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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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import { X509Certificate } from "node:crypto"; import { mkdtempSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { tmpdir } from "node:os"; import { join } from "node:path"; import { resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe } from "../../lib/windows-elevation"; import { acceptsPickerAuthority, PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME, PICKER_HOST, pickerCaFingerprints, } from "./picker-ca"; import type { PickerTrustState, SecurityResult } from "./picker-trust"; /** powershell.exe argv result; alias so the two trust seams never drift apart. */ export type WindowsTrustResult = SecurityResult; /** Per-script options; fakes may ignore them, so single-arg fakes stay portable. */ export interface WindowsTrustRunnerOptions { timeoutMs?: number } /** * powershell.exe argv runner. A SecurityRunner satisfies this shape so macOS-style * fakes stay portable. The caller in picker-trust.ts only forwards an explicitly * injected runner and otherwise leaves this undefined for the Windows default. */ export type WindowsTrustRunner = ( args: readonly string[], options?: WindowsTrustRunnerOptions, ) => Promise<WindowsTrustResult>; /** Read-only argv prefix: no profile, no logo, no interaction. Used for inspection. */ export const WINDOWS_TRUST_POWERSHELL_PREFIX = ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command"] as const; /** Mutating argv prefix: the OS confirmation dialog must be able to appear. */ export const WINDOWS_TRUST_POWERSHELL_INTERACTIVE_PREFIX = ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-Command"] as const; /** Read-only inspection budget: a hung store lookup must never stall status checks. */ export const WINDOWS_TRUST_INSPECT_TIMEOUT_MS = 10_000; /** Interactive import budget: Root installs raise the OS confirmation dialog. */ export const WINDOWS_TRUST_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS = 120_000; /** * Removal budget stays bounded: predecessor cleanup also runs in headless migration * and startup paths where an OS confirmation dialog cannot be answered. A timed-out or * declined removal reports failure and is retried on the next explicit activation. */ export const WINDOWS_TRUST_UNTRUST_TIMEOUT_MS = 30_000; const OUTPUT_LIMIT = 64 * 1024; const TRUST_MARKER = "OCX_PICKER_TRUST="; const SHA1_PATTERN = /^[0-9A-F]{40}$/; const BASE64_PATTERN = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]*$/; /** Uppercase hex without separators, or null. Trust matches on this, never on the CN. */ export function normalizePickerTrustSha1(value: string): string | null { const normalized = value.replace(/[:\s]/g, "").toUpperCase(); return SHA1_PATTERN.test(normalized) ? normalized : null; } /** * Copy the environment minus every PSModulePath entry (case-insensitive). * The trust scripts are .NET-only so module autoload is pure cost and shadowing * risk: a PSModulePath entry can shadow resolution and stall process start on * hosts with a cold module cache. Nothing here needs a module. */ export function sanitizeWindowsPowerShellEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Record<string, string | undefined> { const out: Record<string, string | undefined> = {}; for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(env)) { if (key.toLowerCase() === "psmodulepath") continue; out[key] = value; } return out; } /** * Production runner: trusted System32 powershell.exe, hidden window, sanitized * module path, bounded runtime. Timeout and output-read errors kill the child and report code null * so callers map it to unknown/declined instead of hanging periodic status. */ export const defaultWindowsPowerShellRunner: WindowsTrustRunner = async (args, options) => { const timeoutMs = options?.timeoutMs ?? WINDOWS_TRUST_INSPECT_TIMEOUT_MS; let exe: string; try { exe = resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe(); } catch (error) { return { code: null, stdout: "", stderr: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) }; } let child: { kill(): void } | undefined; let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined; try { const proc = Bun.spawn([exe, ...args], { stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe", windowsHide: true, env: sanitizeWindowsPowerShellEnv(), }); child = proc; const pending = (async () => { const [out, err, code] = await Promise.all([ new Response(proc.stdout).text(), new Response(proc.stderr).text(), proc.exited, ]); return { out, err, code }; })(); const settled = await new Promise<{ out: string; err: string; code: number } | null>((resolve, reject) => { timer = setTimeout(() => { try { child?.kill(); } catch { /* already gone */ } resolve(null); }, timeoutMs); pending.then(resolve, reject); }); if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer); if (settled === null) { return { code: null, stdout: "", stderr: `powershell trust script timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms` }; } return { code: settled.code, stdout: settled.out.slice(-OUTPUT_LIMIT), stderr: settled.err.slice(-OUTPUT_LIMIT) }; } catch (error) { if (timer !