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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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/** * Fail-closed protection for the user's REAL OpenCodex home while tests run. * * A management-route unit test once passed an in-memory fixture config to a handler * that persisted it through the process-global writer, replacing a live 41KB, * ten-provider `~/.opencodex/config.json` with an 874-byte fixture on a real machine. * Credentials survived only because the store files are separate; the providers were * recoverable only because an unrelated backup snapshot happened to exist. * (devlog `_plan/260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070`.) * * Two properties matter more than breadth here: * * 1. It must be INERT in production. Guessing "am I a test?" from ecosystem variables * like NODE_ENV would brick `NODE_ENV=test ocx ...` for a user who did nothing * wrong — worse than the bug it prevents. Arming requires OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=1, * which this repository's test preload sets, or a process whose entry module is a * Bun test file (see {@link isBunTestFileProcess}); no production entrypoint is one. * 2. It must fail CLOSED for code nobody has written yet. So it denies ONE path — the * captured production home — instead of allow-listing known-good test directories. * An allowlist would have to be opted into, and the test that forgets is exactly * how this incident happened. */ import { homedir } from "node:os"; import { basename, dirname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve, sep } from "node:path"; import { realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; const GUARD_ENV = "OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD"; /** * Set by `scripts/test.ts` to the ORIGINAL home before it hands the child a rewritten * HOME. On that path `homedir()` already points at the sandbox by the time this module * loads, so the true home is only knowable from this hand-off. */ const REAL_HOME_ENV = "OCX_REAL_HOME"; /** Set by `scripts/test.ts` to the developer's own Claude config directory before it sandboxes one. */ const REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV = "OCX_REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR"; /** * Resolve symlinks so two spellings of one location compare equal — macOS hands out * `/var/folders/...` whose realpath is `/private/var/folders/...` — and so a path that * merely *points* at the protected home cannot slip past a string comparison. A path * that does not exist yet canonicalizes through its nearest existing ancestor, which is * the common case for a config file about to be created. */ function canonicalize(path: string): string { let current = resolve(path); const unresolved: string[] = []; for (;;) { try { return join(realpathSync.native(current), ...unresolved.reverse()); } catch { const parent = dirname(current); if (parent === current) return resolve(path); unresolved.push(current.slice(parent.length + 1)); current = parent; } } } /** * Captured ONCE at module load, before any harness replaces HOME/USERPROFILE. Reading * `homedir()` later would return the sandbox and leave the real home unprotected — the * guard would be perfectly inverted while its tests still looked green. */ const REAL_HOME = process.env[REAL_HOME_ENV]?.trim() || homedir(); const PROTECTED_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")); const PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")); /** * The developer's Claude config directory: the default `<real home>/.claude`, plus their own * `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` when they set one. `scripts/test.ts` hands the original over as * `OCX_REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` because its child already starts with a sandboxed * `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR`; a bare run imports this module before the preload rewrites the * environment, so `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` still holds the developer's value here. * * Claude agent sync prunes generated `agents/ocx-*.md`, and a bare `bun test` once did that * to a live directory: Bun's `os.homedir()` ignores a HOME rewritten after startup (#6775). */ const REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS = [...new Set([ join(REAL_HOME, ".claude"), process.env[REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR_ENV]?.trim() || process.env.CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR?.trim() || join(REAL_HOME, ".claude"), ])]; const PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES = REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS.map(path => ({ path: canonicalize(path), lexical: resolve(path), label: "the real Claude config directory", })); /** * `~/Library/LaunchAgents` needs its own entry because HOME isolation does not reach it: * `os.homedir()` reads