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@bitkyc08/opencodex

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Universal provider proxy for OpenAI Codex & Claude Code — use any LLM with Codex CLI/App/SDK and Claude Code

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/** Strict local-CA policy layered on the shared Windows ACL hardener. */ import { resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe } from "../../lib/windows-elevation"; import { resolveCurrentWindowsPrincipal, WINDOWS_PRINCIPAL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../../lib/windows-user-principal"; import type { IcaclsResult } from "../../lib/windows-secret-acl"; type AclRunner = (path: string, timeoutMs: number) => IcaclsResult; const MAX_ACL_BYTES = 64 * 1024; const SID = /^S-1-(?:\d+-)+\d+$/i; function nativeAclRunner(path: string, timeoutMs: number): IcaclsResult { // Encode the path as data, not PowerShell syntax. SID-form rules avoid localized account names. // .NET only: Get-Acl/ConvertTo-Json/ForEach-Object are module-autoloaded cmdlets, and // autoload resolves them through the per-profile module analysis cache. With a fresh or // redirected LOCALAPPDATA that rebuild scans every PSModulePath module and can exceed the // inspection budget (hosted Windows runners: 30 s timeouts during `ocx start`); it also lets // a module earlier on PSModulePath shadow the cmdlet. SIDs, ints and booleans need no escaping; // the JSON quote is [char]34 so the -Command argument carries no double quotes to re-parse. const encodedPath = Buffer.from(path, "utf8").toString("base64"); const script = [ "$ErrorActionPreference='Stop'", `$p=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('${encodedPath}'))`, "$s=[System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]", "$q=[char]34", "$c=[System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlSections]'Owner,Access'", "if([System.IO.Directory]::Exists($p)){$a=[System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity]::new($p,$c)}else{$a=[System.Security.AccessControl.FileSecurity]::new($p,$c)}", "$r=foreach($x in $a.GetAccessRules($true,$true,$s)){'{'+$q+'sid'+$q+':'+$q+$x.IdentityReference.Value+$q+','+$q+'type'+$q+':'+[int]$x.AccessControlType+','+$q+'rights'+$q+':'+[long]$x.FileSystemRights+'}'}", "$o='{'+$q+'owner'+$q+':'+$q+$a.GetOwner($s).Value+$q+','+$q+'protected'+$q+':'+$(if($a.AreAccessRulesProtected){'true'}else{'false'})+','+$q+'rules'+$q+':['+(@($r) -join ',')+']}'", "[Console]::Out.Write($o)", "[Console]::Out.Flush()", ].join(";"); const result = Bun.spawnSync([resolveTrustedWindowsPowerShellExe(), "-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", script], { stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "ignore", timeout: timeoutMs, windowsHide: true, }); return { success: result.success, exitCode: result.exitCode, timedOut: result.exitedDueToTimeout ?? false, stdout: result.stdout.toString("utf8") }; } let aclRunner: AclRunner = nativeAclRunner; /** Native-result fault injection; production always uses the trusted bounded runner. */ export function setLocalCaWindowsAclRunnerForTests(next: AclRunner | null): void { aclRunner = next ?? nativeAclRunner; } export function assertLocalCaWindowsAcl(path: string, inspection: "owner" | "private" | "inherited" = "private"): void { try { const deadline = Date.now() + WINDOWS_PRINCIPAL_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT_MS; const current = resolveCurrentWindowsPrincipal(deadline - Date.now()).replace(/^\*/, "").toUpperCase(); if (!SID.test(current)) throw new Error("invalid effective SID"); const remaining = deadline - Date.now(); if (remaining <= 0) throw new Error("ACL inspection deadline"); const result = aclRunner(path, remaining); if (!result.success || result.timedOut || result.exitCode !== 0 || Buffer.byteLength(result.stdout) > MAX_ACL_BYTES) throw new Error("ACL inspection failed"); const acl: unknown = JSON.parse(result.stdout.replace(/^\uFEFF/, "")); if (!acl || typeof acl !== "object" || !("owner" in acl) || !("protected" in acl) || !("rules" in acl) || typeof acl.owner !== "string" || acl.owner.toUpperCase() !== current || typeof acl.protected !== "boolean" || !Array.isArray(acl.rules)) throw new Error("unsafe ACL owner or shape"); // Newly created empty entries can inherit broad grants. Verify the owner // before hardening, then require the complete private policy before use. if (inspection === "owner") return; if (inspection === "private" && !acl.protected) throw new Error("unprotected DACL"); const allowed = new Set([current, "S-1-5-18", "S-1-5-32-544"]); if (acl.rules.length === 0) throw new Error("empty DACL"); for (const rule of acl.rules) { if (!rule || typeof rule !== "object" || typeof rule.sid !== "string" || !SID.test(rule.sid) || ![0, 1].includes(rule.type) || !Number.isSafeInteger(rule.rights) || rule.rights < 0 || rule.rights > 0xffffffff) throw new Error("ambiguous ACL rule"); // Reject every unexpected nonzero Allow ACE, including inherited and tamper-only grants. // Deny ACEs confer no access. SYSTEM and built-in Administrators are the only exceptions. if (rule.type === 0 && rule.rights !== 0 && !allowed.has(rule.sid.toUpperCase())) throw new Error("unexpected ACL principal"); } } catch { // Never expose path, raw ACL output, account names or native diagnostic text. throw Object.assign(new Error("Local CA Windows owner/ACL inspection failed"), { code: "local_ca_path_unsafe" }); } }