== undefined) clearTimeout(timer); try { child?.kill(); } catch { /* already gone */ } return { code: null, stdout: "", stderr: error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error) }; } }; function base64Utf8(value: string): string { return Buffer.from(value, "utf8").toString("base64"); } /** A filesystem path carried as data, never as PowerShell syntax. */ function encodedPathExpression(path: string): string { const encoded = base64Utf8(path); if (!BASE64_PATTERN.test(encoded)) throw new Error("path encoding failed"); return `[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('${encoded}'))`; } /** Interpolated constants must not carry a quote or wildcard that changes the script. */ function psLiteral(value: string, label: string): string { if (value.includes("'") || /[*?[\]]/.test(value)) throw new Error(`unsafe ${label} for script literal`); return `'${value}'`; } function markerOf(stdout: string): string | null { const line = stdout .split(/\r?\n/) .map(entry => entry.trim()) .find(entry => entry.startsWith(TRUST_MARKER)); return line === undefined ? null : line.slice(TRUST_MARKER.length); } function currentUserRootStore(): string { return "New-Object Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Store('Root','CurrentUser')"; } function subjectLikePattern(): string { if (PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME.length === 0 || /['*?[\]]/.test(PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME)) { throw new Error("unsafe picker CA common name for script literal"); } return `'*CN=${PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME}*'`; } /** * Inspect script: exact SHA-1 lookup in CurrentUser Root, persisted-leaf chain build * against that root, plus DNS-name and validity checks. Emits exactly one marker * line and exits 0 (trusted), 1 (untrusted) or 2 (error). Read-only: trust is never * added or removed here; installation happens only on explicit activation via trust. */ export function buildWindowsTrustInspectScript(leafPath: string, wantSha1: string): string { const want = normalizePickerTrustSha1(wantSha1); if (want === null) throw new Error("picker trust fingerprint must be 40 hex characters"); if (leafPath.length === 0) throw new Error("picker trust leaf path must not be empty"); const host = psLiteral(PICKER_HOST, "picker host"); return [ "$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'", `$leafFile=${encodedPathExpression(leafPath)}`, `$want=${psLiteral(want, "picker CA fingerprint")}`, `$store=${currentUserRootStore()}`, "$store.Open('ReadOnly')", "try {", "$found=@($store.Certificates | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq $want })", `if($found.Count -eq 0) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'; exit 1 }`, "$ca=$found[0]", `if($ca.Subject -notlike ${subjectLikePattern()}) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'; exit 1 }`, "$leaf=New-Object Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2($leafFile)", "$dns=$leaf.GetNameInfo([Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509NameType]::DnsName,$false)", `if($dns -ne ${host}) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'; exit 1 }`, "$now=Get-Date", `if($leaf.NotBefore -gt $now -or $leaf.NotAfter -lt $now) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'; exit 1 }`, `if($leaf.Issuer -ne $ca.Subject) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'; exit 1 }`, "$chain=New-Object Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Chain", "$chain.ChainPolicy.RevocationMode=[Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509RevocationMode]::NoCheck", "$chain.ChainPolicy.VerificationFlags=[Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509VerificationFlags]::AllowUnknownCertificateAuthority", "$chain.ChainPolicy.ExtraStore.Add($ca) | Out-Null", "$built=$chain.Build($leaf)", "$root=$null", "if($chain.ChainElements.Count -gt 0) { $root=$chain.ChainElements[$chain.ChainElements.Count-1].Certificate }", `if($built -and ($null -ne $root) -and ($root.Thumbprint -eq $want)) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}TRUSTED'; exit 0 }`, `Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}UNTRUSTED'`, "exit 1", `} catch { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 2 } finally { $store.Close() }`, ].join(";"); } /** * Install script: imports the snapshot file into CurrentUser Root after re-checking * its thumbprint inside the script. Adding to Root raises the OS confirmation * dialog and that user approval is the install gate; the powershell.exe process * itself stays hidden and only the OS dialog is ever visible. */ export function buildWindowsTrustInstallScript(caPath: string, wantSha1: string): string { const want = normalizePickerTrustSha1(wantSha1); if (want === null) throw new Error("picker trust fingerprint must be 40 hex characters"); if (caPath.length === 0) throw new Error("picker trust CA path must not be empty"); return [ "$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'", `$caFile=${encodedPathExpression(caPath)}`, `$want=${psLiteral(want, "picker CA fingerprint")}`, "$cert=New-Object Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2($caFile)", `if($cert.Thumbprint -ne $want) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 2 }`, `$store=${currentUserRootStore()}`, "$store.Open('ReadWrite')", "try {", "$found=@($store.Certificates | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq $want })", "if($found.Count -eq 