the password database, not `$HOME`, so a macOS test that rewrites * HOME still resolves `plistPath()` to the developer's real LaunchAgents directory. The * launchd install tests were doing exactly that — replacing the live * `com.opencodex.proxy.plist` with one whose token file, log path and Bun paths all point * into a temp sandbox, for as long as the case ran. launchd holds its own parsed copy, so * nothing broke until the job next restarted. */ const PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS = canonicalize(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")); /** The production home this process protects. Exported for the guard's own tests. */ export function protectedHomeForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_HOME; } /** The production Codex home this process protects when tests write native credentials. */ export function protectedCodexHomeForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME; } /** The Claude config directories this process protects. Exported for the guard's own tests. */ export function protectedClaudeConfigDirsForTests(): readonly string[] { return PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES.map(tree => tree.path); } /** * The file names Bun's test runner discovers: `.test`, `_test`, `.spec` or `_spec` before a * JS/TS extension. Under `bun test`, `Bun.main` names the test file being evaluated, in the * main runner and in `--parallel` workers alike. Every production entrypoint — the CLI, the * service daemon, the compiled sidecar (`/$bunfs/...`), a release script — has a different name. */ const BUN_TEST_FILE = /[._](?:test|spec)\.[cm]?[jt]sx?$/i; /** * Whether this process runs a Bun test file as its entry module. * * This exists for the run that never loads `tests/preload.ts`. Bun resolves `bunfig.toml` from * the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY, so `cd /tmp && bun test <repo>/tests/x.test.ts` skips the * preload: HOME stays real, OPENCODEX_HOME stays unset, and before this check the guard stayed * down, so an OAuth save landed in the developer's real `~/.opencodex/auth.json` (#7407). * Bun exposes no runner flag, and NODE_ENV=test is both settable by users and overridable by the * runner's caller, so the entry file's name is the one signal that production never carries. * * A file passed by explicit path under a non-test name (`bun test ./scratch.ts`) is not * recognised; every repository suite is a `*.test.ts`, the only name `tests/test-layout.test.ts` admits. * * The converse also holds: `bun run ./something.test.ts` arms, because nothing distinguishes it * from the runner. That is accepted. Requiring NODE_ENV=test as well would exempt every developer * whose shell exports another NODE_ENV (`bun test` keeps an existing value), reopening #7407; * the cost of the false positive is a refused real-home write from a script named like a test. */ export function isBunTestFileProcess(): boolean { const main = (globalThis as { Bun?: { main?: unknown } }).Bun?.main; const entry = typeof main === "string" ? main : process.argv[1]; return typeof entry === "string" && BUN_TEST_FILE.test(basename(entry)); } /** * Armed when the preload (or a harness) set OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=1, or when this process runs a * Bun test file and nobody set the flag. An explicit OCX_TEST_HOME_GUARD=0 is how a test case * exercises the production branch of a guarded call, so it disarms even inside a test file. */ export function isTestHomeGuardArmed(): boolean { const flag = process.env[GUARD_ENV]; if (flag === "1") return true; if (flag === "0") return false; return isBunTestFileProcess(); } /** * A test process that armed through its entry file publishes the flag, so the CLI and helper * processes it spawns — whose own entry is not a test file — inherit the arming instead of * writing the real home they also inherited. Runs at import, which in such a run happens before * any test body. A production process never matches, so it never reaches the assignment. Any value * but the explicit "0" opt-out is normalised, because an empty or stray value arms this process by * name but would leave a non-test child, which cannot match by name, disarmed. */ if (process.env[GUARD_ENV] !== "0" && process.env[GUARD_ENV] !== "1" && isBunTestFileProcess()) { process.env[GUARD_ENV] = "1"; } /** * Appended to a refusal when no preload ran, because the fix there is different: the test did * not forget OPENCODEX_HOME, the whole run started from a directory without bunfig.toml. */ function missingPreloadHint(): string { if (process.env.OCX_TEST_PRELOAD_PID !