deliberately narrow: it applies to one tree, only when a checkout spelling is strictly
* inside that tree and the candidate is strictly inside that checkout. The checkout root itself,
* its ancestors and every sibling stay refused, and a checkout that merely CONTAINS a protected
* tree (one at `$HOME`, or the virtual root of a compiled build) never qualifies.
*/
function isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath: string, candidate: string): boolean {
return checkoutRoots().some(root => isInsidePreservingCase(protectedPath, root) && isInsidePreservingCase(root, candidate));
}
/**
* Why removing `target` is refused, or `null` when it is not a protected location.
*
* Three relations are refused, not one. Equality alone would still permit
* `rmSync(getConfigPath())` against a live `config.json`, and it would permit
* `rmSync(homedir())`, which takes the protected tree with it. So a target is refused when it
* IS a protected tree, when it sits INSIDE one, or when it is an ANCESTOR of one. The one lift is
* content of the running checkout when that checkout lives inside the tree
* ({@link isOwnCheckoutContent}); it never applies to equality or ancestry.
*
* Canonicalization is what makes a symlink useless as a bypass: a temp path that merely points
* at the real home resolves to the real home before any comparison happens. Each spelling is
* judged on its own and any refusal wins, so a link inside the checkout that resolves into the
* protected tree is refused through its canonical form.
*/
export function protectedRemovalReason(target: string): string | null {
// Both spellings are judged, not just the canonical one. Canonicalization is what defeats a
// symlink alias, but it also resolves the target away: if `~/.opencodex` is itself a link,
// the literal path a caller passed is the thing that gets unlinked, and only the lexical
// form still names it. Upstream Codex makes the same distinction in its writable-root
// handling, keeping logical and resolved forms side by side rather than collapsing to one.
for (const candidate of [canonicalize(target), resolve(target)]) {
if (samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, PROTECTED_REAL_HOME) || samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, LEXICAL_REAL_HOME)) {
return `the real home directory (${PROTECTED_REAL_HOME})`;
}
for (const tree of PROTECTED_TREES) {
for (const protectedPath of [tree.path, tree.lexical]) {
if (samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, protectedPath)) return `${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`;
if (isInside(protectedPath, candidate) && !isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath, candidate)) {
return `a path inside ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`;
}
if (isInside(candidate, protectedPath)) return `an ancestor of ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`;
}
}
// The Claude directory is judged like its writer guard: roots resolved now, case folded
// where the filesystem folds it, so an alias created after import is still refused.
for (const root of currentClaudeConfigRoots()) {
if (isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root, candidate)) {
// Same narrow lift as the trees above: content of the running checkout when that
// checkout itself lives inside the directory. Never the root itself.
if (foldPlatformCase(root) !== foldPlatformCase(candidate) && isOwnCheckoutContent(root, candidate)) continue;
return `the real Claude config directory or a path inside it (${root})`;
}
if (isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, root)) return `an ancestor of the real Claude config directory (${root})`;
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Throw before a removal that would reach a protected tree.
*
* Deliberately NOT gated on {@link isTestHomeGuardArmed}. `tests/preload.ts` is loaded from the
* `bunfig.toml` Bun finds in the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY, so a run started outside the
* repository leaves OPENCODEX_HOME unset and resolves the developer's real home. Such a run now
* arms through its test-file entry, but a helper launched as a plain script does not, and the
* incident was exactly this unsandboxed shape, so the refusal has to hold without arming.
* Nothing in production calls this; the callers are test helpers, where the only cost of an
* unconditional check is a path comparison.
*/
export function assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(target: string): void {
const reason = protectedRemovalReason(target);
if (reason === null) return;
throw new Error(
`refusing to remove ${reason} from a test process: "${target}" resolves there. `
+ "Create the directory this test owns with createTempHome() from tests/helpers/temp-home "
+ "and remove that handle instead (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070).",
);
}