0) { $store.Add($cert) }", `Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}INSTALLED'`, "exit 0", `} catch { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 2 } finally { $store.Close() }`, ].join(";"); } /** * Remove script: verifies picker identity for every exact-thumbprint Root entry before * deleting any of them, then re-checks. Legacy picker roots need not match the new install profile. * Removal from Root raises OS confirmation like an install, so this runs on the * interactive prefix with a bounded 30s budget: predecessor cleanup also runs in headless * removal may prompt, mirroring the macOS keychain prompt on migration cleanup. */ export function buildWindowsTrustRemoveScript(wantSha1: string): string { const want = normalizePickerTrustSha1(wantSha1); if (want === null) throw new Error("picker trust fingerprint must be 40 hex characters"); return [ "$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'", `$want=${psLiteral(want, "picker CA fingerprint")}`, `$pickerName=${psLiteral(PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME, "picker CA common name")}`, "try {", `$store=${currentUserRootStore()}`, "$store.Open('ReadWrite')", "try { $found=@($store.Certificates | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq $want });", "foreach($c in $found) {", `if($c.GetNameInfo([Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509NameType]::SimpleName,$false) -ne $pickerName) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 2 }`, "}", "foreach($c in $found) { $store.Remove($c) } } finally { $store.Close() }", `$check=${currentUserRootStore()}`, "$check.Open('ReadOnly')", "try { $left=@($check.Certificates | Where-Object { $_.Thumbprint -eq $want });", `if($left.Count -eq 0) { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}REMOVED'; exit 0 }`, `Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 1 } finally { $check.Close() }`, `} catch { Write-Output '${TRUST_MARKER}ERROR'; exit 2 }`, ].join(";"); } function powershellArgs(script: string, interactive: boolean): string[] { const prefix = interactive ? WINDOWS_TRUST_POWERSHELL_INTERACTIVE_PREFIX : WINDOWS_TRUST_POWERSHELL_PREFIX; return [...prefix, script]; } export async function inspectPickerTrustWindows( leafPath: string, caSha1: string, run?: WindowsTrustRunner, ): Promise<PickerTrustState> { if (normalizePickerTrustSha1(caSha1) === null || leafPath.length === 0) return "untrusted"; const exec = run ?? defaultWindowsPowerShellRunner; try { const result = await exec(powershellArgs(buildWindowsTrustInspectScript(leafPath, caSha1), false), { timeoutMs: WINDOWS_TRUST_INSPECT_TIMEOUT_MS, }); if (result.code === 0 && markerOf(result.stdout) === "TRUSTED") return "trusted"; if (result.code === 1 && markerOf(result.stdout) === "UNTRUSTED") return "untrusted"; return "unknown"; } catch { return "unknown"; } } export async function trustPickerCaWindows( caPath: string, run?: WindowsTrustRunner, cert?: { pem?: string }, ): Promise<{ ok: boolean; reason?: "unsupported" | "declined_or_failed" }> { // The caller gates this on explicit activation; status and restart paths never call it. // The installed bytes are always a private snapshot of the authority authorized here, // never the shared ca.pem a same-user process could swap mid-flight. const exec = run ?? defaultWindowsPowerShellRunner; let privateDir: string | undefined; try { let pem = cert?.pem; if (pem === undefined) pem = readFileSync(caPath, "utf8"); if (!acceptsPickerAuthority(pem)) return { ok: false, reason: "declined_or_failed" }; const { sha1 } = pickerCaFingerprints(pem); privateDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ocx-picker-ca-win-")); const snapshot = join(privateDir, "ca.pem"); writeFileSync(snapshot, pem, { mode: 0o600 }); const result = await exec(powershellArgs(buildWindowsTrustInstallScript(snapshot, sha1), true), { timeoutMs: WINDOWS_TRUST_IMPORT_TIMEOUT_MS, }); return result.code === 0 && markerOf(result.stdout) === "INSTALLED" ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, reason: "declined_or_failed" }; } catch { return { ok: false, reason: "declined_or_failed" }; } finally { if (privateDir !== undefined) rmSync(privateDir, { recursive: true, force: true }); } } export async function untrustPickerCaWindows( fingerprintSha1: string, run?: WindowsTrustRunner, cert?: { pem: string }, ): Promise<{ ok: boolean }> { const exec = run ?? defaultWindowsPowerShellRunner; if (normalizePickerTrustSha1(fingerprintSha1) === null) return { ok: false }; try { // Public recovery state is not removal authority. Accept legacy picker roots, // but reject foreign certificates before invoking even an injected runner. if (cert) { const root = new X509Certificate(cert.pem); const names = root.subject.split("\n"); if (!root.ca || !names.includes(`CN=${PICKER_CA_COMMON_NAME}`) || names.filter(name => name.startsWith("CN=")).length !== 1 || root.issuer !== root.subject || !root.verify(root.publicKey) || pickerCaFingerprints(cert.pem).sha1 !== normalizePickerTrustSha1(fingerprintSha1)) return { ok: false }; } const result = await exec(powershellArgs(buildWindowsTrustRemoveScript(fingerprintSha1), true), { timeoutMs: WINDOWS_TRUST_UNTRUST_TIMEOUT_MS, }); return result.code === 0 && markerOf(result.stdout) === "REMOVED" ? { ok: true } : { ok: false }; } catch { return { ok: false }; } }