== undefined) return ""; return " This test process did not load tests/preload.ts — Bun reads bunfig.toml from the " + "current working directory — so nothing was sandboxed. Run bun test from the repository " + "root, or pass --preload <repo>/tests/preload.ts."; } /** * Whether `dir` IS the protected production home, decided with the SAME canonicalization as * {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}. * * For the caller that must FILTER the real home out of a candidate list instead of refusing * one write: `serviceStatePaths()` in `src/service.ts` keeps a legacy * `~/.opencodex/service-state.json` entry so an install made before OPENCODEX_HOME existed * can still be found, and under an armed test process that entry is the developer's live * record. Exported so that filter cannot drift onto a weaker comparison — `resolve()` alone * calls `/var/folders/...` and `/private/var/folders/...` different paths, which is exactly * how a macOS sandbox path slips past a string compare. */ export function isProtectedHomeUnderTest(dir: string): boolean { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return false; return samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_HOME); } /** * Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real OpenCodex home. * * Call FIRST inside a writer, before any mkdir/chmod/write, so a rejected write leaves * nothing behind. Silent no-op when disarmed (production) or when `dir` is any other * location, including a suite's own `mkdtemp` fixture — no registration required, which * is what keeps the 54 existing suites that write config working untouched. */ export function assertNotRealHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_HOME)) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real OpenCodex home (${PROTECTED_HOME}) from a test process. ` + "Point OPENCODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test, or inject persistence " + "instead of calling the global writer (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070)." + missingPreloadHint(), ); } /** The production LaunchAgents directory this process protects. Exported for its tests. */ export function protectedLaunchAgentsDirForTests(): string { return PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS; } /** * Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real `~/Library/LaunchAgents`. * * Same contract as {@link assertNotRealHomeUnderTest}: call before any mkdir/write, and * pass a DIRECTORY. A launchd test gives `installLaunchd` an explicit plist path inside its * own fixture directory instead. */ export function assertNotRealLaunchAgentsUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS)) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real LaunchAgents directory (${PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS}) from a test ` + "process: os.homedir() ignores HOME, so rewriting HOME does not move this path. Pass an " + "explicit plist path inside the test's own fixture directory instead.", ); } /** Throw when an armed test process is about to write the real native Codex home. */ export function assertNotRealCodexHomeUnderTest(dir: string): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; if (!samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(canonicalize(dir), PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME)) return; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real Codex home (${PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME}) from a test process. ` + "Point CODEX_HOME at a temp directory for this test before writing Codex files " + "(auth.json, the catalog, models_cache.json, the journal or config.toml)." + missingPreloadHint(), ); } /** * Throw when an armed test process is about to write or prune inside the real Claude config * directory. Unlike the OpenCodex and Codex homes this refuses descendants too, and callers pass * every directory they are about to touch (the config root AND its `agents`/`cache` child), so a * sandbox child that is a link into the real directory is judged by where it resolves. * * The protected roots are resolved at check time rather than at import, so a custom directory * created after this module loaded still compares by its current identity. On macOS and Windows, * whose default filesystems ignore case, paths compare case-insensitively: `.CLAUDE` is the same * directory there. Comparing too broadly only refuses more, which is the safe direction here. * * Call FIRST, outside any best-effort catch, so a refusal is visible and nothing is touched. */ export function assertNotRealClaudeConfigUnderTest(...paths: string[]): void { if (!isTestHomeGuardArmed()) return; const roots = currentClaudeConfigRoots(); for (const path of paths) { for (const candidate of [canonicalize(path), resolve(path)]) { for (const root of roots) { if (!isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root, candidate)) continue; throw new Error( `refusing to write the real Claude config directory (${root}) from a test process. ` + "Set CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR to a temp directory, or pass an explicit config directory " + "(for a server, startServer's managementApi.claudeAgentConfigDir).", ); } } } } function currentClaudeConfigRoots(): string[] { return REAL_CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRS.flatMap(path => [canonicalize(path), resolve(path)]); } function foldPlatformCase(path: string): string { return process.platform === "darwin" || process.platform === "win32" ? path.toLowerCase() : path; } /** * Path equality as the default filesystem on this platform sees it. A not-yet-existing * `.OPENCODEX` canonicalizes through its parent and keeps its spelling, so a plain `===` * against the canonical home calls it a different directory on Windows and macOS (#7853). */ function samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(a: string, b: string): boolean { return foldPlatformCase(a) === foldPlatformCase(b); } function isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root: string, candidate: string): boolean { const parent = foldPlatformCase(root); const child = foldPlatformCase(candidate); if (parent === child) return true; const rel = relative(parent, child); // Only a leading ".." COMPONENT leaves the root, split on this platform's separator: a child // named "..fixture", or "..\\fixture" on POSIX where a backslash is a filename character, is inside. return rel !== "" && !isAbsolute(rel) && rel !== ".." && !rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`); } /** * The trees a removal must never reach, and the reason each one is named. * * The writer guard above cannot help here. `rmSync` is plain `node:fs`: it calls no writer of * ours, so no assertion of ours runs, and by the time anything could observe the damage the * directory is already gone. On 2026-09-15 that is exactly what happened — a test resolved the * process-global config directory and removed it, taking every OAuth login, the Codex account * store, the service tokens and a 372MB usage ledger with it. */ const PROTECTED_TREES: ReadonlyArray<{ path: string; lexical: string; label: string }> = [ { path: PROTECTED_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".opencodex")), label: "the real OpenCodex home" }, { path: PROTECTED_CODEX_HOME, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, ".codex")), label: "the real Codex home" }, { path: PROTECTED_LAUNCH_AGENTS, lexical: resolve(join(REAL_HOME, "Library", "LaunchAgents")), label: "the real LaunchAgents directory", }, ...PROTECTED_CLAUDE_TREES, ]; const PROTECTED_REAL_HOME = canonicalize(REAL_HOME); const LEXICAL_REAL_HOME = resolve(REAL_HOME); /** Canonical paths whose removal is refused. Exported so the guard's tests cannot drift off them. */ export function protectedRemovalTreesForTests(): readonly string[] { return [PROTECTED_REAL_HOME, ...PROTECTED_TREES.map(tree => tree.path)]; } /** * Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent`, both already canonicalized. * * Containment is decided per path component, with case folded where the filesystem folds it. * A prefix test on the relative path called a direct child named `..backup` "outside", so the * removal guard let it through (#7853). */ function isInside(parent: string, child: string): boolean { return !samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(parent, child) && isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(parent, child); } /** * Whether `child` sits strictly below `parent` with case PRESERVED, deciding per path component. * * Only for the checkout exemption below, which LIFTS a refusal. Folding case there would let a * running checkout at `~/.codex/worktrees/repo` exempt a distinct `~/.codex/worktrees/REPO` on a * case-sensitive macOS volume. Protection decisions fold, because comparing too broadly only refuses * more; an exemption must not, because the same breadth removes more. */ function isInsidePreservingCase(parent: string, child: string): boolean { if (parent === child) return false; const rel = relative(parent, child); return rel !== "" && !isAbsolute(rel) && rel !== ".." && !rel.startsWith(`..${sep}`); } let checkoutRootSpellings: readonly string[] | undefined; /** * Both spellings of the checkout that loaded this module (`src/lib` -> repository root). * * Lazy so a production process, which never removes anything through this guard, does no work * for it at module load. In a compiled binary the module URL sits under a virtual root, so the * result names no real checkout and the exemption below can never apply. */ function checkoutRoots(): readonly string[] { if (checkoutRootSpellings === undefined) { let lexical: string | null = null; try { lexical = resolve(fileURLToPath(new URL("../..", import.meta.url))); } catch { // A non-file module URL names no checkout: no exemption. } checkoutRootSpellings = lexical === null ? [] : [...new Set([canonicalize(lexical), lexical])]; } return checkoutRootSpellings; } /** * Whether `candidate` is repository content of a checkout that itself lives inside `protectedPath`. * * A Codex-app worktree is a checkout under `~/.codex/worktrees/`, and forty suites keep their * fixture directory beside the test file. Refusing every path inside `~/.codex` refused those * suites' own cleanup, 863 failures in one run, although nothing there is Codex state. The lift * is deliberately narrow: it applies to one tree, only when a checkout spelling is strictly * inside that tree and the candidate is strictly inside that checkout. The checkout root itself, * its ancestors and every sibling stay refused, and a checkout that merely CONTAINS a protected * tree (one at `$HOME`, or the virtual root of a compiled build) never qualifies. */ function isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath: string, candidate: string): boolean { return checkoutRoots().some(root => isInsidePreservingCase(protectedPath, root) && isInsidePreservingCase(root, candidate)); } /** * Why removing `target` is refused, or `null` when it is not a protected location. * * Three relations are refused, not one. Equality alone would still permit * `rmSync(getConfigPath())` against a live `config.json`, and it would permit * `rmSync(homedir())`, which takes the protected tree with it. So a target is refused when it * IS a protected tree, when it sits INSIDE one, or when it is an ANCESTOR of one. The one lift is * content of the running checkout when that checkout lives inside the tree * ({@link isOwnCheckoutContent}); it never applies to equality or ancestry. * * Canonicalization is what makes a symlink useless as a bypass: a temp path that merely points * at the real home resolves to the real home before any comparison happens. Each spelling is * judged on its own and any refusal wins, so a link inside the checkout that resolves into the * protected tree is refused through its canonical form. */ export function protectedRemovalReason(target: string): string | null { // Both spellings are judged, not just the canonical one. Canonicalization is what defeats a // symlink alias, but it also resolves the target away: if `~/.opencodex` is itself a link, // the literal path a caller passed is the thing that gets unlinked, and only the lexical // form still names it. Upstream Codex makes the same distinction in its writable-root // handling, keeping logical and resolved forms side by side rather than collapsing to one. for (const candidate of [canonicalize(target), resolve(target)]) { if (samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, PROTECTED_REAL_HOME) || samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, LEXICAL_REAL_HOME)) { return `the real home directory (${PROTECTED_REAL_HOME})`; } for (const tree of PROTECTED_TREES) { for (const protectedPath of [tree.path, tree.lexical]) { if (samePathIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, protectedPath)) return `${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; if (isInside(protectedPath, candidate) && !isOwnCheckoutContent(protectedPath, candidate)) { return `a path inside ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; } if (isInside(candidate, protectedPath)) return `an ancestor of ${tree.label} (${protectedPath})`; } } // The Claude directory is judged like its writer guard: roots resolved now, case folded // where the filesystem folds it, so an alias created after import is still refused. for (const root of currentClaudeConfigRoots()) { if (isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(root, candidate)) { // Same narrow lift as the trees above: content of the running checkout when that // checkout itself lives inside the directory. Never the root itself. if (foldPlatformCase(root) !== foldPlatformCase(candidate) && isOwnCheckoutContent(root, candidate)) continue; return `the real Claude config directory or a path inside it (${root})`; } if (isSameOrInsideIgnoringPlatformCase(candidate, root)) return `an ancestor of the real Claude config directory (${root})`; } } return null; } /** * Throw before a removal that would reach a protected tree. * * Deliberately NOT gated on {@link isTestHomeGuardArmed}. `tests/preload.ts` is loaded from the * `bunfig.toml` Bun finds in the CURRENT WORKING DIRECTORY, so a run started outside the * repository leaves OPENCODEX_HOME unset and resolves the developer's real home. Such a run now * arms through its test-file entry, but a helper launched as a plain script does not, and the * incident was exactly this unsandboxed shape, so the refusal has to hold without arming. * Nothing in production calls this; the callers are test helpers, where the only cost of an * unconditional check is a path comparison. */ export function assertRemovalOutsideProtectedTrees(target: string): void { const reason = protectedRemovalReason(target); if (reason === null) return; throw new Error( `refusing to remove ${reason} from a test process: "${target}" resolves there. ` + "Create the directory this test owns with createTempHome() from tests/helpers/temp-home " + "and remove that handle instead (see devlog 260730_codex_rs_upstream_v2_live_handoff/070).", ); }